Laurnaga & Co. v. Vélez

19 P.R. 275
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico·Decided March 17, 1913·No. No. 924·Published

Opinion

Me. Justice MacLeaey

delivered thé opinion of the court.

In this case the appellants nought to obtain an injunction to prevent the respondents from removing gravel from the river Culebrinas in the location where it bounds and passes through their lands. ' -

The allegations set forth in the petition for injunction may be briefly stated as follows: That the complainant company is the absolute owner of the rural properties described in the complaint under the letters “A” and “B”; that at a short distance from the rear of the buildings situated on that piece of land described under letter “A” is the river Culebrinas the banks (márgenes) of which are of no mean height, its waters having undermined the soil as far as the sides of the said buildings, for which reason the plaintiffs have been obliged to. engage yearly in the building of retaining walls as a protection against the grave damages to which the said buildings are exposed, especially at such times as the said river is in flood; that the defendants, without the consent and notwithstanding the 'protests of the complainant company, illegally trespassed upon the lands of the described property on the 22d, 23d and 24th of October last, taking-therefrom stones and gravel, digging and removing such material, in particular, from the. very spot on the edge of the river where the complainant company has constructed its dikes or retaining walls, thus increasing the risk of destructive damages threatened by the river aforesaid; that such [277]*277action of the defendants, if persisted in, will canse grave and irreparable damages to the complainant company inasmuch as the masonry foundations situated at the side of the said river will thereby be undoubtedly impaired or weakened, thereby entailing serious risks.

The petition seeking the injunction was properly sworn to and presented to the District Court of Agnadilla, and thereupon the said court on October 30, 1912, issued a preliminary injunction or restraining order previously requiring a bond of the plaintiffs in the sum of $500, which was promptly given.

On the first of November of last year the fiscal of the District Court of Aguadilla appeared in the name of and representing the Attorney G-eneral of Porto Eico on behalf of the defendants and presented a motion in which he prayed for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction which had been previously issued, alleging that the defendants were proceeding with the taking out of gravel from the river Culebrinas by order of the Commissioner of the Interior of Porto Eico and that said gravel was the property of The People of Porto Eico and that it was extracted loose from the surface with tongs at a distance of not less than thirty meters from the mound, upon which mound and at a distance of not less than seven .meters from its border there existed the foundations of a wall or fence of the house belonging to the plaintiffs, and that according to the Law of Waters and the Political Code the Commissioner, of the Interior of Porto Eico had authority to order the extraction of gravel from the beds of the rivers. The said motion was sworn to, under information and belief, by the fiscal and was accompanied by an affidavit of the defendant, Manuel Vélez, repeating and substantiating the facts set forth by the said officer.

On the hearing of the motion counter-affidavits were presented by the plaintiffs amplifying the facts set out in the petition for injunction and contradicting the affidavits filed in support of the motion for dissolution.

[278]*278The District Court of Aguadilla made au order on the 12th of November last dissolving the preliminary injunction which had been issued theretofore against the defendants on the legal grounds which are set forth in the said resolution.

The appellants allege in their brief that the District Court of Aguadilla erred in dissolving the preliminary injunction which had been issued in this case. As viewed by the appellants’ counsel, two questions are involved in the present case: One is the irreparable damage which may ensue to the plaintiffs caused by the extraction of the gravel in the location mentioned on the border of the river where the said plaintiffs have constructed retaining works in order to avoid the dangers which are threatened by the river to the establishments in their walls and foundations; and the second question, involved by implication in the first, is the right of the plaintiffs to the banks and margins of the river Cule-brinas which crosses the property of the plaintiffs as private property, and -the illegal entry of the said defendants upon the lands of the plaintiffs. On account of the alleged error said to have been committed by the District Court of Aguadilla the appellants pray this court to reverse the order of the trial court dissolving the preliminary injunction which had been issued and to leave in all its vigor the order of the said inferior court, which had been first made on the 30th of October last by which the petition for injunction had been declared sufficient and the plaintiffs to have a right to obtain it, and that an order may be issued by this court granting a writ of injunction against the defendants, with costs.

The respondents herein claim that they are improperly brought into this case as defendants and are merely nominal parties and that they have no interest in the action but are all employes, so to speak, and under the immediate orders of the Commissioner of the Interior; that they have nothing else to do than to obey the orders of their chief; that the only proper party to this proceeding is the Commis[279]*279sioner of the Interior and lie is a necessary and indispensable party; and they further set out as a matter of defense that three of the five defendants are convicts in the penitentiary working out their sentences at hard labor as laborers on the public road, and that one of the other defendants is the guard who has these prisoners in charge, and that the first of the five, to wit, Manuel Vélez, is the capataz in charge of the working squad at labor on the public roads. Respondents claim, through the fiscal of this court, that the mere fact that plaintiffs have omitted to make the Commissioner of the Interior a party hereto is a sufficient reason to affirm the order appealed from.

We do not think this latter is a correct proposition. The plaintiffs found five men at work on the river Culebrinas removing gravel therefrom. They were not required to ascertain under what authority they were acting, claiming, as the plaintiffs did, to be the owners of the land on which the gravel was found; and regarding the persons' removing it from the river as trespassers and nothing else, all they needed to do in order to bring their suit and seek for an injunction was to ascertain the names of the parties whom they found infringing upon their rights as they understood them. -If the defendants were not the proper parties against whom the injunction should have been issued, they had a right to set up that fact as a matter of defense, which they did in their motion to dissolve the restraining order, which was sustained by the court. The district court gives as one of the reasons for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction the fact that the plaintiffs in their petition for an injunction did not disclose all of the material facts, and omitted to state the authority under which the defendants were acting. No doubt this point made by the trial judge served as a basis for the contention presented by the fiscal which we have just noticed and overruled.

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Laurnaga & Co. v. Vélez, 19 P.R. 275 (prsupreme 1913).

19 P.R. 275 (Laurnaga & Co. v. Vélez) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.