Lauritzen v. Banner Mach. Co.

287 F. 692, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2375
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 13, 1923
DocketNo. 3700
StatusPublished

This text of 287 F. 692 (Lauritzen v. Banner Mach. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lauritzen v. Banner Mach. Co., 287 F. 692, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2375 (6th Cir. 1923).

Opinions

DENISON, Circuit Judge.

The bill filed in the District Court by appellants here charged an infringement of patent granted to them on March 11, 1919, as assignees of Nesbitt et al., No. 1,297,226, for a separable core used in building automobile tires. The District Court gave a narrow construction to the claims, whereby it resulted that they were not infringed. Claims 1, 2, 5, and 9 were in issue.

The device consists of two primary parts — the separable core and the locking ring. ■ The core is of solid metal, annular in form. Its [693]*693main part is cylindrical in cross section. It carries an inwardly projecting continuous radial flange, with a flat surface on one side, and having on this side a complete annular groove sunk into the flange surface to a substantial depth. This core and flange are divided into at least two parts by cuts, leaving between them a separable key section substantially less than half, and the cuts are at such an angle that the section is removable inwardly. The locking ring is of a size and form to fit the groove in the flange. It follows that, when the two sections of the core are placed together and the ring dropped into the groove, the two sections will be held together, and when the ring is , removed they will come apart. Thus the tire can be built and vulcanized upon the core, and when it is finished and the locking ring is withdrawn, the separable section can be moved inward out, of the tire, and the tire can then be taken off from the remainder of the core.

[1] It is obviously necessary that the ring should be held firmly against displacement while th.e tire is being formed. This had been done by a series of nuts and bolts, registering holes being provided through the ring: and the bottom of the groove to the other side of the flange. In these holes threaded bolts were inserted and the nuts placed thereon were turned down to make the device rigid, and when it was desired to have the core collapse, the nuts and bolts were taken out and the ring removed. It occurred to Nesbitt (we refer to both the joint inventors by the name of one) that the locking ring would be held with sufficient permanence in its effective position, if it were so constructed.as to make with the groove a driving fit, so that as it was forced into the groove it would bring the core sections tighter together endwise, and would stay in position until it was driven out again by a suitable reverse driving or other force. He experimented with this until he built it in an effective and operative form and found it successful. The'specific form in which he made his first working device, and which is shown in his patent drawing, provides complementary tapers upon the inner side of the groove and the contacting inner side of the ring, whereby in driving in the ring there is a wedge action between the ring and the flange, operating to force the coré sections together; but it is the patentees’ theory, essential to a finding of infringement here, that this tapered form of groove and ring was the specfic invention covered by claims not in suit, while the more generic invention consisted in the use of the ring with a driving fit, with no aid from other parts, and no matter whether the contacting edges of the ring and groove were tapered or were at right angles to the plane of the core — a self-retaining ring, effective by itself alone, as a core section retainer lock.

We have concluded that this broader idea involved invention, and was patentable over the old form, which used the bolts, and over other forms shown in the published art. The reasons which lead to that conclusion rather than the other are never demonstrative, and it is not profitable to attempt to state them at length. The change was undoubtedly of substantial utility; the older and less rapid and more complicated forms had been long in use; several different and apparently commercially unsuccessful attempts had been made to get something better; and when this improvement was made it received very [694]*694substantial, although not universal, recognition and acceptance. We think it should be deemed, under all the environment shown by the record, invention rather than mere mechanical skill.

We are satisfied, also, that claims 1 and 2 should be interpreted as not limited to the tapered form, but as satisfied by the straight-sided form. This conclusion results from a study of the language of the respective claims and of the proceedings in the patent office. For this purpose claim 1 may be taken as typical of the broader class. It is:

“A core of the character described comprising a plurality of separable sections having inwardly extending portions provided with grooves, which, in the assembled condition of the sections, provide an annular channel, and an annular locking ring adapted to be forced into and out of the said channel by substantially direct axial movement and to he retained in locking position by frictional engagement.”

Claim 8, on the other hand, expressly calls for “an endless taper ring,” and claims 3 and 4, among others, specifically call for “an annular wedge ring.” Unless there is something in the specification or patent office proceedings which forbids, it is a reasonably clear inference that the “annular locking ring” of claim 1 should not be affected with the limitation carried by the reference to the “wedge” and the “taper” form in the other claims cited.

The Patent Office proceedings rather confirm than dispute this natural inference. As the application was filed, all the claims were plainly confined to and recited the wedge elements. The application went into interference with three others, and after some months of delay the decision was in Nesbitt’s favor. Following the usual practice, and taking the benefit of the education gained by the interference, Nesbitt then added five more claims (4 — 8). One of these called for a taper, but the other four did not, and the references to the ring were substantially in the same form as in issued claim 1. Thereafter, and when the Nesbitt application had been pending for about two years, Yemiker filed an application, the only claim of which expressly called for a ring and groove with a complementary taper in each in the precise form which Nesbitt had stated to be his preference. An interference was declared between Nesbitt and Yemiker.- At the suggestion of the Patent Office, Yemiker had copied claims 1 and 8 of the .Nesbitt application, and these became counts 1 and 2 of the interference. Count 1 was the same as claim 3 of the issued Nesbitt patent (not now in suit). It expressly called for the wedge ring. A similar call and limitation in count 2 of the interference, being claim 8 of the Nesbitt application at that time, and claim 9 of the Nesbitt patent as issued, were not express, but it was eventually held by the Patent Office that they were implied. The interference between Nesbitt and Yemiker thus progressed, with issues limited to the specific form of taper ring, while all the time Nesbitt had in his application, and substantially allowed, the broader claims to the locking ring regardless of taper. That these underlying claims were possibly forgotten in some of the interference decisions cannot change the fact or its effect.

At this point we may well observe the distinction there is between the two forms of rings and their functions in this connection. When [695]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
287 F. 692, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lauritzen-v-banner-mach-co-ca6-1923.