Laurissa Wredberg v. Canvas Health, Inc.

Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-1897

Court of Appeals Procaccini, J.

Laurissa Wredberg, Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 12, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Canvas Health, Inc.,

Respondent.

________________________

Pamela Spera, Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for appellant. James Sherman, Wessels Sherman P.C., Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

SYLLABUS

1. The district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s whistleblower claim under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), because the sexual-assault- counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k)—which appellant alleges her employer ordered her to violate—applies only in an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” and appellant did not allege facts sufficient to show that she was ordered to disclose information under such circumstances.

2

2. The district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge, because appellant premised her claim on a violation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k), and appellant’s amended complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show that disclosing information to her employer would have violated that privilege.

Affirmed.

OPINION

PROCACCINI, Justice.

We are asked to determine whether a sexual assault counselor violates the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k), by disclosing information about a victim to the counselor’s employer without the victim’s consent.1 Appellant Laurissa Wredberg, a sexual assault counselor, alleges that her former employer, respondent Canvas Health, Inc. (Canvas), terminated her employment because she refused orders to disclose information about a victim to her supervisors. Wredberg sued Canvas, asserting a claim based on the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), and a claim for wrongful discharge under the common law. Wredberg grounds both claims on the premise that the disclosure of information about the victim to her supervisors would have violated the sexual-assault- counselor privilege. Canvas moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

1 We use the term “victim” throughout this opinion because that is the term used in the statute containing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.

3

relief can be granted. The district court granted Canvas’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.

As presented by Wredberg on appeal, both of her claims rely on the premise that disclosure of the information to her supervisors would have constituted an actual violation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Wredberg advocates for an interpretation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege that would prohibit all disclosures of information related to a victim without the victim’s consent, regardless of the context of such disclosures. But the plain language of the statute containing the sexual-assault- counselor privilege—along with decades of our case law interpreting that statute— demonstrates that the privilege is confined to disclosures in an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1. Because Wredberg has not alleged that she was ordered to disclose information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” she has not sufficiently alleged that a disclosure to her supervisors would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. As a result, the district court did not err when it dismissed Wredberg’s claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act or her claim for common-law wrongful discharge. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

Because we are reviewing the district court’s decision to grant Canvas’s motion to dismiss, we accept the allegations in Wredberg’s amended complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Wredberg, the nonmoving party. See Halva v. Minn.

4

State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021). We therefore recite the facts as they are alleged in Wredberg’s amended complaint.

Wredberg was employed as an Abuse Response Services Advocate at Canvas Health, a nonprofit organization that provides mental healthcare services in Washington County. She qualified as a “sexual assault counselor” for purposes of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege under Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k).2 Wredberg’s supervisors asked her to provide them with information regarding the whereabouts of “a particular minor client/victim.” Her supervisors told her that the information would be provided to “other members of the County” and was needed to “ultimately jail the victim.” Wredberg’s supervisors also told her about calls that they had received from a family member of the victim, law enforcement officers, the county attorney’s office, and the county probation office, all of whom sought the victim’s location and other information about the victim. Knowing that an arrest warrant had been issued for the victim related to “a probation violation as a runaway,” Wredberg refused to provide the information without her client’s consent. “Due to the information that [she]

2 We refer to the privilege afforded by Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k), as the “sexual-assault-counselor privilege.” See generally In re Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2022) (using the same nomenclature). And we refer to Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1, in general as “the privilege statute.” For purposes of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, a “[s]exual assault counselor” is “a person who has undergone at least 40 hours of crisis counseling training and works under the direction of a supervisor in a crisis center, whose primary purpose is to render advice, counseling, or assistance to victims of sexual assault.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k).

5

had received in her professional role about a criminal court having issued an arrest warrant for the runaway victim/survivor,” Wredberg was concerned that the information her supervisors were ordering her to disclose “would be used in criminal court proceedings against the victim/survivor and that records [Wredberg] produced would also be used in such proceedings against the victim/survivor.” Wredberg cited the statutory sexual-assault-counselor privilege as the basis for her refusal to disclose the victim’s information. According to Wredberg’s amended complaint, one of her supervisors acknowledged that Canvas was “trying to get [Wredberg] to violate her legal and ethical obligations to [her] client,” but the supervisor maintained that Wredberg “should [violate those obligations] anyway.”

The day after they made their initial request, Wredberg’s supervisors called her to a meeting where they again pressured her to disclose information about the victim. The supervisors continued to make clear that Canvas was “working with other people who were also not sexual assault counselors, including law enforcement, the county attorney’s office, and the county probation office.” As a result, Wredberg grew more concerned that any information she shared with her supervisors “would be used as evidence in criminal proceedings against the victim/survivor without their consent.” She again refused to disclose information about the victim, again citing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Canvas never contended that Wredberg was incorrect in her assertion that she could not legally share the information without the victim’s consent. When Wredberg’s supervisors paused the meeting for a lunch break, a law enforcement officer called Wredberg directly, asking her to disclose the whereabouts of the victim and threatening her with arrest if she

6

did not comply. Wredberg alleges that her supervisors “did nothing to help.” She refused the officer’s request but was not arrested.

A few weeks later, Wredberg’s supervisors asked her to disclose information about the victim for a third time. Again, Wredberg refused. Canvas then discharged Wredberg from employment.

Wredberg sued Canvas, asserting two claims.

First, she alleged that Canvas violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minnesota Statutes section 181.932. Although Wredberg’s amended complaint did not cite a specific subdivision within section 181.932, there is no dispute that her claim is based on subdivision 1(3),3 which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who refuses an employer’s order to perform an action when the employee has “an objective basis in fact to believe” that the action “violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation.” Wredberg alleged that disclosing information about the victim to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(k). Wredberg did not identify any alternative “state or federal law or rule or regulation” that would have been violated by the disclosure. See Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3).

3 In her amended complaint, Wredberg recites subdivision 1(3) nearly verbatim:

[The Whistleblower Act] prohibits an employer from discharging an employee on the basis of the employee’s refusal of an employer’s order to commit an illegal act when said employee informs the employer that the order is being refused because he/she has an objective basis in fact to believe that the ordered action violates state or federal laws or regulations.

7

Second, Wredberg asserted a common-law claim for wrongful discharge, citing our opinion in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). In Phipps, we recognized a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employee is terminated from employment “for refusing to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law.” Id. at 571. In addition to citing Phipps, Wredberg’s amended complaint also cited In re Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2022), a case in which we considered a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and emphasized the importance of confidentiality between a victim and a sexual assault counselor. Wredberg’s amended complaint alleged that Canvas’s decision to terminate her employment for refusing to disclose information about a victim “contravene[d] a clear mandate of public policy to protect the rights and safety of victims of sexual assault, including protection of victims’ privacy and confidential, sensitive information.”

Canvas moved to dismiss Wredberg’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e). The district court granted that motion, dismissing both of Wredberg’s claims against Canvas, and the court of appeals affirmed. Wredberg v. Canvas Health, Inc., No. A24-1897, 2025 WL 1733487, at *1 (Minn. App. June 23, 2025). Wredberg petitioned for further review as to the dismissal of both of her claims, and we granted her petition.

ANALYSIS

The question before us is whether either of Wredberg’s claims should have survived Canvas’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rule of

8

Civil Procedure 12.02(e). We review the grant of such a motion de novo and must “determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). A claim survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02(e) “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). When determining whether dismissal was appropriate, we “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 500 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we first review Wredberg’s whistleblower claim before turning to her common-law claim for wrongful discharge.

I.

As relevant to Wredberg’s whistleblower claim, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because “the employee refuses an employer’s order to perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law, and the employee informs the employer that the order is being refused for that reason.” Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3).

Although we have never interpreted what it means for an employee to have “an objective basis in fact to believe” under subdivision 1(3),4 the parties agree that

4 We have cited the phrase “objective basis in fact to believe” in Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), only twice, and we did not analyze its meaning in

9

Wredberg’s whistleblower claim depends on whether Wredberg’s disclosure of information about the victim to her supervisors would have actually violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Wredberg does not contend that “an objective basis in fact to believe” may require something less than being ordered to actually violate a law.5 Given the parties’ agreement and the lack of any briefing on the meaning of “an objective basis in fact to believe,” we assume for the purposes of this case only—but do not decide—that Wredberg’s whistleblower claim is contingent on her alleging that her employer ordered her to actually violate the law.

We further note that Wredberg relies exclusively on the sexual-assault-counselor privilege to support her claim that Canvas ordered her to violate the law. She does not point to any other law, rule, or regulation governing the conduct of sexual assault

either instance. See Ford v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 874 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 2016); Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 455 n.2 (Minn. 2006). 5 The parties’ position on this point is consistent with the analyses of the district court and court of appeals. Quoting Abraham v. Hennepin County, 639 N.W.2d 342, 355 (Minn. 2002), the district court explained that “to state a claim under [the Whistleblower Act], ‘the alleged facts, if proven, would constitute a violation of the law or rule adopted pursuant to law.’ ” And the court of appeals likewise held that “[t]o state a valid claim for relief under the act, ‘the alleged facts, if proven, [must] constitute a violation of [a] law or rule adopted pursuant to law.’ ” Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *2 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 355). Although both courts relied on Abraham, that opinion considered a different provision of the Whistleblower Act. See 639 N.W.2d at 355 (interpreting subdivision 1(a) of the Whistleblower Act, which is now labeled as subdivision 1(1)). Subdivisions 1(1) and 1(3) contain different language. Compare Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (protecting an employee who in “good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation”), with Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(3) (protecting an employee who “refuses an employer’s order to perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law”).

10

counselors.6 Accordingly, to assess Wredberg’s whistleblower claim, we consider whether she has alleged that the disclosure of information about the victim to her supervisors would have actually violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.7 The privilege statute, in relevant part, provides:

Subdivision 1. Competency of witnesses. Every person of sufficient understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence, except as provided in this subdivision:

….

(k) Sexual assault counselors may not be allowed to disclose any opinion or information received from or about the victim without the consent of the victim. However, a counselor may be compelled to identify or disclose information in investigations or proceedings related to neglect or termination of parental rights if the court determines good cause exists. In determining whether to compel disclosure, the court shall weigh the public interest and

6 It is unclear from the record whether a sexual assault counselor may owe other duties to a victim aside from the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. And because we confine ourselves to the allegations in the amended complaint, we do not consider whether a sexual assault counselor may owe other legal duties to a victim aside from the sexual-assault-counselor privilege pleaded in the amended complaint. 7 We note that the unique circumstances presented in this case require us to analyze the privilege statute from an unusual perspective. Typically, we construe the privilege statute in the context of parties seeking to suppress or obtain third-party discovery in an ongoing action or proceeding. See Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d at 657–59 (considering whether the sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibited the defendant’s motion for the victim’s therapist to produce records for in camera review without the victim’s consent); State v. Expose (Expose I), 872 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 2015) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the defendant’s therapist to testify about the defendant’s allegedly threatening statements without his consent at trial); State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 130–31 (Minn. 1984) (considering whether the physician- patient privilege prohibited the State’s motion for discovery of defendant’s statements made during group therapy sessions). This case is different because it involves the application of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, which prompts us to determine whether a disclosure by Wredberg to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.

11

need for disclosure against the effect on the victim, the treatment relationship, and the treatment services if disclosure occurs.

Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) (emphasis added). The statute also defines “sexual assault counselor.” Id. There is no dispute that Wredberg is a sexual assault counselor.

We first consider Wredberg’s argument that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibits the disclosure of victim information in all contexts. After clarifying the scope of the privilege, we then examine whether Wredberg sufficiently alleged that her disclosure to Canvas would have violated the privilege.8 A.

In her briefing to our court, Wredberg contends that “[t]he sexual-assault-

counselor privilege prohibits the counselor’s disclosure of privileged victim information, without the victim’s consent, beyond the context of testimony in a court action or proceeding.” Under her interpretation, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege protects more than oral testimony and also extends beyond the context of an “action or proceeding.” For the reasons set out below, we agree with Wredberg that the privilege encompasses disclosures apart from oral testimony, but we disagree that it extends beyond the context of actions and proceedings.

The scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2013). “The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the

8 Because the parties agree that this issue is dispositive as to Wredberg’s whistleblower claim, we need not address the sufficiency of other allegations bearing on that claim.

12

intention of the Legislature.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). When we interpret a statute, we generally begin by “examin[ing] the statutory language to determine whether the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity.” Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012). If “the language of a statute is clear, we apply the plain language of the statute.” Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624.

To the extent the court of appeals indicated that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege protects only oral testimony,9 such an interpretation is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute itself, which refers to the “disclos[ure of] any opinion or information.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k). Such an interpretation is also foreclosed by our case law. In Hope Coalition, we held that the statutory sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibits sexual assault counselors from disclosing privileged records in response to a subpoena from a criminal defendant, even for in camera review, “unless the victim consents or the court finds good cause in matters involving neglect or termination of parental rights.” 977 N.W.2d at 659. Likewise, in State v. Andring, we held that the statutory physician-patient privilege—which contains language similar to the sexual- assault-counselor privilege—prevented a physician from disclosing, in response to the State’s discovery request, a criminal defendant’s statements made during group therapy. 342 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Minn. 1984). Based on the statutory text and our case law, we

9 Wredberg notes that the court of appeals stated that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege “unambiguously applies only to testimony in a court action or proceeding.” Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *5 (emphasis added). But we acknowledge that in another section of its opinion, the court of appeals appeared to more broadly interpret the sexual-assault-counselor privilege as precluding the “disclos[ure of] victim information during a court action or proceeding.” Id. at *4.

13

agree with Wredberg that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege protects more than oral testimony, as it can also apply to the disclosure of records and other information.

But Wredberg’s broad reading of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege—that all disclosures without the victim’s consent are prohibited—goes too far. Adopting her interpretation would require us to deviate from decades of precedent related to the privilege statute. And it would also be contrary to the plain language of the statute, which limits the privilege to the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1.

In assessing whether the privilege extends beyond actions and proceedings,10 we note that “[o]ur previous interpretation of a statute guides us in determining its meaning.” Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W.2d 400, 404–05 (Minn. 2011). Although we have interpreted the various privileges in the privilege statute on numerous occasions, we have never construed any of them to apply outside the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.”11 Instead,

10 In our analysis, we use the terms “action” and “proceeding” as shorthand for the phrase “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” See Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1. 11 Although Wredberg contends that we held that the privilege statute prohibited disclosure outside the context of an action or proceeding in Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Associates P.A. (Expose II), 889 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 2016), as discussed below, we made no such pronouncement in that case. Aside from Expose II, the parties do not point to any cases in which we have applied the statutory privileges in section 595.02, subdivision 1, outside the context of actions and proceedings, and we appear to have applied those privileges only in that context. See, e.g., State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 753 (Minn. 2025) (concluding that the therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g) did not prohibit a

14

we have consistently treated those privileges as evidentiary in nature and emphasized that we construe such privileges narrowly. See State v. Expose (Expose I), 872 N.W.2d 252, 257–59 (Minn. 2015) (construing the therapist-client privilege as an “evidentiary privilege” and noting that “[w]e have long construed evidentiary privileges narrowly”); Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A. (Expose II), 889 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that “[t]he therapist-client privilege … is a statutory evidentiary privilege”); Larson v. Montpetit, 147 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 1966) (“[E]videntiary privileges constitute barriers to the ascertainment of truth and are therefore to be disfavored and narrowly limited to their purposes.”).

And we have consistently distinguished the obligations arising under the privilege statute from professional duties, such as duties of confidentiality, which may apply outside the context of an action or proceeding. For example, in Expose I, we held that the therapist-client privilege “does not create any affirmative duties for a psychologist or other mental-health professional, but rather simply creates an exception to the general rule that every witness is presumed to be competent to testify in court.” 872 N.W.2d

therapist from testifying at trial about the defendant’s statements to the therapist because the mandated-reporter exception to the privilege applied); Hope Coalition, 977 N.W.2d at 659 (holding that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k) prevented disclosure of records for in camera review in the context of a criminal proceeding); State v. Atwood, 925 N.W.2d 626, 635 (Minn. 2019) (holding that the physician-patient privilege under subdivision 1(d) did not apply to the defendant’s blood sample and test results and, consequently, the district court erred in suppressing such evidence at a pretrial hearing); Expose I, 872 N.W.2d at 259 (concluding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the defendant’s therapist to testify at trial because such testimony was prohibited by the therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g)); State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 41 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the marital privilege in subdivision 1(a) did not prohibit the defendant’s wife from testifying against him at trial).

15

at 258 (emphasis added).12 And in Expose I we also rejected the argument that the therapist-client privilege was “dilute[d]” when it was not applied to prohibit a third party’s testimony regarding privileged communications that a therapist had shared with the third party. 872 N.W.2d at 260. We noted that such an argument “confuses the [therapist-client] privilege with a therapist’s professional duty of confidence.” Id.; see also State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 765 (Minn. 2025) (Thissen, J., concurring) (“[The therapist-client privilege] should not be conflated with a therapist’s professional duty of confidentiality and the rules governing those obligations.”).13 Wredberg appears to be similarly conflating the privilege statute with professional duties of confidence. To accept Wredberg’s view that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege extends beyond actions and proceedings, we would need to accept an interpretation that we have never before adopted.

We decline to adopt a new interpretation because we are convinced that our past view of the privilege statute’s limited application to actions and proceedings is consistent

12 Wredberg’s asserted duty here—a broad duty not to disclose—differs from the affirmative duty to warn at issue in Expose I. That said, our reasoning in Expose I nonetheless applies here because it speaks to the narrow scope of the privilege statute. 13 The distinction between a professional’s ethical duties and their obligations under the privilege statute is important. For example, take the attorney-client context. Under the statutory attorney-client privilege, “[a]n attorney cannot, without the consent of the attorney’s client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to the attorney or the attorney’s advice given thereon in the course of professional duty.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(b). But an attorney is also bound by the ethical duties contained in the Rules of Professional Responsibility, which more generally require an attorney to “preserve the confidences and secrets of [the attorney’s] clients.” O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 1979). “This ethical obligation is broader than the attorney- client privilege [in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02].” Id.

16

with the Legislature’s intent as shown through the statute’s plain text. See Engquist, 803 N.W.2d at 404–05 (“Our previous interpretation of a statute guides us in determining its meaning.”). Wredberg treats the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k) as a standalone prohibition on disclosure that operates outside the context of subdivision 1. But we do not examine a statutory provision in isolation. State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). We “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015). Subdivision 1 of the privilege statute begins with the general rule that “[e]very person of sufficient understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence, except as provided in this subdivision:” and then lists various statutory privileges, including the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege and the other privileges listed in the subdivision plainly function as exceptions to the general rule stated in subdivision 1. See id., subd. 1(a–o); Expose I, 872 N.W.2d at 258 (noting that the therapist-client privilege “creates an exception to the general rule that every witness is presumed to be competent to testify in court”).

As we have repeatedly explained, “ ‘[a]n exception in a statute exempts from its operation something that would otherwise be within it.’ ” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC, 827 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting City of St. Louis Park v. King, 75 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Minn. 1956)); accord State v. Goodman, 288 N.W. 157, 159 (Minn. 1939). This means that an exception operates

17

within the scope of the rule it qualifies. See McDonnall v. Drawz, 3 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. 1942) (“An exception comprehends only subject matter from which the exception is made.”); Swedish-Am. Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 105 N.W. 69, 70 (Minn. 1905) (“The exception … must be construed with reference to the rule adopted and the reason upon which it is based.”).

Because subdivision 1 makes clear that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k) is an exception to the general rule stated in subdivision 1, the sexual- assault-counselor privilege operates within the scope of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” The sexual-assault-counselor privilege does not act as an independent prohibition on disclosure in other contexts.

For all of these reasons, interpreting the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k) to broadly prohibit disclosures to third parties in all contexts would be inconsistent with our existing case law and with the plain language of the privilege statute.

And, as we explain below, we are not persuaded by Wredberg’s other arguments in favor of a different interpretation.

First, Wredberg focuses on the Legislature’s use of the word “disclose” in the sexual-assault-counselor privilege as opposed to its use of the term “be examined” in some of the other privileges. Compare Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) (“Sexual assault counselors may not be allowed to disclose ….”) (emphasis added), with, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(b) (“An attorney cannot, without the consent of the attorney’s client, be

18

examined ….”) (emphasis added). But the use of the word “disclose” in subdivision 1(k), instead of the term “be examined,” does not support Wredberg’s broad interpretation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Even if we assume that “disclose” is broader than “examine,” the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is nonetheless still an exception to the general rule in subdivision 1, and it therefore operates within the scope of an “action or proceeding.” The Legislature’s choice to prohibit disclosures in the sexual-assault- counselor privilege, rather than examinations, does not change our analysis here.14 Second, the statutory language explaining that a sexual assault counselor “may be compelled to identify or disclose information in investigations or proceedings related to neglect or termination of parental rights” does not lend support to the privilege’s application outside the context of an action or proceeding. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) (emphasis added). This is because the “investigations” language plainly contemplates a court action or proceeding, specifying that a sexual assault counselor may

14 Similarly, Wredberg also argues that the Legislature’s 2007 change to the sexual-assault-counselor privilege demonstrates that the privilege extends beyond actions and proceedings. The Legislature amended subdivision 1(k) as follows: “Sexual assault counselors may not be compelled to testify about allowed to disclose any opinion or information received from or about the victim without the consent of the victim.” Act of May 7, 2007, ch. 54, art. 4, § 4, 2007 Minn. Laws 206, 256 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k)). We generally address statutory history only if we conclude that the statute is ambiguous. See State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 924 (Minn. 2019) (“When a statute is ambiguous, we may rely on the canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity …. We may ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering, for example, past versions of the law at issue.” (citation omitted)). In any event, as discussed above, the 2007 change in focus from testimony to disclosure does not undermine the conclusion that the plain language of the privilege statute nonetheless limits operation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege to the context of an “action or proceeding.”

19

be compelled to make disclosures in “investigations … related to neglect or termination of parental rights if the court determines good cause exists.” Id. (emphasis added). Further placing such investigations within the context of an action or proceeding, the statute goes on to describe factors that “the court” must consider when determining whether to compel disclosure. Id.

Third, we are also unpersuaded by Wredberg’s reliance on four of our previous opinions. As explained below, each of these opinions is consistent with our conclusion that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is limited to the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” We address each opinion in turn.

1.

Wredberg relies primarily on Hope Coalition, a case that concerned the sexual-assault-counselor privilege and how it “interacts with a criminal defendant’s interests in a fair trial.” 977 N.W.2d at 653. Wredberg correctly notes that Hope Coalition rejected a “permissive” reading of the phrase “may not be allowed to disclose” in the sexual-assault-counselor privilege that would have allowed courts to require disclosure in some circumstances. Id. at 658 (emphasis added). But we find little support for Wredberg’s assertion that our holding in Hope Coalition means that the sexual-assault- counselor privilege operates outside the context of actions and proceedings. In Hope Coalition we explained that “[s]exual assault counselors … are statutorily prohibited from disclosing privileged records in a criminal proceeding without the victim’s consent.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added). Our analysis was limited to the scope of the

20

sexual-assault-counselor privilege within a court proceeding. Hope Coalition does not stand for the broad proposition that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege prohibits a sexual assault counselor from disclosing victim information outside the context of an action or proceeding.

Likewise, our recognition of the State’s “compelling interest in protecting a victim’s privacy through the sexual-assault-counselor privilege” in Hope Coalition does not conflict with our conclusion that the privilege is limited to the context of an action or proceeding. See id. at 662. Our recognition of the State’s compelling interest must be understood within the context of our analysis in Hope Coalition. There, we considered whether the application of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege would violate the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. Id. at 661–62. To answer that question, we conducted a constitutional balancing test, weighing the State’s interest in protecting victim privacy against the defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. (explaining that “[w]hen the defendant’s constitutional right does not outweigh a compelling interest of the [S]tate, the privilege remains unpierced”). In recognizing the State’s compelling interest in prohibiting disclosure for in camera review in a court proceeding, we emphasized the importance of confidentiality to the counseling relationship. Id. at 661–62. Our recognition of the State’s “compelling interest” was in the context of a balancing test applicable to a defendant’s constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding. And our holding in Hope Coalition did not abrogate or conflict with the plain language of the privilege statute, which remains limited to the context of an action or proceeding.

21

2.

Our recognition in State v. Heaney that privileges have a “substantive component”

also does not support Wredberg’s interpretation that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege broadly prohibits disclosure. See 689 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Minn. 2004) (considering the physician-patient privilege). It is true that we observed in Heaney that evidentiary privileges are not like other rules of evidence and hold a unique place in the law. Id. In Heaney, we explained that “[u]nlike other rules of evidence that are concerned solely with the reliability of evidence and its ability to guide the court to the truth, privileges are an impediment to truth-finding.” Id. Privileges are different from other evidentiary rules because they are “created to substantively protect a particular type of relationship deemed valuable to society in general.” Id. In other words, statutory privileges exist because the Legislature has determined that protecting certain relationships is, in some circumstances, more important than obtaining complete information in court proceedings. See id.

But our recognition of an evidentiary privilege’s “substantive component” does not expand its legal effect beyond its evidentiary function in actions and proceedings. Wredberg has not provided authority for the proposition that the substantive interests underlying an evidentiary privilege can serve to convert that privilege into a regulation of conduct outside of actions and proceedings. And nothing in Heaney itself suggests that evidentiary privileges impose freestanding confidentiality obligations detached from actions and proceedings. Rather, Heaney situates its discussion of privileges within the law of evidence. See id. at 171–74 (considering, in a conflict of laws context, whether

22

blood-alcohol evidence should be suppressed in a criminal proceeding due to Minnesota’s physician-patient privilege statute).

3.

Wredberg’s reliance on Expose I is similarly unpersuasive because the propositions upon which she relies do not apply here. In Expose I, we considered whether the therapist-client privilege in Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(g), contains a “threats exception” in light of a therapist’s statutory duty to warn about serious physical threats.15 872 N.W.2d at 257–59. We declined to recognize such an exception. Id. at 258. Relying on Expose I for the proposition that courts cannot make exceptions to privileges, Wredberg argues that the court of appeals created an improper “workplace communications exception” to the sexual-assault-counselor privilege by holding that her allegations did not amount to a violation of the privilege. But concluding that Wredberg’s allegations simply fall outside the scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege is not equivalent to creating an exception to that privilege.

4.

Finally, we disagree with Wredberg’s assertion that we prohibited the disclosure of privileged information in an out-of-court context in Expose II. In that case, we held that the judicial proceedings privilege16 did not shield a therapist from liability for her

15 The therapist-client privilege in subdivision 1(g), like the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in subdivision 1(k), is an exception to the general operative language in subdivision 1. 16 The judicial proceedings privilege shields judges, judicial officers, attorneys, and witnesses from liability for statements made in judicial proceedings. See Mahoney &

23

out-of-court statements—specifically, statements made to law enforcement during an investigation and to prosecutors when preparing for her testimony at trial. 889 N.W.2d at 286–87. Here, Wredberg relies on our statement expressing our agreement with the court of appeals that “the purpose of the therapist-client privilege (to keep information concealed) and the purpose of the [judicial proceedings] privilege (to reveal information) are ‘so contrary and inconsistent that applying the [judicial proceedings] privilege effectively would defeat the [therapist-client] privilege.’ ” Id. at 287 (quoting Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P.A., 863 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Minn. App. 2015)).

Wredberg contends that this language “prohibits” the disclosure of privileged information “to law enforcement … outside the context of testimony in court.” But we had no occasion to reach such a holding in Expose II. Rather, in Expose II, we were assessing only the applicability of the judicial proceedings privilege. In doing so, we explained that before deciding whether to apply that privilege, “we determine whether there are competing policy interests that would counsel against [its] application.” Id. at 286 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is within that context— evaluating competing policy interests—that we discussed the substantive component of the therapist-client privilege. Id. at 287. Specifically, in the language highlighted by Wredberg, we were describing how the court of appeals “balanced the competing policy interest of the therapist-client privilege against the purpose of the [judicial proceedings]

Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007). Although Expose II used the term “absolute privilege” instead of “judicial proceedings privilege,” e.g., 889 N.W.2d at 286–87, we use the term “judicial proceedings privilege” here for clarity.

24

privilege.” Id. In doing so, we and the court of appeals may have used imprecise language in characterizing statements made to prosecutors or law enforcement in the absence of a subpoena or court order as implicating the therapist-client privilege, when it is therapist- client confidentiality that is more precisely implicated. But even so, this language does not amount to a holding that the therapist-client privilege prohibits disclosures in contexts outside of actions and proceedings.

* * *

For these reasons, we reject Wredberg’s contention that the sexual-assault-

counselor privilege statute broadly prohibits the disclosure of victim information outside the context of actions and proceedings. The sexual-assault-counselor privilege is an exception to the general rule in subdivision 1, which by its plain terms limits the privilege to the context of an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” and we have never held otherwise. The sexual-assault-counselor privilege does not function as an independent prohibition on disclosure in all contexts. Wredberg does not point to any other source of such a prohibition. To be clear, there may well be policy reasons for providing statutory protection to communications between sexual assault counselors and victims even beyond the context of actions and proceedings. If a broader duty of confidentiality for sexual assault counselors is desirable as a matter of policy, it is for the Legislature to provide such a duty. “[W]e must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they should be.” Expose II, 889 N.W.2d at 286.

25

B.

Having concluded that, consistent with the language in the privilege statute, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege applies only in an “action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” we next consider whether Wredberg sufficiently pleaded that Canvas’s demand for disclosure of information occurred in that context.17 In her amended complaint, Wredberg does not assert that she was ordered to make a disclosure in court or that any of her supervisors had “authority to receive evidence.” Instead, she alleges only that her supervisors demanded that she disclose information to them about the victim.18 Because Wredberg

17 Answering this question falls within the first issue presented in Wredberg’s petition for review: “[D]oes a sexual-assault counselor terminated for refusing to disclose victim information, ‘without the victim’s consent,’ upon her employer’s demand for the information to provide to non-counselors in and outside the workplace, have a claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act?” The court of appeals determined that Wredberg had forfeited her alternative argument that “there was a court action or proceeding under Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1.” Wredberg, 2025 WL 1733487, at *4 n.4. Given our conclusion that this argument fails on the merits, we need not decide whether it was forfeited. 18 To the extent Wredberg argues that she was terminated from employment due to her refusal to honor a law enforcement officer’s request for the information, this argument is forfeited. In her petition for review, consistent with her amended complaint, Wredberg framed the alleged unlawful order that resulted in her termination as being from Canvas to disclose information to Canvas.

We limit our review to issues raised in the petition for review. See In re Petition of MCEA for Commencement of an Env’t Assessment Worksheet, 980 N.W.2d 175, 188 (Minn. 2022) (“[W]e generally do not address issues that are not raised in the petition for review….”). Because Wredberg premised her whistleblower claim on her refusal to comply with Canvas’s order to disclose the victim information, she forfeited an alternative argument that her claim was based on her refusal to comply with the law enforcement officer. For these reasons, we do not address whether law enforcement

26

has not alleged that she was ordered to disclose the information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” she has not sufficiently alleged that her disclosure to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.19 Likewise, Wredberg’s concern that the information could be used against the victim in a future criminal proceeding is not sufficient to allege that Canvas was ordering her to disclose information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.”

* * *

Wredberg has not alleged that Canvas ordered her to commit an actual violation of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Based on the parties’ agreement that a successful claim under Minnesota Statutes section 181.932, subdivision 1(3), requires an allegation that Canvas ordered Wredberg to actually violate the law, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. The district court did not err in dismissing Wredberg’s whistleblower claim under Rule 12.02(e).

II.

We next turn to Wredberg’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge. As above, we review de novo whether Wredberg’s amended complaint asserts a claim upon which

officers generally have “authority to receive evidence” as contemplated in the privilege statute. 19 Given our determination that Wredberg has not alleged that she was ordered to disclose the information “in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence,” we need not consider Wredberg’s argument that she was a “witness” in an “action” or “proceeding.”

27

relief can be granted, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Wredberg. See Abel, 947 N.W.2d at 68.

In Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., we recognized a narrow common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge based on public policy, even in cases involving at-will employment.20 See 408 N.W.2d at 571. We held that “an employee may bring an action for wrongful discharge if that employee is discharged for refusing to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law.” Id. We have not recognized “a broader cause of action that arises every time an employee’s termination results from an employer’s violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 2014). Rather, we have made clear that the Phipps cause of action is limited “to discharges resulting from an employee’s good-faith refusal to violate the law.” Id. at 150. Accordingly, a common-law claim for wrongful discharge that is not within the limited scope set forth in Phipps is cognizable only if we recognize a new cause of action. Id. at 151.

Because it is somewhat unclear whether Wredberg’s common-law claim is asserted as a Phipps claim or a new common-law claim for wrongful discharge based on public policy, we address each possibility in turn. See Lykins ex rel. Duranske v. Anderson Contracting, Inc., 20 N.W.3d 880, 890 n.7 (Minn. 2025) (noting that we have “inherent

20 In Minnesota, the employer-employee relationship is generally at-will, which means that an employer can discharge an employee for “any reason or no reason” and that an employee “is under no obligation to remain on the job.” Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983).

28

authority to consider issues raised below but not articulated in precisely the manner necessary to clearly present the issues for appellate review” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

To the extent Wredberg asserts a Phipps claim, she frames it identically to her whistleblower claim—asserting that she would have actually violated the sexual-assault- counselor privilege if she had disclosed the information to Canvas as ordered.21 But such a claim fails for the same reason Wredberg’s whistleblower claim fails; she has not alleged facts sufficient to show that she was ordered to actually violate the sexual-assault- counselor privilege.22 Because Wredberg has not alleged facts sufficient to support a Phipps claim, her common-law claim survives only if we recognize a new cause of action for wrongful discharge due to a sexual assault counselor’s refusal of an order from her employer to disclose victim information without the victim’s consent. We have repeatedly emphasized our reluctance to recognize new public-policy based causes of action, noting that “the task of determining public policy … is usually better performed by the legislature.” See Nelson v. Productive Alts., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 n.5 (Minn. 2006); Dukowitz,

21 In the portion of her brief addressing her common-law claim, Wredberg argues that she “precisely followed the law; Canvas did not.” She further asserts that her “termination for her refusal to unlawfully disclose a sexual-assault victim’s privileged information and whereabouts violated Minnesota’s common-law protection of ‘those fired for their refusal to violate the law.’ ” 22 Wredberg does not argue that the phrase “in good faith, believes [that a law has been violated],” from Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571, allows an employee to allege something less than an order to commit an actual violation of law. Accordingly, we do not consider that interpretation of Phipps here.

29

841 N.W.2d at 151. This reluctance “to extend the legislatively declared public policy of the State applies with equal, if not greater, force” when the proposed cause of action would require the court to “depart from the traditional American common-law, employment-at-will rule.” Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 152.

In Nelson, we described the “difficult” process by which we recognize new common-law causes of action, noting that courts that have undertaken that task have “required that the public policy at issue be clear in order to justify a common-law cause of action.” 715 N.W.2d at 456 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) (explaining that the identified public policy “must be fundamental, substantial and well established at the time of the discharge”)). In holding that the employee in Nelson had not identified an adequately clear public policy, we emphasized that the employee had failed to identify any “statute that expressly prohibit[ed]” the circumstances that led to his termination. Id.

Here, Wredberg asks us to recognize a common-law claim for wrongful discharge grounded on a public policy that she locates solely in the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. But because we hold that Wredberg’s disclosure to Canvas would not have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, the sexual-assault-counselor privilege cannot be the sole source of the “clear public policy” required to support a new common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge. See id.

As Wredberg emphasizes, our decision in Hope Coalition recognized that the sexual-assault-counselor privilege demonstrates the State’s “compelling interest in protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims.” 977 N.W.2d at 662. Wredberg argues

30

that this compelling interest amounts to a clear public policy supporting a new wrongful-discharge cause of action here. But as discussed above, Hope Coalition addressed the scope of the sexual-assault-counselor privilege in a judicial proceeding, and we made clear that the Legislature implemented this compelling interest “through the sexual-assault-counselor privilege.” Id. By placing the sexual-assault-counselor privilege within the privilege statute, the Legislature chose to protect the privacy of victims by prohibiting disclosures only in “an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Without more, our recognition of the State’s compelling interest in protecting the victim’s privacy in Hope Coalition does not justify establishment of a new wrongful-discharge cause of action here, where the alleged order for disclosure occurred in a context different from that contemplated in the privilege statute or in Hope Coalition.23 Whether it is viewed as a Phipps claim or as an assertion of a new cause of action, Wredberg’s common-law claim for wrongful discharge is rooted in her allegation that Canvas ordered her to violate the sexual-assault-counselor privilege. Given our holding

23 To be clear, there may well be other policy justifications supporting the recognition of a common-law wrongful-discharge claim in circumstances where a sexual assault counselor is ordered to disclose communications that they deem to be confidential. We hold only that Wredberg’s proffered justifications—the sexual-assault- counselor privilege statute itself and our analysis of that privilege in Hope Coalition—are insufficient.

And, as noted above, there may also be policy reasons for providing statutory protection to communications between sexual assault counselors and victims even beyond the context of “any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1. But it is for the Legislature to provide such a statutory protection. See Expose II, 889 N.W.2d at 286.

31

that Wredberg failed to allege facts sufficient to show that her disclosure of information to Canvas would have violated the sexual-assault-counselor privilege, we also affirm the decision of the court of appeals to uphold the district court’s dismissal of Wredberg’s common-law claim under Rule 12.02(e).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.