Laurence and Mary Bodkin v. United States of America, Cross-Appellants

Second Circuit

Laurence and Mary Bodkin v. United States of America, Cross-Appellants

266 F.2d 55, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1483, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4053

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedApril 15, 1959

Docket25466

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 266 F.2d 55 (Laurence and Mary Bodkin v. United States of America, Cross-Appellants) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Laurence and Mary Bodkin v. United States of America, Cross-Appellants, 266 F.2d 55, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1483, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4053 (2d Cir. 1959).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellants’ petition for rehearing after denial of its motion to dismiss the government’s cross-appeal as moot is hereby granted. The appeal is moot because the appellant has stipulated to grant the government all the relief to which it could be entitled on a successful appeal. See e. g., Acheson v. Droesse, 1952, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 197 F.2d 574. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 1950, 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36.

The government has argued that its interest in the effect of the district court’s decision as precedent entitles it to a hearing on the merits in this court. It is well established that the interest of a litigant in a controversy solely for its effect as precedent is insufficient to sustain an appeal, see, e. g., Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 632, 64 S.Ct. 776, 88 L.Ed. 975, and that the value of the precedent may be measured when it is sought to be applied against the litigant in a subsequent case. See United States v. Sclafani, 2 Cir., 265 F.2d 408, which expressly disapproves Matter of Bodkin, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1958, 165 F.Supp. 25.

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PER CURIAM.

The appellants’ petition for rehearing after denial of its motion to dismiss the government’s cross-appeal as moot is hereby granted. The appeal is moot because the appellant has stipulated to grant the government all the relief to which it could be entitled on a successful appeal. See e. g., Acheson v. Droesse, 1952, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 197 F.2d 574. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand with directions to dismiss the complaint. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 1950, 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36.

The government has argued that its interest in the effect of the district court’s decision as precedent entitles it to a hearing on the merits in this court. It is well established that the interest of a litigant in a controversy solely for its effect as precedent is insufficient to sustain an appeal, see, e. g., Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 632, 64 S.Ct. 776, 88 L.Ed. 975, and that the value of the precedent may be measured when it is sought to be applied against the litigant in a subsequent case. See United States v. Sclafani, 2 Cir., 265 F.2d 408, which expressly disapproves Matter of Bodkin, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1958, 165 F.Supp. 25.

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266 F.2d 55, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1483, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laurence-and-mary-bodkin-v-united-states-of-america-cross-appellants-ca2-1959.

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