Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 389 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I
No. CV-25-746
LAUREN HATCHER Opinion Delivered September 9, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 70DR-21-166]
LOGAN SINCLAIR HONORABLE MARY THOMASON, APPELLEE JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge Lauren Hatcher appeals the order of the Union County Circuit Court granting appellee Logan Sinclair’s petition for modification of custody. Hatcher contends that the circuit court erred in finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the best interest of the minor child (MC) to modify the custodial agreement. We reverse and remand.
I. Background
On May 5, 2021, Hatcher filed a complaint seeking a declaration of paternity and custody of MC, who was born on November 29, 2019. Sinclair filed an answer and counterclaim seeking joint custody of MC. The parties stipulated that Sinclair is the legal and biological father of MC. On September 15, an agreed order of paternity and custody
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was filed in which Hatcher was awarded sole legal and physical custody over MC, and Sinclair was granted supervised visitation every other week.
On October 17, 2022, Hatcher petitioned the court to modify Sinclair’s visitation to give him more time with MC. On November 4, the court filed a second agreed order in which Sinclair was awarded standard visitation. Specifically, Sinclair’s visitation included every other weekend from six o’clock Friday evening until six o’clock Sunday evening as well as two consecutive weeks in June and two consecutive weeks in July. Additionally, Hatcher and Sinclair were to split holidays on an even/odd year schedule. Finally, the standard visitation guidelines attached to the order explicitly stated the following:
If the parties mutually agree to change the provisions of the orders of this Court, they shall petition the court to approve and order that change. In the event that the parties do not obtain a court order, the Court shall not be bound by an alleged agreement of the parties.
On January 17, 2025, Sinclair filed a petition for change of custody requesting that he be awarded joint custody of MC and alleging that there had been a material change of circumstances. Specifically, Sinclair alleged that (1) MC is now school aged; (2) Hatcher had alienated MC from him by cutting short one of his holiday visitations; (3) Hatcher unilaterally terminated the extra weekday visit and overnight Sunday visitation; and (4) he had concerns about the alcohol use in Hatcher’s home. Hatcher answered Sinclair’s petition and filed a counterclaim requesting Sinclair have only supervised visitation.
On March 12, Sinclair filed a motion for emergency temporary change of custody.
Specifically, Sinclair noted that on March 10, MC had been involved in an incident at
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daycare in which MC threatened to retrieve a firearm from her home and shoot another child at school. On April 2, Hatcher filed a motion for emergency temporary relief requesting that Sinclair’s visitation with MC be suspended during the pendency of the trial due to a photo she found of MC standing on Sinclair’s roof. On April 21, an agreed temporary order was entered after a hearing in which all parties agreed that MC would be barred from accessing any firearms and Sinclair would not allow MC onto the roof of his home.
On June 24, the circuit court held a hearing on Sinclair’s petition and Hatcher’s countersuit. At the hearing, the court heard from both Hatcher and Sinclair as well as seven additional witnesses: (1) Dr. Gregg Massanelli, MC’s maternal grandfather; (2) Lacey Perry, a family friend; (3) Heather Nix, advanced practice registered nurse employed with SAMA Health; (4) Anne Michelle Franklin, MC’s dance teacher; (5) Donate Sinclair, MC’s paternal grandmother; (6) Leanna Massanelli, MC’s maternal grandmother; and (7) Candace Black, MC’s preschool teacher.
At the hearing, both parties agreed that Sinclair was receiving all of his court-ordered visitation and that he was able to call and speak with MC on Monday and Thursday nights. Both parties conceded that MC was set to begin kindergarten. Sinclair testified that Hatcher texted him in 2023 about which elementary school MC should attend because she was worried about the violence in the El Dorado Public School District. Sinclair did not have an opinion at that time and never brought the topic up again.
As to the “incident” during the December 2024 school break, Sinclair had visitation with MC from Christmas until the end of the break. There was confusion over when Sinclair
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needed to return MC to Hatcher because MC’s daycare opened three days before the public schools. Sinclair testified that while Hatcher’s mother called him about it, neither she nor Hatcher took MC from him; Sinclair returned MC to Hatcher when the public schools reopened.
Following this incident, there was an issue regarding regular weekend visitation.
Sinclair testified that he should have received MC the following weekend as well because that was his regularly scheduled weekend. Hatcher, in turn, believed that the following weekend was her weekend because Sinclair’s visitation was every other week. In the end, the parties swapped weekends. Sinclair further testified that Hatcher agreed to “swap” another weekend with him so that he could take MC to Dallas for a supercross race and a baseball game.
Sinclair testified that after the December visitation disagreement, Hatcher terminated the extra visitation he was receiving with MC. Specifically, Sinclair was allowed an extra visit during the week, and on his weekends, he was able to keep MC Sunday overnight. Sinclair was unable to say when these additional visits began. Hatcher conceded that she terminated the extra visits; however, she alleged it was because Sinclair’s truck smelled heavily of marijuana when she opened the door to get MC out of the vehicle, and that concerned her. Hatcher testified she was further concerned when Sinclair would not tell her whether he smoked marijuana in front of MC. Both parties agree that, even after the extra visits ended, Sinclair was never denied his court-ordered visitation.
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There was also testimony regarding MC’s medical care. MC’s maternal grandfather, Dr. Gregg Massanelli, would prescribe MC medications on occasion. Sinclair testified that he was concerned that MC did not have a primary care physician and was being primarily seen by her grandfather and Heather Nix, a nurse practitioner who worked for Dr. Massanelli. He conceded that MC was seen at SAMA Healthcare five times between November 2, 2022, and December 2024. Sinclair further testified that when he expressed concern about MC not having a primary care physician, Hatcher complied with his request. There was also undisputed testimony that Sinclair had seen Heather Nix for his own medical needs.
Additionally, there was an incident shortly before the hearing in which MC passed out at school. Following this, MC was put on a heart monitor, which showed some abnormalities. MC also received an EEG at Arkansas Children’s Hospital and was scheduled to meet with a cardiologist to discuss her condition and next steps. Sinclair concedes that he was made aware of the event and was told of all the doctor’s appointments. Sinclair testified that he was present at Arkansas Children’s Hospital for the EEG and knew of the upcoming cardiologist appointment. Sinclair stated that he had not received any of the actual medical documentation until discovery, however.
MC’s daycare teacher and her dance teacher both testified that MC was very well adjusted. Michelle Franklin, MC’s dancer teacher, testified that she had known MC for two to three years, and that MC’s behavior is good and has not changed in the time she has known her. She further attested that Sinclair and Hatcher’s communication was excellent
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and that they always acted maturely around her and MC. She further stated that they were so collected during the dance classes that she had no idea they were involved in a custody battle. Candace Black, MC’s daycare teacher, testified that MC is “a precious little girl” and that MC is developmentally at the very top of all the children she has taught over the last twenty-five years. She testified that she had spoken to Sinclair multiple times when she was MC’s teacher.
Finally, there was testimony that Hatcher was on medication that should not be mixed with “heavy drinking.” Sinclair stated he became concerned when he saw a picture of Hatcher in the hospital, after giving birth, with an unopened wine bottle in the background. Sinclair was also worried when he saw a picture of Hatcher holding a drink at her wedding.
Lacey Perry recounted an incident in which, while Hatcher was sleeping with MC, Hatcher’s husband, Tyler. drank a lot and “grabbed [her] butt” through her jeans. Finally, there was one incident when MC’s maternal grandmother was seen having a drink in a restaurant while she was with Hatcher and MC. Sinclair presented no evidence or testimony that anyone ever saw Hatcher drinking in front of MC or that she was ever inebriated and could not care for MC.
II. Standard of Review
We perform a de novo review of child-custody matters, but we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Hamerlinck v. Hamerlinck, 2022 Ark. App. 89, 641 S.W.3d 659. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
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has been made. Id. Deference to the circuit court is even greater in cases involving child custody because a heavier burden is placed on the circuit court to utilize to the fullest extent its powers of perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. Fudge v. Dorman, 2017 Ark. App. 181, 516 S.W.3d 306.
For custody-modification cases, courts impose more stringent standards than they do for initial determinations of custody in order to promote stability and continuity in the life of the child and to discourage the repeated litigation of the same issues. Geren Williams v. Geren, 2015 Ark. App. 197, 458 S.W.3d 759. Modification of custody is a two-step process: first, the circuit court must determine whether a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last custody order; and second, if the court finds that there has been a material change in circumstances, the court must determine whether a change of custody is in the child’s best interest. Wallis v. Holsing, 2023 Ark. App. 137, 661 S.W.3d 284. A child- custody determination is fact specific, and each case ultimately must rest on its own facts. Graf v. Graf, 2024 Ark. App. 212, 686 S.W.3d 912. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court, which observed the witnesses firsthand. Id.
The party seeking to modify the custody order has the burden of showing a material change in circumstances. Geren Williams, supra. Determining whether there has been a change of circumstances requires full consideration of the circumstances that existed when the last custody order was entered in comparison to the circumstances at the time the change of custody is considered. Id. To establish a material change, it is essential to demonstrate that the changed circumstances are substantial and directly affect the child’s welfare. Fry v. Laire,
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2025 Ark. App. 470, 721 S.W.3d 836. Failure to communicate, increasing parental alienation by a custodial parent, and inability to cooperate can all constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of custody. Montez v. Montez, 2017 Ark. App. 220, 518 S.W.3d 751. Further, we have held that the combined, cumulative effect of particular facts may together constitute a material change. Shannon v. McJunkins, 2010 Ark. App. 440, 376 S.W.3d 489.
III. Material Change in Circumstances Hatcher first argues on appeal that the circuit court erred when it determined that there had been a material change in circumstances. Specifically, Hatcher argues that MC’s reaching school age, isolated visitation disputes, returning to court-ordered visitation, allegations of alcohol use, and isolated school incidents do not individually or cumulatively constitute a material change of circumstances.
In its August 5, 2025 order, the circuit court did not provide any explanation to support its finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred. When the circuit court fails to make findings of fact about a change in circumstances, this court, under its de novo review, may nonetheless conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could have found a change in circumstances. Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 384, 985 S.W.2d 724, 727 (1999); Stamps v. Rawlins, 297 Ark. 370, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988).
The circuit court, however, did make the following findings:
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At the final hearing, neither [Hatcher] nor [Sinclair] testified as to the other parent being the problem with visitation or being the ones making the derogatory remarks about the other party’s character. This is highly unusual in custody cases. The parties are capable of making joint decisions for their child.
The circuit court further found that “[t]he Court feels both parties can jointly parent their child if left alone by all outside parties and family members.”
A. MC’s Reaching School Age It is undisputed that MC has reached school age and has begun kindergarten. Sinclair, however, does not articulate any reason why this presents a material change of circumstances in this case. This court has previously held, in part, that a child becoming school age is not sufficient to trigger a material change of circumstances on its own. See Fry, 2025 Ark. App. 470, at 9, 721 S.W.3d at 842.
B. Alienation
In his petition to change custody, Sinclair argued that Hatcher had attempted to alienate him from MC when Hatcher “sua sponte, retrieved the minor child during his period of visitation, thus interrupting his period of visitation.” Neither in his pleadings nor at the hearing did Sinclair allege a pattern of alienation by Hatcher.
Alienation occurs when separating parents “transform a child into a relationship weapon by engaging in patterns of behavior designed to destroy the child’s psychological connection with the other parent.” Cline v. Simpson, 2024 Ark. App. 611, at 10, 703 S.W.3d 497, 504 (citing Thomas E. Schacht, Prevention Strategies to Protect Professionals and Families
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Involved In High-Conflict Divorce, 22 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 565, 592 (2000)). By definition, a singular incident does not represent a pattern.
As to the incident in which Sinclair alleged that Hatcher “retrieved” MC, his testimony at the hearing directly contradicts this claim. Sinclair explicitly stated that while they had a disagreement about when his visitation ended, at no point did Hatcher retrieve MC or otherwise interfere with his visitation with MC.
Even if, however, Hatcher had retrieved MC during this disagreement, Sinclair testified that he has regular communication with MC and that he has otherwise received all of his court-ordered visitations. Sinclair further testified that Hatcher worked with him to make sure he was able to communicate with MC even when it was not his day to call, such as being able to call and talk with MC the night of the daycare incident. Accordingly, this single event is not a change of circumstances, either material or otherwise.
C. Termination of Extra Visitation An additional ground argued below by Sinclair was that Hatcher’s termination of the visitation, in addition to the court-ordered visitation, was evidence of a material change of circumstances. The court-ordered visitation provided that Sinclair was to have MC every other weekend from six o’clock Friday evening to six o’clock Sunday evening. Hatcher, at some point, let Sinclair have an additional evening during the week and let him keep MC overnight on the Sundays he had MC. Sinclair was unable to testify about how long this out- of-court agreement lasted.
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The visitation schedule attached to the 2022 agreed order clearly laid out that if the parties agreed to a new visitation schedule, then they needed to petition the court to approve and order the change. Absent such a petition, the court was not bound by the agreement of the parties. Sinclair did not petition the court at any time to amend the visitation agreement to include these additional days. Furthermore, the testimony at the hearing was clear: even after Hatcher terminated the extra visitation, at no point did she interfere with Sinclair’s court-ordered termination. The adherence to a court-ordered visitation schedule cannot be used to show a change of circumstances when it reflects the circumstances that existed at the time of the initial agreement. This court has previously held that “[p]etty complaints and parental gamesmanship may not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances, especially if the child is left relatively unscathed.” Hart v. Hart, 2013 Ark. App. 714, at 3 (citing Dodd v. Gore, 2013 Ark. App. 547; Byrd v. Vanderpool, 104 Ark. App. 239, 244, 290 S.W.3d 610, 613 (2009)).
Moreover, Sinclair’s testimony that he believed the original visitation schedule was not in MC’s best interest and that he agreed to it only because he could not afford an attorney is unavailing. A change of attitude is not a change of circumstances. Brown v. Brown, 2012 Ark. 89, at 8, 387 S.W.3d 159, 164.
D. Medical Issues
Although not pleaded in his petition, at the hearing, Sinclair alleged that Hatcher’s medical treatment of MC represented a change of circumstances. The circuit court, however, did not find Sinclair’s argument compelling. In its ruling, it explicitly held that “[b]oth
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[MC’s] grandfather and step-grandmother are well-respected physicians in our area and they should be allowed to render treatment anytime it is not in violation of their code of ethics.” It is axiomatic that the circuit court is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses. See, e.g., McNutt v. Yates, 2013 Ark. 427, 430 S.W.3d 91; Hildreth v. Hildreth, 2026 Ark. App. 193, at 16, 736 S.W.3d 408, 418. Moreover, no evidence was produced that MC was negatively affected by her medical treatment before the hearing. While she was found to have a potential heart issue, there is no evidence that it would have been found sooner if she had established a primary care physician earlier.
Sinclair conceded that MC was seen by other providers as well as her maternal grandfather and Heather Nix. Sinclair also testified that when he expressed concern over MC’s not having a primary care physician, Hatcher secured a primary care physician for MC. Moreover, Sinclair provides no evidence that MC’s medical care changed between the entry of the 2022 agreed order and the filing of his petition. Absent a showing that the circumstances are different from what they were previously, Sinclair has failed to meet his burden of showing that this represents changed circumstances. See Rushton v. Rushton, 2026 Ark. App. 283, at 10, 737 S.W.3d 774, 780 (holding that absent a showing that the behavior changed there can be no material change of circumstances).
E. Parental Communication Contrary to arguments made, the record does not show a complete inability of the parents to communicate. Rather, the testimony adduced at trial shows the exact opposite: while the parties may not have had the best communication, they always were able to
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communicate. Moreover, neutral witnesses testified that they had excellent communication, and MC’s dance teacher even attested that they communicated so well she did not know they were fighting over custody. Accordingly, Hatcher and Sinclair’s communication problems do not rise to the level required to show a material change in circumstances. See Anderson v. Thomas, 2013 Ark. App. 653, at 6.
F. Interference of Leann Massanelli The circuit court, though silent on why it found a material change of circumstances, was explicit in its findings that the problems in the relationship between Hatcher, Sinclair, and MC were the result of interference by MC’s maternal grandmother, Leann Massanelli. Specifically, the circuit court found that Ms. Massanelli was negative about Sinclair and his parenting, surreptitiously recorded Sinclair while trying to get him to admit wrongdoings, and turned Sinclair into DHS over allegations she could not prove.
Leann Massanelli’s alleged interference in the relationship between the parties, even if completely accurate, is not sufficient to create a material change of circumstances. First, there is no evidence that Ms. Massanelli did not exhibit this desire for control before 2022. Second, regardless of Ms. Massanelli’s influence on the situation, the testimony at the hearing and the holding by the circuit court was that Hatcher and Sinclair were able to fully coparent MC with limited issues. Problematic in-laws, without more, do not create a material change in circumstances.
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G. Alcohol Use
Finally, any allegations of excessive alcohol use in Hatcher’s home were not supported by the record. The only evidence concerning alcohol was that Hatcher’s husband became intoxicated on one occasion when Hatcher was upstairs asleep with MC, Hatcher had an unopened bottle of wine in her hospital room after she gave birth, and Hatcher had a drink at her own wedding. None of these instances, either alone or together, support a finding that MC is unsafe at Hatcher’s home. Moreover, Sinclair did not testify that he ever smelled alcohol on Hatcher’s breath or knew of her becoming intoxicated around MC. Further, the record does not contain any evidence that Hatcher’s drinking was different at the time of the 2022 agreed order. Thus, Sinclair has not met his burden of showing that there has been a material change—or any change—in Hatcher’s alcohol use. See Rushton, 2026 Ark. App. 283, at 10, 737 S.W.3d at 780.
Accordingly, on this voluminous record, we hold that none of the evidence, considered either individually or collectively, met the threshold requirement of showing a material change in circumstances.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that the circuit court clearly erred in its determination that there was a material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. Because we reverse on the issue of material change of circumstances, we do not address Hatcher’s remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded.
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THYER and HIXSON, JJ., agree. Streit Law Firm, PLLC, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for appellant. Thomas Law Firm, PLLC, by: F. Mattison Thomas III, for appellee.