Laureano v. United States of America

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 10, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-10986·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JEAN CARLOS LAUREANO, Plaintiff, 19-CV-10986(LLS) -against- ORDERTO AMEND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: By order datedJanuary 24, 2020,Chief Judge McMahon granted Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to file anamended complaint to assert a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Probation Officer Brooks, a U.S. Probation Officer for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff has submitted an amended complaint, but it does not state facts in support of a malicious prosecutionclaim. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff an additional 30 days to file a second amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s informa pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b);see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The court must also dismiss a complaint ifthe court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action challenging his probation officer’s decision to seek his arrest for violating his supervised release,imposed in United States v. Laureano, ECF 1:12-CR-0248, 16, a criminal case previously pending before Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of this Court. In the amended complaint, Plaintiffalleges thefollowing, verbatim: On or about May 15, 2018, Mr. Terry Brooks lodged a warrant seeking my arrest. The warrant stopped me from getting a job and also attend to programs while I was in Westchester County DOC. When I finish my year sentence on Dec. 3, 2018 I was picked up by the Marshalls and took me to a federal facility where I was granted home incarceration until I come infront of the Judge. A month later I was supposed to go infront of the judge on Jan. 7, 2019 . . . [but] Brooks . . . adjourned the court date . . . and sent me to a inpatient program for 90 days. . . . Finally, I did the 90 days and went infront of the judge on April 9, 2019 and because of lack of facts I was found innocent of my specifications which I never violated. (ECF No. 6, at 5-6.)Although directed to do so in the January 24, 2020 order, Plaintiff does not provide any details regarding the specifications and what caused his probation officer to charge him with violating his supervised release. Court records from the April 9, 2019 revocation hearing indicated that Judge Kaplan dismissed the specifications charged in the violation of supervised release memo, concluding that the facts alleged did not support a finding that Plaintiff violated the terms of his supervision for three of the specifications, and the remaining four specifications were dismissed based on a joint application by the parties.ECF 1:12-CR-0248, 22.But that record does not describe the

specifications,and which were dismissed for lack of factual support and which were dismissed by joint application. DISCUSSION In the January 24, 2020 order, Chief Judge McMahonconstruedthe complaint as asserting a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Brooks for initiating the violation of supervised release.1 But in the amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to state facts in support of such a claim. A Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim requires four elements: (1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding; (2) termination of the proceeding in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual

malice as a motivation for the defendants’ actions. Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Hartman v. Moore,547 U.S. 250, 265–66 (2006) (requiring that the absence of

1 Because Brooks is an employee of the federal government, Chief Judge McMahon construedthe complaint as asserting the malicious prosecution claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court implied a damages remedy against federal employees who violate a plaintiff’s right under the Fourth Amendment. 403 U.S. at 397.Federal courts have analogized Bivens claims to those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which require a showing that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive a plaintiff of a federally protected right. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). And caselaw from actions brought under §1983 may be used to address issues raised in Bivenscases. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1978); Shue v. United States, 466 F. App’x 51, 51 (2012) (citing Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1995)). probable cause be pleaded and provedfor Bivensactions against federal officials based on claims of retaliatory prosecution).Moreover, a “plaintiff asserting a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must [also] show some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of ‘seizure.’” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.1995).Finally, the plaintiff “must . . . show that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a manner that

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Related

Butz v. Economou
438 U.S. 478 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Hartman v. Moore
547 U.S. 250 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Shue v. United States
466 F. App'x 51 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Tavarez v. Reno
54 F.3d 109 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Murphy v. Lynn
118 F.3d 938 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Lanning v. City of Glens Falls
908 F.3d 19 (Second Circuit, 2018)