Laura Ziencik v. Office of Personnel Management

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 2, 2023
DocketPH-0831-17-0327-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Laura Ziencik v. Office of Personnel Management (Laura Ziencik v. Office of Personnel Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laura Ziencik v. Office of Personnel Management, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LAURA L. ZIENCIK, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0831-17-0327-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: March 2, 2023 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Laura L. Ziencik, Berlin, Maryland, pro se.

Carla Robinson, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which found that she was not entitled to survivor benefits under the Civil Service

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure. 2

Retirement System (CSRS). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion in the initial decision that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving by preponderant evidence that she was entitled to survivor benefits under the CSRS. 3 Cheeseman v. Office of Personnel Management, 791 F.2d 138, 140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that the burden of proving entitlement to a survivor annuity is on the applicant for benefits); Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID). Specifically, the appellant did not demonstrate that her now-deceased husband’s income was below the earning limitation amount when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) terminated his disability retirement annuity for regaining earning capacity, nor did she prove that this annuity was reinstated prior to his death. ID at 4-5; see White v. Office of Personnel Management, 72 M.S.P.R. 672, 674-75 (1996) (finding that a widow of a disability annuitant was not entitled to a survivor

3 Preponderant evidence is defined as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). 3

annuity, as the annuitant regained earning capacity but died before having his disability annuity reinstated). Relatedly, the appellant’s husband did not file for a deferred retirement annuity when he became eligible at age 62, nor was he receiving any other benefit under the CSRS at the time of his death. ID at 2-3; IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5; see Dickerson v. Office of Personnel Management, 47 M.S.P.R. 109, 111, 113-14 (1991) (holding that the appellant was not entitled to a survivor annuity, as her former husband, who retired on a disability annuity and recovered, had not filed for his deferred annuity and was not receiving payments under the CSRS when he died). Lastly, there were no retirement deductions left in her husband’s account, meaning there was no lump sum payment to be made by OPM to the appellant, as the survivor, after her husband’s death. IAF, Tab 4 at 7, 9; see 5 U.S.C. § 8342(d); Narvasa v. Office of Personnel Management, 47 M.S.P.R. 152, 154 (1991). ¶3 The appellant alleges on review that she had power of attorney for her husband and could have signed an application for reinstatement of his annuity when he was unable. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant did not raise this argument during the adjudication of her appeal before the administrative judge. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). There has been no showing of these circumstances here; thus, we need not consider the appellant’s argument. Notwithstanding, as the initial decision concludes, the appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that her husband was ever eligible for and applied for reinstatement of his disability annuity after its termination in 2006. ID at 4-5. The appellant now claiming that she possessed power of attorney for him does not alter this outcome. Moreover, the appellant cannot now make an election for survivor benefits on behalf of her late husband. See Diehl v. Office of Personnel Management, 50 M.S.P.R. 519, 522 (1991) (holding that no 4

election for a survivor annuity can be made after the death of the Federal employee). ¶4 On review, the appellant also claims that her husband had his annuity reinstated before he died and took less of an amount to provide for her. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. This is the same argument that the appellant set forth during her initial appeal and which the administrative judge found that she failed to prove. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant has not provided any evidence to support her argument, and there is no basis to overturn the initial decision. ¶5 The appellant also states on review that as the Federal employee’s wife for 36 years, she is entitled to his annuity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, the appellant’s deceased husband was not receiving an annuity at the time of his death. IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5. It is well settled that the requirements for eligibility for a retirement benefit are substantive legal requirements, meaning there is no room for administrative discretion from OPM or the Board. Oliveros v. Office of Personnel Management, 49 M.S.P.R. 360, 363 (1991), appeal dismissed, 965 F.2d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table); see Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414

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Related

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond
496 U.S. 414 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Laura Ziencik v. Office of Personnel Management, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laura-ziencik-v-office-of-personnel-management-mspb-2023.