Laura J.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 2026
Docket5:25-cv-00045
StatusUnknown

This text of Laura J.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security (Laura J.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laura J.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security, (N.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LAURA J.T.,

Plaintiff,

-against- 5:25-CV-45 (LEK/PJE)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Laura J.T.1 (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) for lack of a disability. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff moved to vacate the Commissioner’s judgement regarding her disability status. Dkt. No. 11 (“Motion”). On July 28, 2025, the Commissioner filed a motion in response, Dkt. No. 12 (“Cross Motion”), and Plaintiff replied on August 11, 2025. Dkt. No. 13 (“Reply”). On February 24, 2026, the Honorable Judge Paul J. Evangelista issued a Report- Recommendation and Order recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Motion, grant the

1 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018 to better protect personal and medical information of non- governmental parties, this Order will identify Plaintiff’s last name by initial only. Commissioner’s Cross-Motion, and affirm the Social Security Administrations’ decision. See Dkt. No. 14 (“Report and Recommendation”). Plaintiff filed objections, Dkt. No. 15, and amended objections, Dkt. No. 17 (“Amended Objections”). For the purposes of this Order, the Court will treat the Amended Objections as the

operative document. For the reasons that follow, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. II. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with Judge Evangelista’s Report and Recommendations, as well as Plaintiff’s factual allegations as detailed therein. See R. & R. at 2–8. III. LEGAL STANDARD “Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 28 United States Code Section 636 govern the review of decisions rendered by Magistrate Judges.” A.V. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace, S.p.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Review of decisions rendered by magistrate judges are also governed by the Local Rules. See L.R. 72.1. 28 U.S.C. § 636 states: Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation], any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When written objections are filed and the district court conducts a de novo review, that “de novo determination does not require the Court to conduct a new hearing; rather, it mandates that the Court give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made.” A.V. by Versace Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (emphasis in

original). “The district court may adopt those portions of a report and recommendation to which no timely objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record.” DiPilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 333, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “When a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the [report and recommendation] strictly for clear error.” New York City Dist. Of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Forde, 341 F. Supp. 3d 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). IV. DISCUSSION As Plaintiff has filed specific objections, the Court will review the issues identified by

Plaintiff in the Report and Recommendation, de novo. See A.V. by Versace Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 406. Plaintiff’s objection is that Judge Evangelista erred when he found that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) had not committed error in crafting a “light level RFC.” Am. Obj. at 3. Her argument supporting the objection is that she met her burden in “demonstrat[ing] evidence which shows greater restrictions and limitations related to a unique severe impairment of POTS syndrome.” Id. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff for the reasons stated below. “In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district Court may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024) (italics added), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024). “Rather, the Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Johnson

v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985–86 (2d Cir. 1987)). The substantial evidence standard is not demanding, it can be met with “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, where such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” exists. Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curium) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, (1971)). “[I]f the correct legal standards were applied and the ALJs finding is supported by substantial evidence, such finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). Here, as Judge Evangelista recognized in his thoughtful and well-reasoned Report and

Recommendation, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff had a light RFC was supported by substantial evidence. See R. & R. at 11–16.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Johnson v. Bowen
817 F.2d 983 (Second Circuit, 1987)
Bonet Ex Rel. T.B. v. Colvin
523 F. App'x 58 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Dipilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc.
662 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
602 F. Supp. 2d 485 (S.D. New York, 2009)
A v. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace S.P.A
191 F. Supp. 2d 404 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Rosado v. Sullivan
805 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. New York, 1992)
N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Forde
341 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)

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