In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo ________________________
No. 07-21-00028-CR ________________________
LAURA ANN MARROQUIN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 84th District Court Ochiltree County, Texas Trial Court No. 4934; Honorable Curtis W. Brancheau, Presiding
November 2, 2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
In 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, Laura Ann Marroquin, was
convicted of abandoning or endangering a child, a second degree felony. 1 Punishment
was assessed at two years confinement, suspended for two years community
supervision. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine. In 2016, the State moved to
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(e) (West 2019). revoke Appellant’s community supervision for violations of the conditions thereof.
Instead, the trial court modified the conditions to add two years to the period of community
supervision plus an additional $2,000 fine. After several attempts by the State to revoke
Appellant’s community supervision in 2018 and 2019, the State filed its third amended
motion to revoke in 2020, alleging 147 violations of the conditions of community
supervision. 2 Most of the violations involved commission of new offenses and failure to
timely report them, use of drugs, failure to report, failure to remain in Ochiltree County,
and failure to pay fees.
At a hearing on the State’s third amended motion, Appellant entered pleas of not
true to all 147 alleged violations. The State presented its evidence and Appellant testified
on her own behalf. After the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
During sentencing, the trial court found that Appellant violated some but not all of the
allegations presented by the State, revoked her community supervision, and sentenced
her to the original term of two years confinement. 3 In presenting this appeal, counsel has
filed an Anders 4 brief in support of a motion to withdraw. We affirm and grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
In support of her motion to withdraw, counsel certifies she has conducted a
conscientious examination of the record, and in her opinion, it reflects no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
2 The alleged violations are voluminous as itemized by the State. Specifically, on the allegations of failure to pay particular fees and failure to report, the State itemized monthly violations from 2017 to 2019. 3 The trial court also entered judgment for the unpaid portion of the fines assessed.
4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
2 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the record supports that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated that she has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to
Appellant, (2) notifying her of the right to file a pro se response if she desired to do so,
and (3) informing her of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408. 5 By letter, this court granted Appellant an opportunity to
exercise her right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should she be so inclined. Id. at
409 n.23. Appellant did not file a response. Neither did the State favor us with a brief.
BACKGROUND
Appellant left four of her minor children home alone while she was out with a friend.
In her absence, one of the children was injured when he was bitten by the landlord’s dog.
A relative took the child to the emergency room for treatment. Appellant was indicted for
abandoning or endangering a child and agreed to a plea agreement in exchange for two
years community supervision. The conditions of community supervision were explained
to her.
5Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of her right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of her right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.22, 411 n.35. The duty to send the client a copy of this court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.
3 At the hearing on the third amended motion to revoke, the State presented
testimony from several witnesses, including law enforcement officers, who confirmed they
arrested Appellant in March 2019, for driving while intoxicated. Appellant denied having
consumed alcohol but admitted she had earlier consumed methamphetamine and
marihuana. She admitted to one of the officers that she had drugs inside her bra. After
she was transported to jail and searched by a female officer, drugs were found where she
had claimed.
The custodian of business records from the Community Supervision Department
testified to Appellant’s chronology of violations. She confirmed many violations between
2017 and 2019, as alleged by the State.
Appellant testified in her defense. However, during her testimony, she admitted
that some of the violations were true. She acknowledged to concealing
methamphetamine inside her bra, possessing drug paraphernalia, and being arrested for
fighting. She admitted to leaving Ochiltree County without permission on three occasions
and to breaking curfew “all the time.”
After hearing the testimony and considering evidence that was admitted without
any objections, the trial court found that Appellant had violated some of the allegations
presented by the State. Although Appellant asked the court for leniency, she was
sentenced to the original term of two years confinement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question
before the court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State, 389
4 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation context, “a preponderance of the evidence” means
“that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo ________________________
No. 07-21-00028-CR ________________________
LAURA ANN MARROQUIN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 84th District Court Ochiltree County, Texas Trial Court No. 4934; Honorable Curtis W. Brancheau, Presiding
November 2, 2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
In 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, Laura Ann Marroquin, was
convicted of abandoning or endangering a child, a second degree felony. 1 Punishment
was assessed at two years confinement, suspended for two years community
supervision. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine. In 2016, the State moved to
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(e) (West 2019). revoke Appellant’s community supervision for violations of the conditions thereof.
Instead, the trial court modified the conditions to add two years to the period of community
supervision plus an additional $2,000 fine. After several attempts by the State to revoke
Appellant’s community supervision in 2018 and 2019, the State filed its third amended
motion to revoke in 2020, alleging 147 violations of the conditions of community
supervision. 2 Most of the violations involved commission of new offenses and failure to
timely report them, use of drugs, failure to report, failure to remain in Ochiltree County,
and failure to pay fees.
At a hearing on the State’s third amended motion, Appellant entered pleas of not
true to all 147 alleged violations. The State presented its evidence and Appellant testified
on her own behalf. After the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
During sentencing, the trial court found that Appellant violated some but not all of the
allegations presented by the State, revoked her community supervision, and sentenced
her to the original term of two years confinement. 3 In presenting this appeal, counsel has
filed an Anders 4 brief in support of a motion to withdraw. We affirm and grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
In support of her motion to withdraw, counsel certifies she has conducted a
conscientious examination of the record, and in her opinion, it reflects no potentially
plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
2 The alleged violations are voluminous as itemized by the State. Specifically, on the allegations of failure to pay particular fees and failure to report, the State itemized monthly violations from 2017 to 2019. 3 The trial court also entered judgment for the unpaid portion of the fines assessed.
4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
2 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling
authorities, the record supports that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated that she has complied with the
requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to
Appellant, (2) notifying her of the right to file a pro se response if she desired to do so,
and (3) informing her of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408. 5 By letter, this court granted Appellant an opportunity to
exercise her right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should she be so inclined. Id. at
409 n.23. Appellant did not file a response. Neither did the State favor us with a brief.
BACKGROUND
Appellant left four of her minor children home alone while she was out with a friend.
In her absence, one of the children was injured when he was bitten by the landlord’s dog.
A relative took the child to the emergency room for treatment. Appellant was indicted for
abandoning or endangering a child and agreed to a plea agreement in exchange for two
years community supervision. The conditions of community supervision were explained
to her.
5Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of her right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with notification of her right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.22, 411 n.35. The duty to send the client a copy of this court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.
3 At the hearing on the third amended motion to revoke, the State presented
testimony from several witnesses, including law enforcement officers, who confirmed they
arrested Appellant in March 2019, for driving while intoxicated. Appellant denied having
consumed alcohol but admitted she had earlier consumed methamphetamine and
marihuana. She admitted to one of the officers that she had drugs inside her bra. After
she was transported to jail and searched by a female officer, drugs were found where she
had claimed.
The custodian of business records from the Community Supervision Department
testified to Appellant’s chronology of violations. She confirmed many violations between
2017 and 2019, as alleged by the State.
Appellant testified in her defense. However, during her testimony, she admitted
that some of the violations were true. She acknowledged to concealing
methamphetamine inside her bra, possessing drug paraphernalia, and being arrested for
fighting. She admitted to leaving Ochiltree County without permission on three occasions
and to breaking curfew “all the time.”
After hearing the testimony and considering evidence that was admitted without
any objections, the trial court found that Appellant had violated some of the allegations
presented by the State. Although Appellant asked the court for leniency, she was
sentenced to the original term of two years confinement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question
before the court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State, 389
4 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of community
supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). In a revocation context, “a preponderance of the evidence” means
“that greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that
the defendant has violated a condition of his [community supervision].” Hacker, 389
S.W.3d at 865 (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764). The trial court abuses its discretion in
revoking community supervision if, as to every ground alleged, the State fails to meet its
burden of proof. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If,
however, the State meets its burden of proof as to any single violation, that evidence
alone is sufficient to support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d
419, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), and “[t]he trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
In a revocation proceeding, the trial court has discretion to revoke community supervision
when a preponderance of the evidence supports one of the State’s allegations that the
defendant violated a condition of community supervision. Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d
570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
5 ANALYSIS
By the Anders brief, counsel evaluates the entire record and candidly concedes
there are no meritorious grounds to present on appeal. Counsel assesses whether the
trial court abused its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community supervision and
whether her two-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
In evaluating those concerns, counsel has determined those complaints do not present
reversible error.
We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are
any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no such
issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After
reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that there is no plausible
basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-
27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
Do not publish.