Laun v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad

116 S.W. 553, 216 Mo. 563, 1909 Mo. LEXIS 349
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedFebruary 25, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 116 S.W. 553 (Laun v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laun v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad, 116 S.W. 553, 216 Mo. 563, 1909 Mo. LEXIS 349 (Mo. 1909).

Opinion

GRAVES, J.

Plaintiff, the widow of George Lann, deceased, brings action for the alleged wrongful killing of her husband by one of defendant’s' trains as it passed through the city of St. Janies in Phelps county, Missouri, June 14, 1904.

The negligence charged is (1) running in excess of the ordinance speed, i. e., six miles per hour, (2) failure to ring the bell upon the approach of the street crossing where the accident occurred, and (3) carelessly and negligently running said train upon and against the deceased, after the employees knew or by the exercise of ordinary care might have known the perilous situation of deceased. In other words the last charge was an appropriate pleading of the humanitarian doctrine. In the instruction asked and given for the plaintiff the failure to ring the bell is abandoned, as is also the humanitarian doctrine, and the case is submitted solely upon the excessive rate of speed.

By change of venue the cause was sent from Crawford county, the place of its institution, to Gasconade county, where it was tried. By answer the defendant first invokes a general denial, and secondly an appropriate plea of contributory negligence.

Plaintiff introduced her evidence, to which the defendant demurred, which demurrer being overruled, the defendant declined to introduce any evidence, whereupon the jury was instructed and in regular course returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, which was followed by a judgment for such sum. Motion for new trial, timely made, proving futile, the defendant appealed.

The serious question in this case is the question of contributory negligence upon the part of the deceased. The negligence of the defendant in running in excess of ordinance speed is not denied. The rate is variously estimated at from twenty-five to thirty-[569]*569five miles per hour, and the latter is perhaps more nearly correct.

The accident occurred at the crossing of Jefferson street in the city of St. James. Defendant’s railway runs practically east and west through said city, and Jefferson street runs north and south, so that they cross nearly at right angles. This crossing is one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five feet east of the depot of the defendant, and at the east end of the depot platform. The street is eighty feet in width and the one most generally used in going to and from the north and south parts of the city. Deceased left Miles’s store, which is south of the railroad and on the west side of Jefferson street, evidently to cross to the north part of the city. In so doing he walked along the west side of Jefferson street and walked north. Between him and the east end of the depot platform was a side track and the main track of defendant’s railway. The space between the two is given at twenty feet. In his course, he reached the switch track first and crossed it. On this occasion two trains came into St. James within a few minutes of each other — as best we can gather, within three minutes of each other. Both trains consisted of an engine and caboose. The station agent said that he did not signal a clearance to the latter train because it was following the other too closely, and he signalled it to stop, and that it finally stopped some six hundred or eight hundred' feet beyond the depot, at the stockyards. This of course bears upon the rate of speed, and as indicated above, might tend to show a speed up to the limit placed by other witnesses of thirty-five miles per hour. But as the negligence of the company stands conceded, we are more concerned in the actions of the deceased, inasmuch as they must bear upon the question of contributory negligence. For the plaintiff there were seven witnesses, including herself. She did not see the acci[570]*570dent, nor did P. R. Elliott, the station agent, nor C. P. Bnrge. Their testimony is not, therefore, directly valuable upon the question now in hand. The other witnesses upon this question testify thus:

H. H. Pinto says:

“Q. How long did you watch Mr. Laun? A. I watched him till he got across the street — or clear across the railroad, I mean, till he got to the main track.
“Q. What, if anything, did you see Mr. Laun do to ascertain if there was a train coming from the east? A. Why, nothing more than he looked when he got between the two; he crossed the side track before he got to the main track; he first glanced his head down the track, he looked east, the direction the train was coming.
“Q. Now, this track he crossed was a switch to the main fine? A. Yes, sir; that is what I saw him cross.
“Q. He had crossed the street and crossed the switch track, and, as I understand you, he was between the main track and the switch track when he paused and looked east? A. Yes, sir.”

On cross-examination, he further said:

“Q. You heard the train go through a minute before that and then you stepped out to see what it was? A. No, sir, I stepped to the door at leisure as I had nothing else to do at that time.
“Q. Well, the train was a block away then, in plain view and hearing? A. Yes, sir; it was.
“Q. Where was Mr. Laun then? A. He was right close to the side track; right close to the main track, I mean.
“Q. He crossed over on the side track? A. He crossed over to the side track and when he got half way between the side track and the main track he kind of paused and turned his head around.
[571]*571“Q. He looked toward the engine? A. He looked that way.
“Q. And at the time the engine was right at him? A. It was not very long.
“Q. Well, it was right at him? A. It was back, I guess, forty or fifty feet.
“Q. And he started to run across, didn’t he? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. He tried to beat it to the. crossing — that is what he tried to do ? A. I do not* know.
“Q. That is the way it appeared to you, was it not; is not that a fact? He jumped like he would have to hurry to get across? A. Yes, sir; he would have to hurry of course to get out of danger.
“Q. When he stopped he was not in danger; he was between the two tracks? A. Yes, sir.”

(xeorge Stbattman, a boy thirteen years old, who was on the depot platform, said:

“Q. Where was he when you first saw him [Laun] ? A. He was right there at the switch com-. ing across the track.
“Q. On which side of the main track is the switch? A. On the south side.
‘‘Q. When you first saw him was he at the switch? A. He was out there coming across.
“Q. What was he doing? A. He was walking across there.
“Q. Did you see him as he got between the switch and the main line? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. After he had crossed over from the side track before he got to-the main line? A. Yes, sir; I saw him then.
“Q. What did he do? A. He just looked east.
“Q. Was that the direction the train was coming from? A. Yes, sir; it was a west-bound train.
“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
116 S.W. 553, 216 Mo. 563, 1909 Mo. LEXIS 349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laun-v-st-louis-san-francisco-railroad-mo-1909.