Lauinger v. Commissioner

1963 T.C. Memo. 155, 22 T.C.M. 733, 1963 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 189
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJune 5, 1963
DocketDocket No. 63098.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1963 T.C. Memo. 155 (Lauinger v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lauinger v. Commissioner, 1963 T.C. Memo. 155, 22 T.C.M. 733, 1963 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 189 (tax 1963).

Opinion

Joseph F. Lauinger v. Commissioner.
Lauinger v. Commissioner
Docket No. 63098.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1963-155; 1963 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 189; 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 733; T.C.M. (RIA) 63155;
June 5, 1963
Nathan Korn, One Hanson Place, Brooklyn, N. Y., for the petitioner. Charles M. Greenspan, for the respondent.

WITHEY

Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion

WITHEY, Judge: The Commissioner determined a deficiency in petitioner's income tax for 1947 in the amount of $7,953.82. In his amended answer the respondent claimed an increased deficiency in the amount of $1,232.54.

After trial on the issues raised by the pleadings filed herein, this Court on January 30, 1959, filed its Findings*190 of Fact and Opinion with respect thereto and, on February 3, 1959, entered its decision in favor of the respondent. Joseph F. Lauinger, 31 T.C. 934. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of this Court with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which, on August 15, 1960, rendered its opinion, Lauinger v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d 419, and issued its mandate remanding the case to this Court for further consideration. Accordingly, the case is now before us under the mandate.

The issue in this case involves the proper income tax treatment of a life insurance and retirement income contract which was acquired by petitioner from the trustees of an exempt, noncontributory pension trust established by the Conlan Electric Corporation of which petitioner was president and a 50 percent stockholder. The conclusions of this Court that the petitioner acquired ownership of the policy in question on January 8, 1947, and that he did not act merely as a conduit of the funds of Conlan Electric Corporation were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. However, because of new arguments raised by petitioner for the first time*191 on appeal, or improperly presented to this Court, the Court of Appeals did not rule on our holding that he realized taxable income in 1947 to the extent of the cash surrender value of the insurance contract, but directed us to give further consideration to the following:

1. With respect to the life insurance protection provided by the policy in question, the respondent conceded on appeal that under the provisions of Regulations 111, section 29.165-6, the petitioner was taxable on the premium payments attributable solely to the life insurance feature for the prior years (1942-1946) during which the premiums were paid by Conlan. The Court of Appeals held that any portion of the cash surrender value of the policy which represented premiums paid by Conlan on the life insurance feature would not constitute taxable income to petitioner for 1947. Since petitioner had failed to offer any evidence indicating what portion, if any, of the cash surrender value of the policy acquired by petitioner on January 8, 1947, represented life insurance premiums, the Court of Appeals suggested that we receive evidence on this point.

2. With respect to the retirement income feature of the policy, the*192 Court of Appeals left to this Court for decision a question of law raised by petitioner for the first time on appeal, i.e., whether or not the policy constitutes "an annuity contract" within the meaning of the respondent's regulations (Regulations 111, section 29.165-6), the distribution of which by an exempt pension trust would not constitute income to the employee-recipient until the surrender of the contract.

3. The Court of Appeals also requested this Court to make "a more explicit finding" as to whether the distribution of the insurance policy on January 8, 1947, was made "on account of the employee's separation from the service" within the meaning of the respondent's regulations. (Regulations 111, section 29.165-6.) The regulations provide that if a distribution is made "on account of the employee's separation from the service," the amount of the distribution "shall be considered a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months."

Pursuant to the opinion and mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we held a further hearing on October 15, 1962, and after consideration of the evidence there presented and the briefs filed by the*193 parties with respect to the above-stated matters, we make the following further Findings of Fact and Opinion.

Findings of Fact

The insurance policy here involved is policy No. 506,721 which was issued by the Home Life Insurance Company of New York on December 31, 1942, to the trustees of the Conlan Electric Corporation Pension Trust. At the time of its issuance, petitioner, who was named as the insured thereunder, was 53 years of age.

The principal benefits provided by policy No. 506,721 are stated on page 1 thereof as follows:

Home Life Insurance Company agrees to pay to the Insured a Monthly Income of the amount stated below, the first payment to be due on the date of maturity if the Insured is then living, the last income payment to be that due next preceding the death of the Insured.

If the Insured shall die on or before the date of maturity, the Company further agrees that, upon receipt of due proof of the death of the Insured, it will pay as a death benefit the initial face amount hereof or an amount equal to the cash value at the end of the policy year in which such death occurs (on the basis of the table of cash values on the fourth page hereof), whichever amount*194 is greater. The greater amount so payable is herein referred to as "the face amount."

If the Insured shall die after the date of maturity without having elected one of the alternate options at maturity, and within the period of ten years from the date of maturity (hereinafter referred to as "the period of years certain"), the Company further agrees to pay as a death benefit the discounted value at the rate of three per cent (3%) interest per annum, compounded annually, of any remaining payments for the period of years certain.

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Related

Cook v. Tait
265 U.S. 47 (Supreme Court, 1924)
Fry's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
205 F.2d 517 (Third Circuit, 1953)
Fry v. Commissioner
19 T.C. 461 (U.S. Tax Court, 1952)
Lauinger v. Commissioner
31 T.C. 934 (U.S. Tax Court, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1963 T.C. Memo. 155, 22 T.C.M. 733, 1963 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lauinger-v-commissioner-tax-1963.