Lau v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedSeptember 30, 1992
Docket92-1048
StatusPublished

This text of Lau v. United States (Lau v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lau v. United States, (1st Cir. 1992).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


September 30, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

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No. 92-1048

MICHAEL A. LAU,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Selya, Circuit Judge.
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Michael A. Lau on brief pro se.
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Daniel F. Lopez Romo, United States Attorney, and Antonio R.
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Bazan, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Petitioner Michael Lau appeals from the
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denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 for post-

conviction relief. He alleges that his attorney rendered

ineffective assistance by arguing a motion to suppress

evidence in a deficient manner, and thereafter failing to

raise the issue on appeal. We disagree, and therefore

affirm.

One portion of the suppression motion at issue here

challenged the legality of a warrantless search of

petitioner's apartment in the Netherlands Antilles, a search

conducted by Dutch authorities with the participation of DEA

agents. The general rule is that searches conducted by

foreign officials are not subject to the Fourth Amendment and

the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Janis,
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428 U.S. 433, 456 n.31 (1976). There are two well-

established exceptions to this rule: (1) where the conduct of

foreign police shocks the judicial conscience; and (2) where

American officers participated in the foreign search, or the

foreign officers acted as agents for their American

counterparts, thereby rendering the search a joint venture.

See, e.g., United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1482 (1st
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Cir. 1989); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1st
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Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). Petitioner claims
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that his counsel failed to recognize, and to argue to the

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court, that the latter exception governed the search and

seizure here.

Having reviewed the record in some detail, we cannot

agree that counsel's performance in prosecuting the motion to

suppress fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
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(1984). We find no support for the suggestion that counsel

was unaware of the "joint venture" exception. Petitioner

makes much of the fact that counsel acknowledged not having

read Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
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1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969), one of the central
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cases addressing this issue. Yet this proves little; that

opinion, issued fifteen years earlier by another Circuit, was

only one of various decisions on the subject. (And, we might

note, the court there upheld the denial of a suppression

motion.) More to the point, most of counsel's questioning

focused on this very issue--i.e., the extent to which the DEA

agents participated in the search and in the selection of

items to be seized. And in his argument to the court,

counsel made specific reference to the Dutch authorities

having conducted the search "at the direction, or at the

request, or at the insistence of the DEA or Customs agents,"

and to their having acted as "agents" for the United States

government. As we read it, counsel was thereby directly

invoking the "joint venture" exception.

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To be sure, counsel might have pressed the issue with

greater vigor. Yet to the extent oral argument was

truncated, that largely occurred at the behest of the

district court, which manifested both a familiarity with the

governing legal principles and a readiness to make a ruling.

There can be little doubt that the court was cognizant of

counsel's position on the matter. Under these circumstances,

where the pertinent factual and legal issues both received an

adequate airing, it cannot be said that counsel's performance

rendered the hearing something less than a "reliable

adversarial testing process." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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Nor do we think that counsel acted unreasonably in

declining to raise the Fourth Amendment issue on appeal. As

evidenced by this court's opinion in the direct appeal,

United States v. Lau, 828 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.
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denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988), counsel had a number of
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Related

United States v. Janis
428 U.S. 433 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Kimmelman v. Morrison
477 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court, 1986)
United States v. Hensel
699 F.2d 18 (First Circuit, 1983)
United States v. Mitro
880 F.2d 1480 (First Circuit, 1989)

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