Lau v. Roger Storage

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0536
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0536 Lau v Roger Storage 08-14-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0536 Boulder County District Court No. 23CV134 Honorable Robert R. Gunning, Judge

Michael Lau,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Roger Storage, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025

Michael Lau, Pro Se

SGR, LLC, Heather A. Salg, Jean M. Peterson, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Michael Lau, appeals the district court’s judgment on

his replevin claim. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Lau had a lease to store personal property at a storage yard.

His lease provided that, if he defaulted on his rent or other lease

terms, the owner of the storage yard would have the right to assert

an owner’s lien and associated remedies under sections 38-21.5-

101 to -105, C.R.S. 2024.

¶3 Defendant, Roger Storage, LLC, acquired the storage yard after

Lau signed his original lease. Twice, Roger Storage sent Lau a

proposed new lease, along with an introductory letter. The letter

accompanying the new lease said that, if Lau didn’t sign and return

the new lease by a specified date, Lau’s continued use of the storage

yard “constitute[d] [his] acceptance of the terms of this new lease.”

The new lease increased Lau’s rent and provided for an owner’s lien

in the event of default. Lau denied receiving the letters, refused to

agree to the new lease, and filed a complaint for replevin under

C.R.C.P. 104.

¶4 In his complaint, Lau sought to recover possession of his

personal property located at the storage yard. The complaint also

1 included eight additional claims: breach of fiduciary duty, unjust

enrichment, declaratory judgment, accounting, negligence,

conversion, constructive trust, and fraud (collectively, the non-

replevin claims).

¶5 The court held a hearing regarding the replevin claim.

Although Lau didn’t provide this court with a transcript of the

hearing, a detailed minute order (replevin order) indicates that both

sides presented testimony and introduced other evidence. The

district court ruled in the replevin order that (1) Lau was entitled to

possession of his personal property located at the storage yard, and

(2) Roger Storage was entitled to a self-service storage lien for any

unpaid rent under section 38-21.5-102, C.R.S. 2024. The court

ordered that Lau had until a specific date to remove his property,

after which Roger Storage could enforce its lien against any

unremoved property. See § 38-21.5-103(1)(b)-(e), C.R.S. 2024. The

court reserved ruling on the non-replevin claims.

¶6 After the hearing, Roger Storage moved for a more definite

statement as to the allegations supporting Lau’s non-replevin

claims. See C.R.C.P. 12(e). The court granted the motion and

ordered Lau to amend the operative version of his complaint. After

2 Lau failed to timely do so or respond to the court’s subsequent

order to show cause, the court dismissed the non-replevin claims

without prejudice.

¶7 Lau appeals the replevin order. As best we understand his

arguments, Lau contends that the district court erred at the

replevin hearing by (1) not permitting him to call or cross-examine

certain witnesses and (2) admitting into evidence Roger Storage’s

proposed lease and other documents. Lau doesn’t contest the

dismissal of the non-replevin claims.

II. Analysis

¶8 Because Lau is self-represented, we liberally construe his

filings in the district court and in this court. See Minshall v.

Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21. Nevertheless, “liberal construction

does not include inventing arguments not made by the [self-

represented] party.” Id. With these principles in mind, we decline

to address the merits of Lau’s arguments for two reasons.

¶9 First, Lau failed to preserve his arguments for appeal. See

Gestner v. Gestner, 2024 COA 55, ¶ 27 (declining to address

unpreserved argument). He argues that he preserved his

arguments in “Court documents, Exhibits, and Transcripts from the

3 Record of Appeal,” but he fails to provide “the precise location in the

record where the issue[s] [were] raised and where the court ruled,”

as C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) requires. See Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 67

(“‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in’ the parties’

submissions.” (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956

(7th Cir. 1991))) (alteration omitted). Furthermore, because Lau

contends the court made both purported errors at the replevin

hearing, and he failed to provide a transcript of that hearing, we

must assume that the transcript supports the district court’s

rulings. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where the

appellant fails to provide . . . a transcript, the [appellate] court must

presume that the record supports the judgment.”); see also Wolven

v. Velez, 2024 COA 8, ¶ 53 n.6 (holding that the party asserting an

error is obligated to provide a record that discloses the error); In re

Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 10 (holding that the appellant

failed to establish preservation because she did not designate the

hearing transcript on review). Even if Lau raised these issues in his

motion for post-trial relief following the replevin hearing, that

motion wasn’t sufficient to preserve his arguments for review. See

Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA

4 78M, ¶ 66 (“Arguments made . . . for the first time in a post-trial

motion are too late and, consequently, are deemed waived for

purposes of appeal.”).

¶ 10 Second, even if Lau preserved his arguments, they are too

undeveloped for our review. Lau hasn’t provided us “with citations

to the authorities [or] parts of the record on which [he] relies” to

support his assertions, C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B), and we “will not consider

a bald legal proposition presented without argument or

development,” Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19

(Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 11 Finally, even if we were to address Lau’s contentions, he fails

to explain how the district court’s rulings impacted his substantial

rights. Indeed, the court granted the relief Lau requested in his

replevin action: possession of his personal property.1 See C.A.R.

35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any error or defect not

affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.

1 It is of no consequence to this appeal that Lau failed to timely

remove his property, and Roger Storage proceeded with a lien sale.

5 JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.