Latraille v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau

481 N.W.2d 446, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 42, 1992 WL 28181
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1992
DocketCiv. 910219
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 481 N.W.2d 446 (Latraille v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Latraille v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 481 N.W.2d 446, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 42, 1992 WL 28181 (N.D. 1992).

Opinion

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

Wanda Latraille appeals from a district court judgment affirming the Workers Compensation Bureau’s order denying further benefits. We affirm.

Wanda was employed at the Grafton State School as a resident care technician. In this position Wanda helped groom, dress, and walk clients who were low functioning adults. This job required lifting of some clients into wheelchairs as well as other physical demands. On November 10, 1988, Wanda was involved in an incident where a patient pushed her to the floor and fell on top of her. 1 This patient weighed approximately 170-185 pounds. As a result, Wanda sustained injury to her right side, pulled muscles in her neck, and bruised an ankle. On December 22, 1988, Wanda resigned due to medical concerns.

Thereafter, the Bureau awarded benefits for reasonable medical expenses for treatment of the injuries which occurred on November 10, 1988. The Bureau also ordered that disability benefits be paid from December 20, 1988, through March 30, 1989. The order stated that “absent a significant change in medical condition due to the work injury, additional benefits under the North Dakota Workers Compensation Act beyond those previously paid or those awarded pursuant to the terms of this order, are in all things denied.” This order directed that chiropractic treatments were no longer to be paid by the Bureau. Wanda and the State School waived their right to appeal from this order. However, on January 29,1990, Wanda reapplied for benefits. The Bureau denied further benefits in an order issued on April 6, 1990.

On April 20, 1990, Wanda requested that the Bureau change her treating doctor from James A. Lessard, M.D., to Phillip J. Bruno, D.C., a chiropractor in Grafton. This request was denied by the Bureau. On May 3, 1990, she petitioned for rehearing of the order of April 6, 1990. After holding a formal telephonic hearing, the Bureau issued an order denying further disability benefits on February 6, 1991. Wanda appealed to the district court which affirmed the Bureau’s order. She then appealed to this Court.

Wanda states three issues on appeal:

“I. Whether the Bureau erred in discounting the testimony of Dr. Philip [sic] Bruno, a treating chiropractor.
“II. Whether the claimant’s fibrositis resulted from her multiple work injuries.
“HI. Whether the claimant remains disabled as a result of her work injuries.”

I.

Wanda argues that a reasoning mind could not have determined that Dr. Bruno was less credible than the other treating physicians. She also argues that the Bureau failed to explain the discrepancies in the medical evidence and testimony.

Dr. Bruno had treated Wanda on several occasions between April 20 and May 31, 1990. 2 The Bureau heard testimony only from Dr. Bruno. The Bureau considered the notes and letters of the other doctors and found them to be more credible than Dr. Bruno. 3 Drs. Lessard, Richards, and *448 Eckhoff saw her only a few times; however, the Bureau found them more credible because “they had considerably more extensive experience in treating the claimant.” Wanda asserts that the Bureau only relied upon the testimony that was favorable to it, and did not adequately explain why Dr. Bruno’s testimony was not credible or worthy of more weight. Wanda asserts that the Bureau’s findings must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 28-32-19, N.D.C.C. She argues that the Bureau’s findings that Dr. Lessard and Dr. Eckhoff are more credible because they had more extensive experience treating Wanda is unreasonable. We disagree.

On appeal, we review the Bureau’s decision, not the decision of the district court. Holmgren v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 201 (N.D.1990). Our review is limited by statute. Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C. We will affirm the Bureau’s decision unless the findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, or its conclusions are not supported by the findings. Howes v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D.1988). It is important to keep in mind that, “[i]n determining whether or not an agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but we determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined that the factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence.” Howes, 429 N.W.2d at 734 (citing Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D.1979)).

In Kopp v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d 132 (N.D.1990), we addressed issues similar to those presented in this case. Kopp involved a claimant who was awarded medical and disability benefits by the Bureau for a work-related injury. Id. at 133. The Bureau continued benefits until it determined that Kopp was no *449 longer disabled. Id. A formal hearing was held after which the Bureau issued an order denying Kopp benefits. Id. On appeal to the district court, the Bureau was ordered to reconsider the case in light of other evidence. Id. After such review, the Bureau issued an order which, in essence, again denied further benefits. Id. On appeal to the district court, that court determined that the claimant was entitled to recover disability benefits for a specified time, but affirmed the decision of the Bureau to terminate the claimant’s benefits after the time specified. Id.

On appeal to this Court, Kopp asserted that the Bureau’s findings were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence because it placed the burden upon Kopp to show that he remained disabled, and that the Bureau failed to resolve the inconsistencies in the medical evidence. Id. In response to Kopp’s argument that it was not his burden to prove that he remained disabled, this Court said:

“As we have previously indicated herein, where the Bureau decides to terminate benefits after initially granting compensation, the burden will be upon the claimant to establish that he or she has a continuing right to receive the benefits. Hayden v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 447 N.W.2d [489] at 496; Gramling v. North Dakota Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 303 N.W.2d 323 (N.D.1981).”

Kopp v. Workers Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d at 135.

We acknowledge that Justice Meschke dissented in

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Bluebook (online)
481 N.W.2d 446, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 42, 1992 WL 28181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/latraille-v-north-dakota-workers-compensation-bureau-nd-1992.