Latoya Spencer v. Copper Springs Hospital, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5

9 Latoya Spencer, No. CV-25-02219-PHX-JZB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Copper Springs Hospital, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 16 48), and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 49). For the foregoing reasons, 17 the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion. 19 Plaintiff, an intake specialist, brought this civil action under Title VII and Arizona 20 tort law against her employer and a doctor alleging she suffered illegal discrimination, 21 retaliation, a hostile work environment, and defamation. There are no genuine issues of 22 facts surrounding Plaintiff’s administrative charge, her alleged adverse employment 23 actions, the alleged offensive conduct she suffered, or Defendants’ qualified privilege to 24 speak. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, does not establish a prima 25 facie case for her Title VII claims, and Defendants sufficiently establish their qualified 26 privilege to speak. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate. 28 Plaintiff, Latoya Spencer, brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 1964 and a claim for defamation. (Doc. 13.) Defendant Copper Springs Hospital (“Copper 2 Springs”), hired Plaintiff, an African American woman, as an intake specialist on 3 November 7, 2022. (Doc. 49 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff’s job duties included assessing patients for 4 inpatient or outpatient care, completing clinical assessment forms, making initial patient 5 determinations, and providing information to doctors to make admission decisions. (Id. at 6 ¶ 3.) 7 On March 16, 2025, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Dr. Mecham, regarding a patient 8 who presented with OCD (“the OCD-presenting patient”). (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges Dr. 9 Mecham accused Plaintiff of downplaying her assessment, said that he did not believe her, 10 called her a liar, and said she needed to be fired (“the March 16 incident”). (Id.) Dr. 11 Mecham sent a message to Plaintiff’s supervisor reporting his version of events, who 12 forwarded it to a Human Resources (“HR”) member at Copper Springs. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff 13 complained to her supervisor and HR about Dr. Mecham verbally and in writing, stating 14 that he was demeaning, unprofessional, and dismissive, that he called her a liar, dishonest 15 and incompetent, and that he said she needed to be fired. (Id. at ¶ 7.) On March 28, 2025, 16 Plaintiff met with HR, answered questions about the March 16 incident, and shared her 17 version of events. (Id. at ¶ 9.) 18 On April 13, 2025, Dr. Mecham sent an email to Plaintiff’s supervisor raising 19 concerns about the job performance of the Intake Department. (Id. at ¶ 10.) On April 21, 20 2025, Plaintiff was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), which stated that 21 Plaintiff provided incomplete, inconsistent information to providers during care 22 assessments. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Two Copper Springs HR members told Plaintiff the PIP did not 23 mean she did anything wrong and that the PIP was for educational purposes. (Id. at ¶ 12.) 24 The PIP required Plaintiff to continue her normal job duties with additional oversight for 25 four weeks. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s pay, schedule, job title, and responsibilities were not 26 affected by the PIP. (Id.) Two other female African American intake specialists received 27 similar PIPs at this time, but other African American and/or female intake specialists did 28 not receive PIPs. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges the additional oversight from the PIP 1 subjected her to substantial workplace pressure and that her mental well-being was affected 2 by such pressures. (Doc. 51 at 3.) Plaintiff completed the PIP and it is no longer in effect. 3 (Doc. 49 at ¶ 16.) After completing the PIP, Plaintiff received a raise and was hired for a 4 separate job by Sage Counseling. (Id. at ¶ 19.) No one at Sage Counseling was aware of 5 her PIP. (Id.) 6 On April 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint via Copper Spring’s ethics hotline 7 stating that Dr. Mecham called her a liar and incompetent, that he was verbally abusive, 8 and that she believed she was retaliated against for complaining about him. (Id. at ¶15.) 9 Plaintiff has worked with Dr. Mecham once since March 16, 2025, and Plaintiff admits he 10 did not call her a liar, downplay her assessments, act rudely or unprofessional towards her, 11 or “harass” her during this interaction. (Id. at ¶ 17.) On May 6, 2025, Plaintiff emailed her 12 supervisor to express her belief that she was placed on a PIP in retaliation for reporting Dr. 13 Mecham’s conduct in creating a “hostile work environment.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) 14 On May 8, 2025, Plaintiff received an email from her supervisor stating that she was 15 out of compliance for clinical oversight and that she would need to catch up before her next 16 shift. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff admits she missed a clinical oversight, that she was taken off 17 the schedule for one day to complete it, and that she received no corrective action. (Id. at ¶ 18 22.) 19 Plaintiff filed her original Complaint alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile 20 work environment in violation of Title VII in Maricopa County Superior Court on May 22, 21 2025, then filed an Amended Complaint on June 4, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 24.) On June 5, 2025, 22 Plaintiff emailed her supervisor to follow up on her earlier HR complaint and alleged, for 23 the first time, that she believed she was subjected to discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 24 On June 25, 2025, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to this 25 Court. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff filed the present SAC in this Court on September 3, 2025, and 26 filed her charge with the EEOC on September 25, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff received her 27 right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on February 19, 2026. (Doc. 51-2 at 83.) 28 // 2 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 3 warranted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 4 the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking 5 summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 6 basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 7 demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 8 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light 9 most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 10 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 56(a). 12 Summary judgment is also appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing 13 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 14 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only 15 disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of 16 summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could 17 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 18 248 (1986). “The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of 19 material fact exists.” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 20 omitted). 22 A. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies Under Title VII. 23 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims should be dismissed because she 24 failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Doc. 49 at 7.) Specifically, Defendants point 25 to Plaintiff’s failure to file an EEOC charge until after she filed her original complaint and 26 both amended complaints as the reason why the claims should be dismissed. (Id.) In 27 response, Plaintiff contends that she exhausted her administrative remedies because she 28 received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in February 2026 while this litigation was 1 pending. (Doc. 51 at 14–15). The Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her 2 administrative remedies regarding her Title VII claims.1 3 To bring a Title VII claim, “a plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative 4 remedies before seeking adjudication[.]” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 5 2002) (emphasis added). To exhaust Title VII administrative remedies, a plaintiff must 6 “file a timely charge with the EEOC[.]” Id. at 1104. This charge “must be filed with the 7 EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.”2 Bond v. Wells Fargo 8 Bank NA, 782 F. Supp. 3d 743, 753 (D. Ariz. 2025) (citation omitted). Courts “must enforce 9 [this] rule if a party properly raises it.” Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 549 10 (2019) (citation omitted). “The administrative charge requirement serves the important 11 purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for 12 prompt adjudication and decision.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th 13 Cir. 2002) (simplified), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Bend, 587 U.S. 541 (2019). 14 Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not file 15 her charge with the EEOC until after she filed this lawsuit. Specifically, Plaintiff filed her 16 original complaint on May 22, 2025, her FAC on June 4, 2025, and her SAC on September 17 3, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 1); (doc. 13.) However, Plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC 18 until September 25, 2025. (Doc. 49 at 5.) Thus, while Plaintiff filed her charge with the 19 EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practices here, she did not exhaust “her 20 administrative remedies before seeking adjudication of a Title VII claim.” Lyons, 307 F.3d 21 at 1103 (emphasis added). 22 Plaintiff asserts that she exhausted her administrative remedies because she received

23 1 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her Title VII administrative remedies overall, the Court does not address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff failed to 24 exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her discrimination and retaliation claims based on color, sex, and retaliation due to boxes on the EEOC charge being unchecked. 25 (Doc. 49 at 7.) 2 “[B]ecause Arizona has its own state agency empowered to investigate and remedy 26 allegations of discrimination in employment, Arizona is a so-called deferral state.” Cox v. Glob. Tool Supply LLC, 629 F.Supp.3d 963, 971 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2022) (citation omitted). In 27 such states, the deadline to file a claim with the EEOC is extended from 180 days to 300 days if the plaintiff initiates proceedings with the state agency first. Id. “[W]here, like here, 28 the ACRD and EEOC are parties to a worksharing agreement, a complainant ordinarily need not file separately with federal and state agencies.” Id. (citation omitted). 1 a right-to-sue letter while this action was pending. (Doc. 51 at 14–15). Plaintiff relies on 2 Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp. to support her claim, which states that “[a] Title VII 3 complainant may file an action prior to receiving her right to sue letter, provided there is 4 not evidence showing that the premature filing precluded the state from performing its 5 administrative duties or that the defendant was prejudiced by such filing.” 892 F.2d 1442, 6 1445 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the procedural posture in Edwards was different from 7 this case. In Edwards, the plaintiff filed her Title VII charge with a designated EEOC 8 agency before filing a complaint in federal court. Id. at 1444. Thus, the plaintiff in Edwards 9 gave notice to “the charged party of the claim” and helped narrow the issues “for prompt 10 adjudication and decision.” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099. 11 Notably, other federal district courts hold that a plaintiff has not exhausted their 12 administrative remedies where they filed a charge with the EEOC after filing a lawsuit, 13 even where they later received a right-to-sue letter. In Kirby v. Brown, a Title VII plaintiff 14 did not file a charge with the EEOC until five days after she filed her Title VII action in 15 federal court. No. 2:13-CV-00021 LKK, 2013 WL 4780767, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 16 2013). The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and 17 that her Title VII claims should be dismissed. Id. The court reasoned that because a charge 18 was not filed prior to the start of the lawsuit, “the purposes of the administrative charge 19 requirement were not met” and the defendants “were not afforded an opportunity to either 20 resolve plaintiff’s concerns before she filed a complaint, or to be put on notice on plaintiff’s 21 claims so that they could potentially narrow the issues.” Id.; see United States ex rel. Reed 22 v. Keypoint Gov’t Sols., No. 14-CV-00004-CMA, 2017 WL 6033682, at *11 (D. Colo. 23 Sept. 28, 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 923 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 2019) 24 (finding that “it would defy logic to allow [the plaintiff] to satisfy the [statutory] exhaustion 25 scheme by filing the [EEOC] charge after commencing suit”).3 26 Like the EEOC charges in both Kirby and Keypoint, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was 27 3 Allowing a plaintiff to bring a complaint before filing a charge “would circumvent 28 the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge ….” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099 (citation omitted). 1 filed after her lawsuit began. Therefore, while Plaintiff filed her charge within the 300-day 2 deadline and received a right-to-sue letter, she still failed to exhaust her administrative 3 remedies before filing the current suit.4 The Court grants Defendants’ motion regarding 4 Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. 5 B. Plaintiff Does Not Satisfy a Prima Facie Case under Title VII. 6 Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative 7 remedies, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title 8 VII claims because Plaintiff does not sufficiently show essential elements of such claims.5 9 Specifically, Plaintiff fails to show that she suffered an adverse employment action, that 10 similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, or that she suffered offensive 11 conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment. 12 1. Plaintiff Does Not Satisfy a Prima Facie Case for Discrimination. 13 An employee suffers intentional discrimination when they are “singled out and 14 treated less favorably than others similarly situated” because of their protected class. 15 Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 16 omitted). “Where direct evidence is unavailable, plaintiffs can, and frequently do, rely on 17 the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,6 … as a way 18 of channeling inquiry into the available circumstantial evidence.” Ballou v. McElvain, 29 19 F.4th 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2022). 20 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff alleging discrimination must first establish a 21 prima facie case of discrimination. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 22 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show

23 4 Plaintiff asserts that any procedural defect was cured by the Court because “the Court granted [her] request” to stay proceedings to allow completion of the EEOC process. 24 (Doc. 51 at 15). Plaintiff’s assertion misstates the record. The Court explicitly found that a stay was not warranted. (Doc. 29 at 1.) The Court instead required Plaintiff to provide 25 notice of whether she received a right-to-sue notice by the end of a 180-day deadline. (Id. at 6–7). Because Defendants have sufficiently shown that Plaintiff did not exhaust her 26 administrative remedies, her Title VII claims are dismissed. 5 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claims against Dr. 27 Mecham because the Ninth Circuit has “long held that Title VII does not provide a separate cause of action against supervisors or co-workers.” Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 28 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). 6 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 1 that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was performing according to her 2 employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 3 (4) similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably, 4 or “other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an 5 inference of discrimination.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 F.3d 678, 691 (9th 6 Cir. 2017). The proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for a Title VII claim at 7 summary judgment is “minimal” and does not have to “rise to the level of a preponderance 8 of the evidence.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062 (citation omitted). However, “conclusory 9 statements without factual support are insufficient[.]” Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 10 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 11 The first two elements are uncontested. However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 12 did not suffer an adverse employment action. (Doc. 49 at 8–9.) 13 An adverse employment action is “one that materially affects the compensation, 14 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 15 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (simplified). “[O]nly non-trivial employment actions[,]” such as 16 “termination, dissemination of a negative employment reference, issuance of an 17 undeserved negative performance review and refusal to consider for promotion[,]” are 18 considered adverse employment actions. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 19 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 Plaintiff claims that she suffered three adverse employment actions: (1) she was 21 placed on a PIP, (2) she received an email stating that she was out of compliance with 22 clinical oversight requirements, and (3) she was taken off schedule for one day to complete 23 the clinical oversight she missed. (Doc. 49 at 5.) None of these qualify as an adverse 24 employment action. 25 First, “merely placing someone on a [PIP] is not a per se adverse employment 26 action.” E.E.O.C. v. Evergreen All. Golf Ltd., LP, No. CV 11-0662-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 27 4478870, at *10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2013). A PIP that is “non-disciplinary training” and 28 does not “materially impact a plaintiff’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 1 employment” is not considered an adverse employment action. Id.; see Jackson v. City of 2 Yachats, No. 6:23-CV-00690-AP, 2025 WL 3524372, at *16 (D. Or. Dec. 9, 2025) (holding 3 that a PIP is not an adverse employment action where it does not materially alter the terms 4 of a plaintiff’s employment). Plaintiff admits that the PIP did not change her job 5 responsibilities, did not change her pay, did not change her schedule, and did not change 6 her title. (Doc. 49-1 at 30–31.) The PIP’s only change was an increase in the supervision 7 of Plaintiff’s work for four weeks. (Doc. 49-1 at 29). In fact, Plaintiff received a raise after 8 she completed the PIP, and she secured a second job with an employer who had no 9 knowledge of her PIP. (Doc. 49 at 4.) The Court finds the PIP here was non-disciplinary 10 training that did not impact Plaintiff’s terms of employment. Thus, the PIP was not an 11 adverse employment action. 12 Second, Plaintiff does not show how the email from her supervisor stating that she 13 was out of compliance with clinical oversight requirements materially affected the terms 14 of her employment. Plaintiff claims “she was fully compliant at all relevant times,” (doc. 15 51 at 6), even though Plaintiff admits she missed a clinical oversight. (Doc. 49 at 4.) The 16 email itself appears to be a mere follow-up email and nothing in its contents suggests that 17 the material terms of Plaintiff’s employment would be negatively impacted. See (doc. 49- 18 11). Overall, Plaintiff fails to show that this email was an adverse employment action. See 19 Watkins v. Wesley Homes, No. 2:25-CV-00290-LK, 2026 WL 353262, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 20 Feb. 9, 2026) (finding that a supervisor’s email was not an adverse employment action 21 where it only asked to discuss an issue with a plaintiff and stated that the plaintiff needed 22 additional training). 23 Third, “a change in schedule will [typically] not constitute an adverse employment 24 action.” Peck v. City of Tucson, No. CV-20-00017-TUC-LCK, 2021 WL 24578, at *6 (D. 25 Ariz. Jan. 4, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-15198, 2021 WL 5984971 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021). 26 However, “a schedule change could be adverse to a particular employee facing specific 27 circumstances.” Id. Plaintiff does not point to any specific circumstances for why being 28 taken off schedule for one day to complete a clinical oversight was materially adverse to 1 her employment. Plaintiff claims that “she was removed from the schedule based off a 2 manufactured and mathematically impossible audit” but does not explain what this audit is 3 or how it relates to her missing a clinical oversight. (Doc. 51 at 6.) Overall, Plaintiff does 4 not point to anything in the record showing that being taken off-schedule for a single day 5 to complete a clinical oversight materially affected the terms of her employment. 6 Additionally, Plaintiff fails to show that similarly situated employees outside her 7 protected class were treated more favorably than her. “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated 8 when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 9 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Employees are not required to be “identical; they must 10 simply be similar in all material respects.” Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 11 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Plaintiff claims she satisfies the fourth prima facie 12 element of a Title VII discrimination claim because Dr. Mecham accepted a white male 13 supervisor’s clinical assessment of the OCD-presenting patient over hers, and because two 14 other African American female intake specialists received similar PIPs at the same time 15 she did. (Doc. 51 at 16–17.) However, Plaintiff’s cited evidence does not show that Dr. 16 Mecham agreed with a second screening assessment over Plaintiff’s and nothing in the 17 record shows that Dr. Mecham had access to objective data confirming Plaintiff’s initial 18 assessment of the OCD-presenting patient. While only African American female intake 19 specialists received PIPs similar to Plaintiff’s, other African American and/or female intake 20 specialists did not receive such PIPs. (Doc. 49 at 6.) Plaintiff may subjectively believe that 21 Defendants acted with a discriminatory motive, but such a belief without sufficient 22 evidence “is no more than speculation.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 23 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, Plaintiff fails to show that similarly situated 24 employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably than her. 25 Overall, Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence to satisfy a prima facie 26 discrimination case under Title VII. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue 27 of fact, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the discrimination claims. 28 // 1 2. Plaintiff Does Not Satisfy a Prima Facie Case for Retaliation. 2 Similar to the requirements of a Title VII discrimination claim, Plaintiff must 3 establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1034. This requires 4 Plaintiff to show: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse 5 employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the 6 adverse employment action.” Id. at 1034–35. As discussed above, the three actions Plaintiff 7 claimed she suffered in her discrimination claim were not adverse employment actions and 8 therefore fail to satisfy a prima facie case for retaliation. The only new action Plaintiff 9 claims as adverse is that she had to “continue working with Dr. Mecham without Copper 10 Springs protecting her from him.” (Doc. 49 at 6.) 11 The Court finds Plaintiff’s ongoing work with Dr. Mecham was also not an adverse 12 employment action. Plaintiff claims continuing to work with Dr. Mecham “caused 13 heightened stress, emotional distress, and additional workplace pressure.” (Doc. 51 at 4.) 14 However, Plaintiff does not explain how continuing to work with Dr. Mecham created a 15 material impact on the terms of her employment. Plaintiff’s only evidence in the record to 16 support her conclusion is an email from Plaintiff stating that she left her shift because of 17 “acute physical and emotional distress caused by Dr. Mecham’s verbal abuse and 18 misconduct.” (Doc. 51-2 at 21.) But, Plaintiff admits that the only time she worked with 19 Dr. Mecham after the March 16 incident was during a routine staffing call. (Doc. 49-1 at 20 23–24). Plaintiff admits that during this interaction, Dr. Mecham did not call her a liar, did 21 not downplay her assessment, and was not rude to her in any way. (Doc. 49-1 at 26). This 22 is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action. See Rodriguez v. Boeing Co., No. 23 21-35951, 2024 WL 1328774, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2024) (finding that a plaintiff did 24 not show an adverse employment action where defendants refused to move plaintiff’s 25 workspace away from a coworker who previously made disparaging remarks). 26 Thus, Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence to satisfy a prima facie claim for 27 Title VII retaliation. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact, 28 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim. 1 3. Plaintiff Does Not Sufficiently Show a Hostile Work Environment Claim. 2 A plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment claim must show that their employer 3 discriminated against them on account of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected group, 4 and the “offensive conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions 5 of employment.” Sharp v. S&S Activewear, L.L.C., 69 F.4th 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2023) 6 (citation omitted). “To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive 7 to violate Tile VII, [courts] consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the 8 discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 9 a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 10 work performance.” Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 648 (9th Cir. 2021) 11 (citations omitted). “Simple teasing,” “offhand comments,” and “isolated incidents” are 12 generally insufficient to constitute hostility. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 13 775, 788 (1998) (explaining that Title VII is not a “general civility code”) (citation 14 omitted). 15 Plaintiff claims that the following actions constituted a hostile work environment: 16 (1) the March 16 incident, (2) an HR worker’s statements to her, (3) her PIP, and (4) the 17 compliance email. (Doc. 49 at 14.) The only action that could plausibly contribute to a 18 hostile work environment claim is the March 16 incident. The HR member’s statements to 19 Plaintiff cannot be said to be hostile or uncivil here. The HR meeting allowed Plaintiff to 20 share her perspective about the March 16 incident, and the HR workers even told Plaintiff 21 they would follow up with witnesses who supported Plaintiff’s version of events. (Doc. 49- 22 1 at 19–21). As discussed above, the PIP and compliance email did not unreasonably 23 interfere with Plaintiff’s work performance and nothing in their contents could be said to 24 be physically threatening or humiliating. 25 The March 16 incident, by itself, is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff suffered 26 offensive conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 27 employment. Isolated incidents are actionable only if “extremely serious[.]” Faragher, 524 28 U.S. at 788. This incident does not rise to that level. While Plaintiff likely felt a subjective 1 level of humiliation from Dr. Mecham’s comments calling her a liar and incompetent, no 2 reasonable jury could conclude that the comments were “sufficiently severe or pervasive 3 to alter the conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment.” Sharp, 69 F.4th at 978; see McCree v. 4 State of Cal. Dep’t of Conservation, No. 12-CV-04127-JST, 2014 WL 1936504, at *5 5 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (finding that an isolated incident where a plaintiff was called a 6 liar and their performance was called into question did not establish a hostile work 7 environment). 8 Thus, Plaintiff fails to show that she suffered offensive conduct sufficiently hostile 9 to violate Title VII. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact, 10 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim. 11 C. Qualified Privilege to Speak. 12 Plaintiff claims Dr. Mecham’s statements to her on March 16, his email to Plaintiff’s 13 supervisor, and statements in her PIP were defamatory. (Doc. 49 at 6.) Defendants claim 14 Plaintiff’s defamation action should be dismissed because they had a qualified privilege to 15 speak and did not abuse it. (Id. at 15.) Specifically, Defendants claim their statements “are 16 conditionally protected by the common interest privilege[,]” and that Plaintiff presented 17 “no evidence of either malice or excessive publication.” (Id. at 16.) The Court agrees with 18 Defendants. 19 A qualified privilege defends against a defamation action and is “based on the social 20 utility norm of protecting statements required to be made in response to a legal, moral, or 21 social duty.” Green Acres Tr. v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 624 (Ariz. 1984). The immunity 22 from this privilege is “conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a 23 proper purpose.” Id. (citation omitted). Without a “proper purpose or reasonable manner 24 of publication, the defense fails.” Id. 25 To determine whether a qualified privilege exists, courts analyze “whether a 26 privileged occasion arose, and if so, whether the occasion for the privilege was abused.” 27 Id. “Whether a privileged occasion arose is a question of law for the court, and whether the 28 occasion for the privilege was abused is a question of fact for the jury.” Id. 1 1. Defendants Sufficiently Prove That a Privileged Occasion Arose. 2 To show “that a privileged occasion arose, a defamation defendant must establish 3 that the circumstances in which the communication was made created an obligation to 4 speak.” Id. Defendants claim their statements “are conditionally protected by the common 5 interest privilege.” (Doc. 49 at 16.) This privilege applies where “the circumstances lead 6 any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly 7 or reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest 8 is entitled to know.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977).7 This privilege exists 9 between “[p]ersons associated together in professional activities.” Id. § 596 cmt. d. 10 Arizona courts recognize that the common interest privilege applies where medical 11 workers discuss a patient’s care with each other and criticize a plaintiff’s job performance. 12 In Hirsch v. Cooper, a doctor made alleged defamatory statements in a conversation about 13 another doctor’s performance concerning a patient’s care. 737 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Ariz. Ct. 14 App. 1986). The court found that the common interest privilege applied because the 15 discussion “concerned the future care of the patient and involved matters of a ‘common 16 interest’ as well as ‘information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the recipient 17 or a third person.’” Id. at 1096. 18 Here, like the alleged defamatory statements in Hirsch, Defendants’ statements 19 arose in conversations between medical workers about a plaintiff’s job performance in 20 connection with the care of patients. First, Dr. Mecham’s verbal statements to Plaintiff 21 concerned the OCD-presenting patient’s care and Plaintiff’s job performance in relation to 22 such care. See (doc. 49-1 at 9–10.) Second, Dr. Mecham’s written statements to Plaintiff’s 23 supervisors concerned the care of the OCD-presenting patient, other patients who may have 24 been improperly released, and the job performance of Plaintiff and others in the intake 25 department. See (doc. 49-3; see also (doc. 49-5). Third, the PIP concerned Plaintiff’s job 26 performance in relation to patient care. See (doc. 49-6.) Each of the alleged defamatory 27 statements arose on occasions where medical workers had a common interest in improving

28 7 “Arizona views the Restatement as authority for resolving questions concerning rules in defamation cases.” Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119, 1126 ¶ 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 1 patient care and correcting Plaintiff’s job performance to improve such care. 2 Thus, Defendants’ statements are conditionally protected by the common interest 3 privilege. 4 2. Plaintiff Provides No Evidence that the Privilege was Abused. 5 Once a defendant shows that a conditional privilege may apply, the plaintiff can 6 “prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by 7 demonstrating excessive publication.” Green Acres, 688 P.2d at 624 (citations omitted). 8 An abuse through actual malice “occurs when the defendant makes a statement knowing 9 its falsity or actually entertaining doubts about its truth.” Id. While this is normally a 10 question for the jury, “the court can dispose of the issue” where there is no evidence of 11 malice. Aspell v. Am. Cont. Bridge League of Memphis, Tenn., 595 P.2d 191, 193 (Ariz. 12 Ct. App. 1979). 13 “In a defamation case, if the factual dispute concerns actual malice, the trial court’s 14 summary judgment inquiry is whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable 15 jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing 16 evidence or that the plaintiff has not.” Heuisler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 812 P.2d 17 1096, 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). “Proof of actual malice requires clear 18 and convincing evidence that the defendants published either with knowledge that the 19 defamatory statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether the statements 20 were true or false.” Id. “The evidence must be sufficient to permit the conclusion that the 21 defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Id. (citations 22 omitted). 23 Plaintiff does not directly address Defendants’ qualified privilege claim in her 24 response. See (doc. 51.) Instead, Plaintiff denies that she lacks evidence of intentional 25 misrepresentation and denies that she lacks evidence regarding the conduct and knowledge 26 of Copper Spring’s HR administrators. (Id. at 10–11). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that her 27 “clinical assessment was confirmed by her supervisor and witnessed by two coworkers.” 28 (Id. at 10.) However, Plaintiff does not explain how this is evidence showing that 1 Defendants knew their statements were false or that they recklessly disregarded whether 2 their statements were true or false. Plaintiff also claims that Dr. Mecham could have 3 accessed “objective clinical information supporting [her] conclusions[,]” and that 4 Defendants had access to “system implementation dates, monitoring records, and 5 compliance timelines.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff does not point to anything in the record to 6 support this claim, nor does she explain how this is evidence of actual malice. Thus, the 7 Court finds Plaintiff’s “mere denial” of the alleged defamatory statements is not evidence 8 that Defendants abused their common interest privilege. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 9 267, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a plaintiff’s mere denial of alleged defamatory 10 statements about his job performance was not evidence of actual malice). 11 Thus, Plaintiff failed to show that “the evidence in the record could support a 12 reasonable jury finding … that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and 13 convincing evidence.” Heuisler, 812 P.2d at 1100 (citation omitted). Because Plaintiff has 14 not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 15 the defamation claims.8 16 // 17 /// 18 // 19 /// 20 // 21 /// 22 // 23 /// 24 //

25 8 As a final matter, Plaintiff, on June 25, 2026, filed a “Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal and Substitute Redacted Exhibits.” (Doc. 56.) Although the public has a general right 26 to inspect judicial records and documents, see Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), given that the documents in question contain non-party medical records 27 and personally identifiable medical information, the Court finds that the disclosure of such information “could result in improper use of the material for scandalous or libelous purposes[.]” 28 Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the Court shall grant the Motion and seal (docs. 30 & 39). 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) is || GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment || (doc. 48) is DENIED. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Exhibits 7\| Under Seal and Substitute Redacted Exhibits (doc. 56) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court 8 || 1s kindly directed to file (doc. 30) and (doc. 39) UNDER SEAL. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any pending motions are denied as moot and all scheduled hearings are vacated. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment 11 |} accordingly and terminate this action. 12 Dated this 14th day of July, 2026.

14 Honorable John Z. Boyle United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-17-