AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 13, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00290-CV
LATISHA HASSEN, Appellant V. PAUL DEMETRIOU, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 7 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 007-03505-2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Carlyle, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia In this landlord/tenant suit, Latisha Hassen (“Tenant”) appeals the County
Court’s judgment against her for $2,887.63 in damages and $4,130 in attorney’s fees.
In eight issues with multiple subparts, Tenant, appearing pro se, generally
complains that the County Court lacked jurisdiction and the judgment was in error.
Concluding Tenant’s arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND Paul Demetriou (“Landlord”) and Tenant were parties to a residential lease
agreement (the “Lease”) that was renewed multiple times. The Lease period at issue here was from December 1, 2021 to November 30, 2022, during which time the
Lease required that Tenant make $1,525 monthly rent payments.
On March 30, 2022, Tenant advised Landlord that she was terminating the
Lease because certain requested repairs had not been done. Tenant did not pay April
rent and vacated the property on April 6, 2022. Tenant subsequently demanded
return of her security deposit.
Landlord responded to Tenant’s request for her security deposit with a
demand for payment. Landlord stated that after applying a $1,650 credit for Tenant’s
security deposit, $2,887.63 remained due and owing for damages to the property,
unpaid rent, cleaning, and the cost of reletting.
Tenant sued Landlord and his property manager in JP Court seeking three
times the amount of her deposit and other damages for alleged landlord retaliation.
The property manager appeared, but the Landlord did not. The court entered a default
judgment against Landlord and dismissed the property manager from the suit.
Landlord appealed to the County Court. He also filed a breach of contract
counterclaim and requested damages and attorney’s fees. When the appeal was filed,
Landlord filed a $14,000 cash deposit in lieu of bond. When the deposit was filed,
the JP court gave Landlord a surety form to complete. Landlord signed the form but
did not indicate that “the bond” was payable to Tenant.
Tenant moved to dismiss the case for failure to perfect the appeal by posting
a proper bond. The court conducted a hearing, and counsel for Landlord explained
–2– that the wrong form had been used to accompany the cash deposit. Counsel requested
seven days to remedy the defect in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(g). The
trial court granted the request and reset the trial.
On the day of trial, Tenant re-urged her motion to dismiss.1 She acknowledged
that the bond issue had been remedied, but claimed she had not received written
notice of the appeal. There was no evidence attached to the motion attesting to this
allegation. Counsel for Landlord represented that the required notice had been
emailed to Tenant. Before the bond issue was rectified, the court’s docket reflects
“Appeal filed in CCAL—Emailed to Plaintiff.” After the bond issue was remedied,
the court’s docket sheet reflects “Notice of Deposit.” The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
The property manager, Debbie Leonard (“Leonard”) testified on Landlord’s
behalf. The Lease and renewals, correspondence between the parties, an itemized
list of the amounts due and owing, and photographs of the property were admitted
into evidence. Landlord’s counsel testified about attorney’s fees with supporting
documentation that was admitted into evidence. Tenant also testified and introduced
documentary evidence. When the trial concluded, the court entered judgment for
Landlord, awarding $2,887.63 in damages and $4,130.00 in attorney’s fees.
1 The previously filed motion was not supported by affidavit or any other evidence.
–3– At Tenant’s request, the court also made findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The court concluded that Landlord did not breach the Lease and Tenant should
take nothing on her claims against him. The court further found that Tenant breached
the Lease by vacating the property prior to expiration of the Lease, damaged the
property in excess of normal wear and tear, and Landlord incurred damages for
cleaning and maintaining the property. The court also found that Tenant owed
unpaid rent and the cost of reletting.
Tenant filed a “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Motion to
Reconsider Motion to Dismiss,” and a motion for new trial. The trial court denied
the motions. Tenant also requested additional findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which the trial court also denied. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS We note at the outset that Tenant has appeared pro se. “We construe liberally
pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards
as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of
procedure.” In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no
pet.) (“We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure.”); Richardson v. Marsack, No. 05-18-00087-
CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (discussing specific requirements for briefing).
–4– “An appellate brief is meant to acquaint the court with the issues in a case and
to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case.” Schied v. Merritt,
No. 01-15-00466-CV, 2016 WL 3751619, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations omitted). Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant’s brief “contain a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities
and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). “This is not done by merely uttering brief
conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v.
Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, pet. denied); see also Barham v. Turner Constr. Co. of Tex., 803 S.W.2d 731,
740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) (appellant bears burden of discussing his
assertions of error). The failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite
appropriate authority waives a complaint on appeal. Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851,
854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
We have liberally construed Tenant’s brief in an effort to address the issues
she seeks to raise. To the extent our understanding of Tenant’s presentation of an
issue or subpoint is incorrect, it is waived for inadequate briefing. See id.
A. Jurisdiction Tenant’s first two issues complain that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to dismiss because the appeal from JP court to County court was not properly
perfected in accordance with TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(e).
–5– Rule of Civil Procedure 506.1 governs appeals from Justice Court to County
Court. That rule provides, in part, as follows:
(a) How Taken; Time. A party may appeal a judgment by filing a bond, making a cash deposit, or filing a sworn statement of inability to pay with the justice court within 21 days after the judgment is signed or the motion to reinstate, motion to set aside, or motion for new trial, if any, is denied.
(b) Amount of Bond; Sureties; Terms. A plaintiff must file a $500 bond. A defendant must file a bond in an amount equal to twice the amount of the judgment. The bond must be supported by a surety or sureties approved by the judge. The bond must be payable to the appellee and must be conditioned on the appellant's prosecution of its appeal to effect and payment of any judgment and all costs rendered against it on appeal.
(c) Cash Deposit in Lieu of Bond. In lieu of filing a bond, an appellant may deposit with the clerk of the court cash in the amount required of the bond. The deposit must be payable to the appellee and must be conditioned on the appellant's prosecution of its appeal to effect and payment of any judgment and all costs rendered against it on appeal.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1.
The Rule provides that “an appeal is perfected when a bond, cash deposit, or
Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is filed in accordance with
this rule.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(h). The Rule also requires written notice of the
appeal. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(e) (“Within 7 days of filing a bond or making a
cash deposit, an appellant must serve written notice of the appeal on all other parties
using a method approved under Rule 501.4.”).2
2 Rule 501.4 provides that service of papers other than citation may be made in person, by mail or courier, by fax, email, or any other method directed by the court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 501.4. –6– Tenant acknowledges, as she did in open court, that the bond issue was
remedied. The appeal was perfected when that occurred. TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(h).
Nonetheless, she argues Landlord did not provide written notice of the appeal. The
court’s docket sheet reflects, however, that a “Notice of Deposit” was filed. There is
nothing to establish that Tenant did not receive such notice. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in denying Tenant’s motion to dismiss. Tenant’s first two issues are
overruled.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law We understand Tenant’s third, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues to generally
challenge the trial court’s denial of Tenant’s requested additional findings and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that were made. Tenant does not
expressly challenge any individual findings.
Sufficiency
We begin with the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings that Tenant breached the Lease and Landlord was entitled to damages.
Following a trial before the court, a party is entitled to written findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon timely request. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. A trial court should
make findings as to ultimate issues, not evidentiary facts. See Guillory v. Dietrich,
598 S.W.3d 284, 290 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied). A “trial court should
not make findings on every disputed fact, but only those having some legal
significance to an ultimate issue in the case” Id. (quoting Watts v. Lawson, No. 07-
–7– 03-0485-CV, 2005 WL 1241122, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 25, 2005, no
pet.) (mem. op.)); see also Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 93
S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). An ultimate or
controlling fact issue is one that is essential to the cause of action and that would
have a direct effect on the judgment. Rich v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Buckeye Ret. Co., L.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239
S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Findings on evidentiary matters
are unnecessary and we disregard such findings on appeal. Guillory, 598 S.W.3d at
290.
Findings of fact entered in a case tried to a court are of the same force and
dignity as a jury’s verdict on jury questions. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295,
297 (Tex.1994). We apply the same standards in reviewing the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s fact findings as we do when
reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s
answer to a jury question. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297. We indulge every reasonable presumption in
favor of the findings and judgment of the trial court, and no presumption will be
indulged against the validity of the judgment. Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer
Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 252 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. See BMC Software
Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Incorrect conclusions
–8– of law will not require a reversal if the controlling findings of fact will support a
correct legal theory. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Nichols, 819 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in
the light favorable to the fact finding, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable
persons could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable persons could
not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). To evaluate the
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, we consider all the evidence
and will set aside the finding only if the evidence supporting the finding is so weak
or so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly
wrong and unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).
In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses, assigns the weight to be given their testimony, may accept or reject all or
any part of their testimony, and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
testimony. LaCroix v. Simpson, 148 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no
pet.). This Court is not a fact finder and we may not pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if a different
answer could be reached upon review of the evidence. See Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705
S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
–9– Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on the parties and the appellate
court. Employers Cas. Co. v. Henager, 852 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1993, writ denied). See Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1998).
The evidence here establishes the Lease term and the amount of rent due, and
the fact that Tenant vacated the property before the Lease term expired. The Lease
reflects that Tenant is responsible for the cost of reletting for vacating the property
before the Lease term expires, as well as for damages that exceed normal wear and
tear on the property.
Leonard testified about repairs that were required after Tenant vacated,
including a damaged miniblind that was new when Tenant moved in, an overgrown
yard, a dirty stove, replacement of a burned section of the fence, a missing towel bar,
and excess trash removal. Photographs of the conditions described, as well as
invoices supporting the charges, were admitted into evidence. Leonard also
explained how the cost of reletting was calculated, as reflected in the itemized list of
charges that was admitted into evidence.
Correspondence between Leonard and Tenant concerning repairs was
admitted into evidence. Leonard testified that none of the requested repairs affected
the health or safety of the Tenant.
Correspondence from Tenant on November 4, 2021, requested replacement of
her stove (because some of the burners were not working), the kitchen floor, the
doorbell, and the garage door. Leonard responded on November 30, 2021, declining
–10– to replace any of the items. Leonard noted that she found it odd that when they
discussed the Lease extension that was signed on October 26, 2021, Tenant failed to
mention the repairs. Leonard also noted that:
The stove has been repaired previously, and the repairman noted that grease had shorted out the receptacle wiring, and another time It was noted that the stove was working as intended. If a repairman is dispatched again, and it is determined that the repair needed was caused by tenant damage or there is no repair needed at all, you will once again be charged . . . I will contact the stove repair company if the stove is currently not working. However, if he goes there again and there are no issues detected, you will be charged the amount of the service call.
Leonard also noted that the kitchen floor was in good condition when Tenant
moved in, a doorbell was not a necessary feature, and the garage door was closed
every time she drove by. Leonard also expressed concern about Tenant’s lack of fire
safety. Specifically, she stated:
Another area of concern for management and the homeowner, is your lack of fire safety. Since your tenancy began, the living room carpet has burned due to a charging device you were using. The stove wiring burned due to accumulated grease on the burner, also a tenant damage. And lastly, approximately two months ago, you caused a fire with your grill which burned a portion of the fence. We had this damage repaired immediately, and when the repairman tried to collect from you, pursuant to the lease, you told him that you couldn’t afford the repair! This charge has been added to your tenant ledger and is due immediately.
On cross-examination, Tenant showed Leonard items she had noted on her
inventory sheet upon move-in, such as weather stripping. Leonard noted that the
inventory sheet was not a request for repair. Tenant also showed Leonard a text
message with a picture of a flooded kitchen she claimed to have sent to Leonard.
–11– Leonard did not recall receiving the text, and there was no evidence that a repair was
requested in writing as required by the Lease.
A landlord’s duties are found in the Property Code, which provides:
(a) A landlord shall make a diligent effort to repair or remedy a condition if:
...
(3) the condition materially affects the physical health or safety of an ordinary tenant.
(b) Unless the condition was caused by normal wear and tear, the landlord does not have a duty . . . to repair or remedy a condition caused by:
(1) the tenant . . . .
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052; see also Churchill Forge, Inc. v. Brown, 61 S.W.3d
368, 370 (Tex. 2001).
Subject to notice requirements, Chapter 92 permits a residential tenant to
terminate a lease if a landlord does not make a diligent effort to repair or remedy a
condition that materially affects an ordinary tenant’s health or safety. TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN 92.056(b), (e)(1). A tenant who does so is entitled to one month’s rent,
plus a civil penalty, court costs, and attorney’s fees. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN §
92.0563(a)(3), (5).
Once a tenant surrenders the premises, the landlord is obligated to refund any
security deposit. Id. § 92.103(a). The landlord may deduct charges and damages for
which a tenant is legally liable under the lease, excluding normal wear and tear, or
any damages that result from breach of the lease. Id. § 92.104(a)–(b). But the –12– landlord must return the remainder of the deposit along with “a written description
and itemized list of all deductions” Id. § 92.104(c).
In the present case, there was no evidence that Tenant gave Landlord notice
of any property condition that would materially affect an ordinary tenant’s health or
safety. Therefore, Tenant was not entitled to early termination of the Lease.
Landlord properly charged Tenant for the damages and repairs to the property
and provided an itemized list of charges against which the security deposit was
credited. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion
that Tenant, not Landlord, breached the Lease and Tenant was responsible for
damages.
Additional Findings
After the trial court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, Tenant
requested additional findings. A party may request additional or amended findings
of fact and conclusions of law if the party believes that the court’s findings and
conclusions are deficient in some way. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 298; Nicholas v. Envt’l.
Sys. (Int’l) Ltd., 499 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied).
In addition to requesting that the court find several evidentiary facts, Tenant
requested the following additional conclusions of law:
[Tenant] met all the requirements under Tex. Prop. Code §92052 (a)(1-3) to request repairs from [Landlord] by not being delinquent on rent at the time of notice, sending notice certified
–13– and in writing of the requested repairs, and listing one or more conditions that materially affected the health or safety of the occupants’ in the unit.
[Tenant] established as a matter of law that she was entitled to request these repairs and that [Landlord] had a duty to repair or remedy the conditions she requested under Tex. Prop. Code §92.052.
[Tenant] gave [Landlord] a reasonable amount of time to repair the conditions and sent additional notice of repairs via text after [Landlord] failed to respond to the first notice. A “reasonable” amount of time is defined as 7 days by Tex. Prop. Code §92.056. [Tenant] gave [Landlord] 4 months to repair the condition and the repairs were never made.
[Tenant] established as a matter of law that she had the right to legally terminate the lease under Tex. Prop. Code §92.056 (e)(1) after [Landlord] clearly breached or defaulted on the lease on or around 11/15/2021 according to page 10, section 18(b) and D(1)(c) of the lease when he failed to repair or remedy conditions on his property or repair water penetration from structural defects after receiving proper notice from [Tenant] in accordance with Page 9, section 18 (a) in the lease.
[Tenant] established as a matter of law that she was entitled to her security deposit in the amount of $1,650.00 after surrendering the premises as a result of [Landlord’] breach of the lease under Tex. Prop. Code §92.103.
[Tenant] established that [Landlord] did not comply with the law in retaining her security deposit, under Tex. Prop. Code §92.104 after she surrendered the premises, by deducting for normal wear and tear and not giving [Tenant] the remaining balance of the security deposit or an itemized statement explaining why within 30 days. The only condition in which the landlord is not required to return the security deposit or provide an itemized statement is when the tenant owes rent AND there is no controversy concerning the amount of rent owed. [Tenant] did not owe rent at the time of surrender as she properly terminated the lease. If [Landlord] believed she owed rent at the time she surrendered the premises, that would constitute a controversy
–14– concerning the rent, therefore requiring him to follow normal statute regarding retention of security deposits under Tex. Prop. Code §92.104 (a)(b)(c).
As a result, [Tenant] established as a matter of law that [Landlord] was no longer entitled to any portion of her security deposit under Tex. Prop. Code §92.109 as he is presumed to have acted in bad faith.
[Tenant] met all the requirements and established as a matter of law that she was entitled to relief and a judgment in her favor from this Court under Tex. Prop. Code §92.109 and Tex. Prop. Code §92.056.
None of the requested findings were appropriate or required. Additional
findings are not required if the original findings and conclusions properly and
succinctly relate the ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to
apprise the party of information adequate for the preparation of the party’s appeal.
In re C.A.S. and D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(citing Pakdimounivong v. City of Arlington, 219 S.W.3d 401, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, pet. denied)). There is no reversible error if the refusal to file additional
findings does not prevent a party from adequately presenting an argument on appeal.
Id.
The findings Tenant requested were unnecessary and were contrary to the
court’s judgment. The trial court is only required to make additional findings and
conclusions that are appropriate. See Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 254. “A trial court is not
required to make additional findings that are unsupported by the record, are
evidentiary, or that are contrary to previous findings.” Rich v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878,
–15– 886 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Buckeye Ret. Co., L.L.C. v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)). Moreover,
additional findings and conclusions are not required if they are aimed at tying down
the court’s reasoning rather than its conclusions. Stucky, 93 S.W.3d at 213–14
(holding trial Court did not err by refusing to make additional findings and
conclusions that are merely evidentiary, nuances of facts already found, or otherwise
unnecessary).
Because the requested additional findings were evidentiary, unnecessary, and
contrary to the court’s judgment, the trial court did not err in denying Tenant’s
requested additional findings. Tenant’s third, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues are
resolved against her.
C. Attorney’s Fees
Tenant’s fourth issue argues the trial court erred in awarding Landlord’s
attorney’s fees because Landlord breached the Lease. We have concluded the
evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that Tenant, not
Landlord, breached the Lease.3 A party many recover attorney’s fees for a successful
breach of contract claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001. If
attorney’s fees are proper under 38.001(8), the trial court has no discretion to deny
3 Tenant’s argument also fails because Tenant did not answer Landlord’s counterclaim or otherwise plead any affirmative defenses. The contention that a party to a contract is excused from a contract because of a prior material breach is an affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pleaded. Blackstone Medical, Inc. v. Phoenix Surgicals, L.L.C., 470 S.W.3d 636, 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
–16– them. Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust, 296 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009). The
attorney’s fees award was not in error. Tenant’s fourth issue is resolved against her.
D. Motion to Vacate Default/New Trial
Tenant’s eighth issue argues the trial court erred in denying her motions
because “if the trial court did not rely on any applicable laws to make its decision
then its ruling is not justified . . . .” Tenant cites no authority and presents no
argument to support her contention that the court failed to follow the law.4 This issue
is waived for inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
Moreover, even if the issue had been properly briefed, we have concluded the
evidence supports the trial court’s judgment. As does the law. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tenant’s motions. See Dolgencorp of
Tex. Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (ruling on motion
for new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion). Tenant’s eighth issue is resolved
against her.
4 Tenant also fails to explain the basis for asking the County court to vacate the default the JP Court entered against Landlord. –17– III. CONCLUSION
Having resolved all of Tenant’s issues against her, we affirm the trial court’s
/Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE 240290F.P05
–18– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
LATISHA HASSEN, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 7, Collin County, Texas No. 05-24-00290-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 007-03505- 2023. PAUL DEMETRIOU, Appellee Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Partida-Kipness and Carlyle participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered November 13, 2024.
–19–