UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL ) AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ) et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) Civil Action No. 09-897 (EGS) v. ) ) The ADMINISTRATOR of the ) Federal Highway Administration ) in his official capacity, ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 25, 2009, the Court granted defendants’ motion
to transfer this action to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan (the “Eastern District of
Michigan”). Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration
of this decision, and sought leave to file an amended complaint.
Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ motion, the response and reply
thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the Court
DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Having determined
that justice does not require the Court to reconsider its
transfer Order, the Court declines to consider plaintiffs’
request to amend their complaint; this issue shall be preserved
for determination by the transferee court. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are challenging the decision of the Federal
Highway Administration (“FHWA”) to authorize construction of the
Detroit River International Crossing (“DRIC”), which would
connect Detroit, Michigan with Windsor, Ontario. See Defs.’ Ex.
A, Record of Decision (“ROD”) at 1. Plaintiffs allege that
defendants’ issuance of the ROD violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act,
and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
Compl. ¶¶ 305-313. Defendants filed a motion to transfer this
action to the Eastern District of Michigan, which the Court
granted on November 25, 2009. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration of this decision, which is now ripe
for determination by the Court.1
1 On November 25, 2009, while the Court was in the midst of finalizing its Memorandum Opinion transferring this action to the Eastern District of Michigan, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. See Docket No. 29. Based on plaintiffs’ assertions of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, see Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 39-41, and in light of the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, the Court found it appropriate to telephonically issue its ruling to the parties. After the Court apprised the parties that the case would be transferred to the Eastern District of Michigan, plaintiffs’ counsel - without knowledge of the Court’s rationale for its decision - notified the Court that it would be filing a motion for reconsideration. See also Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶ 15 (“Plaintiffs’ counsel expressly requested that the Court not enter an order transferring the matter until Monday, November 30, 2009, and that Plaintiffs be permitted to review the memorandum and submit a motion to reconsider.”). Plaintiffs’ counsel is cautioned that a
2 II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may revise its own interlocutory rulings
“at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b). The standard of review for interlocutory
orders differs from the standard of review for final judgments
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. United States DOJ, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citing cases). The primary reasons for amending a judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) are “an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court may
reconsider any interlocutory judgment “as justice requires.”
Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D. 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2000). However,
“[the Court’s] discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders is
tempered somewhat by the Supreme Court’s [admonition] that courts
should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly
motion for reconsideration is not a motion that should be filed as a matter of course. Given the Court’s limited judicial resources and significant interest in finality, such a motion should only be filed when, after careful consideration of the Court’s opinion, a party determines that an “extraordinary circumstance[]” necessitates reconsideration. Keystone Tobacco Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D.D.C. 2003). No such circumstance has been presented in this case.
3 erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Keystone Tobacco
Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D.D.C.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alternation in
the original). Motions for reconsideration should not be treated
as “an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a
court has already ruled.” Black v. Tomlinson, 235 F.R.D. 532,
533 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its ruling
transferring this case to the Eastern District of Michigan,
arguing that “[t]his Court’s conclusion that the Eastern District
of Michigan has a stronger interest in this action than the
District of Columbia is erroneous.” Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶ 3.
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that because the DRIC project is
“of immense national and international importance,” the Court
erred in its determination that transfer was proper pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶¶ 5-7.
“The Court finds that this argument by plaintiffs is ‘little
more than a rehash of the arguments’ previously argued and
rejected by the Court.” ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum &
Bailey Circus, 246 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Black,
235 F.R.D. at 533)). In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court
“acknowledge[d] that Washington-based federal officials had a
role in the events underlying plaintiffs’ lawsuit,” Mem. Op. at
4 10, and recognized that the DRIC project “is an international
border crossing raising issues of national and international
significance, including international commerce, homeland
security, foreign relations, and national spending.” Mem. Op. at
14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, after
carefully considering each of the relevant § 1404(a) factors, the
Court found that transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan was
warranted because (i) the majority of operative events occurred
in Michigan, including the drafting, signing, and issuance of the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Final Environmental Impact
Statement, and the ROD; (ii) the United States’ public hearings,
meetings, and workshops on the DRIC project were held in
Michigan; (iii) all of the identifiable, non-governmental public
comments were received from Michigan residents; (iv) the
administrative record was assembled in Michigan; (v) all of the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL ) AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ) et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) Civil Action No. 09-897 (EGS) v. ) ) The ADMINISTRATOR of the ) Federal Highway Administration ) in his official capacity, ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 25, 2009, the Court granted defendants’ motion
to transfer this action to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan (the “Eastern District of
Michigan”). Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration
of this decision, and sought leave to file an amended complaint.
Upon consideration of plaintiffs’ motion, the response and reply
thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the Court
DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Having determined
that justice does not require the Court to reconsider its
transfer Order, the Court declines to consider plaintiffs’
request to amend their complaint; this issue shall be preserved
for determination by the transferee court. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are challenging the decision of the Federal
Highway Administration (“FHWA”) to authorize construction of the
Detroit River International Crossing (“DRIC”), which would
connect Detroit, Michigan with Windsor, Ontario. See Defs.’ Ex.
A, Record of Decision (“ROD”) at 1. Plaintiffs allege that
defendants’ issuance of the ROD violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act,
and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
Compl. ¶¶ 305-313. Defendants filed a motion to transfer this
action to the Eastern District of Michigan, which the Court
granted on November 25, 2009. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration of this decision, which is now ripe
for determination by the Court.1
1 On November 25, 2009, while the Court was in the midst of finalizing its Memorandum Opinion transferring this action to the Eastern District of Michigan, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. See Docket No. 29. Based on plaintiffs’ assertions of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, see Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 39-41, and in light of the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, the Court found it appropriate to telephonically issue its ruling to the parties. After the Court apprised the parties that the case would be transferred to the Eastern District of Michigan, plaintiffs’ counsel - without knowledge of the Court’s rationale for its decision - notified the Court that it would be filing a motion for reconsideration. See also Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶ 15 (“Plaintiffs’ counsel expressly requested that the Court not enter an order transferring the matter until Monday, November 30, 2009, and that Plaintiffs be permitted to review the memorandum and submit a motion to reconsider.”). Plaintiffs’ counsel is cautioned that a
2 II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may revise its own interlocutory rulings
“at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b). The standard of review for interlocutory
orders differs from the standard of review for final judgments
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. United States DOJ, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citing cases). The primary reasons for amending a judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) are “an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court may
reconsider any interlocutory judgment “as justice requires.”
Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D. 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2000). However,
“[the Court’s] discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders is
tempered somewhat by the Supreme Court’s [admonition] that courts
should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly
motion for reconsideration is not a motion that should be filed as a matter of course. Given the Court’s limited judicial resources and significant interest in finality, such a motion should only be filed when, after careful consideration of the Court’s opinion, a party determines that an “extraordinary circumstance[]” necessitates reconsideration. Keystone Tobacco Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D.D.C. 2003). No such circumstance has been presented in this case.
3 erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Keystone Tobacco
Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D.D.C.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alternation in
the original). Motions for reconsideration should not be treated
as “an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a
court has already ruled.” Black v. Tomlinson, 235 F.R.D. 532,
533 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its ruling
transferring this case to the Eastern District of Michigan,
arguing that “[t]his Court’s conclusion that the Eastern District
of Michigan has a stronger interest in this action than the
District of Columbia is erroneous.” Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶ 3.
Specifically, plaintiffs argue that because the DRIC project is
“of immense national and international importance,” the Court
erred in its determination that transfer was proper pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. ¶¶ 5-7.
“The Court finds that this argument by plaintiffs is ‘little
more than a rehash of the arguments’ previously argued and
rejected by the Court.” ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum &
Bailey Circus, 246 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Black,
235 F.R.D. at 533)). In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court
“acknowledge[d] that Washington-based federal officials had a
role in the events underlying plaintiffs’ lawsuit,” Mem. Op. at
4 10, and recognized that the DRIC project “is an international
border crossing raising issues of national and international
significance, including international commerce, homeland
security, foreign relations, and national spending.” Mem. Op. at
14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, after
carefully considering each of the relevant § 1404(a) factors, the
Court found that transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan was
warranted because (i) the majority of operative events occurred
in Michigan, including the drafting, signing, and issuance of the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Final Environmental Impact
Statement, and the ROD; (ii) the United States’ public hearings,
meetings, and workshops on the DRIC project were held in
Michigan; (iii) all of the identifiable, non-governmental public
comments were received from Michigan residents; (iv) the
administrative record was assembled in Michigan; (v) all of the
plaintiffs are residents of Michigan; and (vi) the DRIC project
will be located in Michigan, thereby most directly effecting
Michigan residents. See also Mem. Op. at 20 (“In sum, having
balanced plaintiffs’ choice of forum in the District of Columbia
against the relevant private- and public- interest factors, the
Court concludes that the balance of private and public interests
counsels in favor of transferring this action to the judicial
district with the greatest stake in the pending litigation -
plaintiffs’ home forum and the site of the DRIC project - the
5 Eastern District of Michigan.”). In light of these and other
facts discussed at length in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, the
Court rejects plaintiffs’ assertion that it committed clear error
in transferring the case pursuant to § 1404(a). Accordingly,
having determined that justice does not require the Court to
reconsider its earlier decision, plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.2
As the Court has not reconsidered its Order to transfer
venue to the Eastern District of Michigan, the Court declines to
rule on plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint. This issue
should be resolved by the transferee court in the Eastern
District of Michigan.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration. An Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SIGNED: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Court Judge December 14, 2009
2 Despite defendants’ assertion to the contrary, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to resolve plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration because this Court’s docket does not yet reflect an entry indicating that the case files have been received by the Eastern District of Michigan. See Pls.’ Reply Br. at 2 n.1 (explaining that jurisdiction remains with the transferor court until the papers are lodged in the transferee court (citing 15 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3846)).