Lathus v. Round Valley Justice Court

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH LATHUS, No. 25-5784 D.C. No. 3:24-cv-08233-DWL Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

ROUND VALLEY JUSTICE COURT; BUTCH L. GUNNELS; ALANA CASTILLO; APACHE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; THOMAS PACL,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 29, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

Joseph Lathus appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his

action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of state court proceedings. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We

affirm.

Because Lathus does not raise in his opening brief the district court’s

dismissal of his action on the independent, alternative grounds that his claims are

barred by immunity and that he failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible

claim, Lathus has abandoned any challenge. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v.

Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “we will not

consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief”).

Contrary to Lathus’s contentions, the district court did not err in labeling the

second amended complaint as such and treating it as the operative pleading, and

did not lack jurisdiction to dismiss the second amended complaint. See Lacey v.

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (recognizing “the

general rule . . . that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and

renders it without legal effect”); Estate of Conners v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658

(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that filing a notice of appeal from a nonappealable order

does not effect a transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the court of

appeals).

2 25-5784 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lathus’s motions

for entry of default and default judgment because defendants Round Valley Justice

Court and Gunnels did not fail to plead or otherwise defend the action. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 55(a) (providing that default can be entered against a party only where that

party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend”); Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v.

Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988) (a default

judgment is inappropriate if defendant indicates its intent to defend the action);

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of

review and factors for determining whether to enter default judgment and

explaining that “default judgments are ordinarily disfavored”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Lathus’s action

without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper

when amendment would be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,

540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion

to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously

amended the complaint” (citation omitted)).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 25-5784