Latham v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission

117 P.2d 971, 167 Or. 371, 1941 Ore. LEXIS 23
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 24, 1941
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 117 P.2d 971 (Latham v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Latham v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission, 117 P.2d 971, 167 Or. 371, 1941 Ore. LEXIS 23 (Or. 1941).

Opinion

BAND, J.

The plaintiff, a former employee of the Cobbs & Mitchell Company, a corporation which was engaged in the business of logging and the manufacture of lumber at Valsetz, Oregon, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court sustaining an order of *372 the State Unemployment Commission which denied his claim for unemployment benefits.

The commission based its decision upon its finding that plaintiff’s unemployment was due to a stoppage of work growing out of a labor dispute at the plant of the Cobbs & Mitchell Company at which he had been last employed.

. The law then in force was chapter 398, Or. L., 1937. Section 4 of that act expressly provided that:

“An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
* * *
(e) For any week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed; provided, that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that:
(1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the. stoppage of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purpose of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment or other premises.”

Under section 10 of that act, the right of appeal to the courts is given to any unsuccessful claimant from an adverse decision of the commission which *373 denies his claim for compensation. That section, however, expressly provides that:

“* * * In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of this commission as to the facts if supported by evidence and, in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said (such) court shall be confined to questions of law.”

There is no contention of fraud in this case and, hence, the sole question for decision is whether the finding of the commission is supported by substantial evidence.

Before passing upon said claim, the matter was referred by the commission to a referee who, after due notice to all interested parties, took testimony consisting of 350 typewritten pages and this record was certified to the circuit court, which affirmed the decision of the commission, and is now before us for examination.

From this record, it appears that plaintiff had been employed by the Cobbs & Mitchell Company as a donkey engineer for more than two years before the company ceased operations. It also appears that the company employed some 350 men in its operations and that, by an agreement entered into with its employees, it operated as a closed shop, all of its employees at that time being members of Local Union No. 2636; that later Local Union No. 2692 was organized for the purpose of taking into its membership all said employees engaged in logging, and thereafter all the employees of said company belonged to one or the other of said unions, both of which were affiliates of the American Federation of Labor.

It also appears from the record that on and prior to November 15, 1937, the marketing conditions were *374 such, that the company was having difficulty in paying its operating expenses and, on that date, all the employees of said company, except three of which the plaintiff was not one, for the purpose of continuing the operations of said company, individually signed and delivered to the company a document reading as follows:

“Cobbs & Mitchell Company,
Valsetz, Oregon.
Gentlemen:
Recognizing the impossibility of your profitably continuing your operations during the present conditions of the lumber market at the current costs, and desiring to co-operate with you to the mutual advantage of all, and in consideration of your continuing the sawmill and logging operations on a forty hour week basis during the ensuing winter months, or as much thereof as seems practical to you, we the undersigned employees agree to work, beginning November 15, 1937, forty hours a week, and to accept in full payment for such forty hours of work thirty-five hours pay at the present scale of wages for our respective positions. This plan to continue in full force and effect until it is mutually agreed by and between your company and the undersigned employees, or their representative, that the lumber market conditions warrant a restoration of normal working conditions and rate of pay.”

It further appears that, on December 21, 1937, the company entered into a contract with Local Union No. 2636, which at the time included all the employees of the company, in and by the terms of which it was agreed that:

‘ ‘ The wage scales established under this agreement shall be 60c per hour for unskilled labor, with the same differentials that apply at this date at this *375 plant for semi-skilled and skilled labor. Provided, however, that nothing in this article contained shall, in anywise, invalidate that certain agreement entered into November 15, 1937, by and between employer and the employees.”

The record further shows that, on or about February 1, 1938, the employees became dissatisfied and demanded that they be paid for all hours worked and, upon this demand being refused, went on strike which lasted for one day only. On the following day, it was agreed that the wage scale of 60 cents per hour for unskilled workers with the same differentials that had formerly applied to semi-skilled and skilled labor should be reinstated and that the men should receive pay for the full time employed. This continued until April 26, 1938, when the company, finding that it could not operate profitably and pay that scale of wages, notified the president of Local Union No. 2636 that it could not continue operations, said notice reading as follows:

“Mr. Roy Stryker, President,
Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, Local No. 2636, Valsetz, Oregon.
Dear Sir:
We hereby wish to advise you that this company is unable to continue the logging and sawmill operations, and we are closing down as of tonight.
Operations will not be resumed until such time as we can negotiate a wage scale which will be satisfactory to both the company and employees.
Yours very truly,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 P.2d 971, 167 Or. 371, 1941 Ore. LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/latham-v-state-unemployment-compensation-commission-or-1941.