Latham v. Jim & Joe General Contractors

547 A.2d 66, 16 Conn. App. 138, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 343
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
DecidedSeptember 13, 1988
Docket6048
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 547 A.2d 66 (Latham v. Jim & Joe General Contractors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Latham v. Jim & Joe General Contractors, 547 A.2d 66, 16 Conn. App. 138, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 343 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

Daly, J.

This is an appeal from a decision of the workers’ compensation review division denying the claim for reimbursement filed by the defendant Middlesex Insurance Company (Middlesex), the insurance carrier of the defendant employer. The workers’ compensation commissioner for the second district had dismissed the claim on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, whereas the compensation review division determined there was jurisdiction and denied the claim on the merits.

Middlesex has appealed claiming that the review division erred (1) in considering the matter on the merits when the commissioner did not reach the merits of Middlesex’s claim, and (2) in ruling that Middlesex was not entitled to a credit for the money that the plaintiff had received from the third party tortfeasor’s liability carrier. Since we find error in the first issue, we do not examine the remaining issue.

The following facts are not in dispute. On December 24, 1980, the plaintiff, an employee of Jim and Joe General Contractors, was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The accident, which was caused by the negligence of a third party, resulted in knee injuries to the plaintiff. Middlesex agreed to pay the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits.

On or about October 27, 1981, Middlesex became aware that the plaintiff’s attorney was in contact with the insurance carrier for the third party tortfeasor. Correspondence was exchanged between the plaintiff’s counsel and Middlesex which indicated a willingness to reimburse Middlesex for workers’ compensation benefits from any settlement with the third party tortfeasor’s liability carrier. The plaintiff subsequently received $25,000 from the third party tortfeasor without executing any formal release.

[140]*140Middlesex sought relief from the workers’ compensation commissioner. The commissioner dismissed the claim on the theory that General Statutes § 31-2931 applied to the facts of the case and that he, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested because no civil action was instituted against the third party tortfeasor and there was no compromise or settlement approved by the commissioner.2 Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301, Middlesex appealed to the compensation review division which determined that the commissioner had the requisite jurisdiction. The compensation review division then addressed the merits of Middlesex’s claim, determining that Middlesex was not entitled to a credit for. money the plaintiff had received, and, therefore, that the relief sought should not be granted. This appeal ensued.

Although the compensation review division was correct in determining that the commissioner possessed the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claim,3 it was [141]*141incorrect in deciding the case on the merits. The appellate powers of the compensation review division are defined by § 31-301-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies issued pursuant to § 31-301, which regulation provides in pertinent part: “[F]or the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusion reached. ... Its power in the corrections of the finding of the commissioner is analogous to, and its method of correcting the finding similar to the power and method of the Supreme Court in correcting the findings of the trial court.”

This makes it abundantly clear that review by the compensation review division is limited to (1) whether the finding should be corrected, and (2) whether there was evidence to support in law the conclusion reached by the commissioner below. Moreover, the compensation review division must follow certain procedural guidelines consistent with any tribunal conducting an appellate compensation review. That is, the compensation review division must confine the scope of review to matters in the record and specifically assigned questions that were raised before the commissioner, and were ruled upon. See, e.g., New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 727, 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Krulikowski v. Polycast Corporation, 153 Conn. 661, 667-68, 220 A.2d 444 (1966).

In this case, the commissioner did not rule upon the merits of the case. The commissioner ruled that he “lacked the legal or equitable powers to enforce the remedies,” and that the appropriate remedy “would appear to be . . . available at law and equity before [142]*142the Superior Court.” Since the commissioner ruled only-on the jurisdictional issue, the review division was limited to that issue and erred in ruling beyond it.

There is error, the finding and award are set aside and the case is remanded to the compensation review division with direction to remand the matter to the commissioner to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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Related

Stafford Bd. of Ed. v. State Bd. of Ed., No. Cv95 0057771 S (Nov. 13, 1996)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 9116 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
547 A.2d 66, 16 Conn. App. 138, 1988 Conn. App. LEXIS 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/latham-v-jim-joe-general-contractors-connappct-1988.