In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
LATANYA TOWNSEND, ) No. ED110085 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Labor and ) Industrial Relations Commission vs. ) ) DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) ) Respondent. ) FILED: October 18, 2022
Introduction
Latanya Townsend (“Townsend”) appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission (the “Commission”) denying her unemployment benefits. The Division
of Employment Security (the “Division”) maintains Townsend voluntarily quit her job without
good cause. Because the briefing does not substantially comply with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 84.04,1 the appeal preserves nothing for our review. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal.
Discussion
For us to review an appeal, the appellant must comply with the minimum requirements
for appellate briefing set forth in Rule 84.04. Freeland v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 647 S.W.3d 22, 24
(Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Murphree v. Lakeshore Est., LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 623–24
1 All Rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P. (2022). (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). An appellant’s failure to adhere to the briefing standards outlined in
Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for appeal and is grounds for dismissal. Indelicato v. McBride &
Son Mgmt. Co., LLC, 646 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting Hoover v. Hoover,
581 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)).
“Rule 84.04 is not merely a rule of technicalities” but instead “serves several necessary
functions.” Freeland, 647 S.W.3d at 24 (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624). “[C]ompliance
with Rule 84.04 ensures that the opposing party is adequately informed of the precise matters in
contention and informs this Court of the issues for review.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d
at 624). “Perhaps even more importantly, an appellant’s compliance with Rule 84.04 is
necessary to ensure that this Court retains its role as a neutral arbiter.” Id. (quoting Murphree,
636 S.W.3d at 624). “Deficient briefing runs the risk of forcing this Court to assume the role of
advocate by requiring us to sift through the legal record, reconstruct the statement of facts, and
craft a legal argument on the appellant’s behalf.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624).
“This requires this Court to speculate as to the facts and arguments that may have been
asserted.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624). “If this Court cannot reach the merits
without supplementing the appellant’s legal arguments, then nothing has been preserved for
review.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624).
Further, “[p]ro se appellants must follow the same rules of procedure as parties
represented by attorneys, and they are not entitled to exceptions they would not receive if
represented by counsel.” Id. at 26 (quoting Barbero v. Wilhoit Props., Inc., 637 S.W.3d 590, 595
(Mo. App. E.D. 2021)); Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (citing Hoover, 581 S.W. at 640). “Our
application of the rules stems not from a lack of sympathy, but instead from a necessity for
judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties.” Freeland, 647 S.W.3d at 26
2 (quoting Barbero, 637 S.W.3d at 595). “Although our Court prefers to dispose of a case on the
merits whenever possible, we must dismiss the appeal if the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief
are such that no claims are preserved for appellate review.” Richardson v. Div. of Emp. Sec.,
573 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
Townsend’s amended pro se appeal from the Commission’s denial of unemployment
benefits fails to comply with Rule 84.04 in numerous respects and deprives this Court the
opportunity to meaningfully review the case. See id.; see also Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624. As
the Division notes in its motion to dismiss the appeal, which we took with the case, the contents
of Townsend’s brief are deficient under Rule 84.04(a) in omitting a table of statutes or other
authorities as well as in combining the table of contents for the brief and the appendix, which
also violates Rule 84.04(h)’s requirement for a separate appendix to be filed with its own table of
contents. See Rule 84.04(a), (h). The jurisdictional statement does not meet the minimum
requirements of Rule 84.04(b) because it states only Townsend’s argument and does not provide
a statement of jurisdiction. See Rule 84.04(b). Additionally, the brief statement of facts does not
consist of “a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for
determination without argument” and lacks any citations to the record on appeal. See Rule
84.04(c) (requiring that “[a]ll statements of facts shall have specific page references to the
relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits”). “A violation of
Rule 84.04(c), standing alone, constitutes grounds for dismissal of an appeal.” Indelicato, 646
S.W.3d at 307 (internal quotation omitted).
Next, although the point relied on identifies the challenged ruling and claims it was
contrary to law and not based on competent or substantial evidence, the point fails to “[e]xplain
in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of
3 reversible error.” Rule 84.04(d)(2). In this way, the point relied on fails to adequately state the
“in that” requirements of the rule. See T.G. v. D.W.H., 648 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Mo. App. E.D.
2022). The point is further deficient because it omits a “list of authorities, not to exceed four,
and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that
party principally relies.” Rule 84.04(d)(5); see also Carruthers v. Serenity Mem’l Funeral &
Cremation Servs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal quotation omitted)
(“[A]n appellant must cite legal authority to support [her] points relied on if the point is one in
which precedent is appropriate or available; if no authority is available, an explanation should be
made for the absence of citations.”). Indeed, Townsend identifies no legal authority in support of
her allegation that the Commission impermissibly put the burden on her to prove she did not
voluntarily quit without good cause, and the absence of citations is unexplained. See Carruthers,
576 S.W.3d at 305.2 The point relied on is deficient in multiple respects, and “[a] point relied on
that fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d) preserves nothing for appeal” and warrants dismissal.
Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (internal quotation omitted).
We further note that the argument section of the brief does not limit the discussion to the
error raised in Townsend’s point relied on and neglects to include either the applicable standard
of review or a statement of how the error was preserved for review. See Rule 84.04(e). “Both of
these items are required by Rule 84.04(e), and both are essential to this Court’s review of the
case.” Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 625. Further, the argument fails to “explain why, in the context
of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error by showing how the principles of law
and the facts of the case interact.” Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (quoting Burgan v. Newman,
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
LATANYA TOWNSEND, ) No. ED110085 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Labor and ) Industrial Relations Commission vs. ) ) DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) ) Respondent. ) FILED: October 18, 2022
Introduction
Latanya Townsend (“Townsend”) appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission (the “Commission”) denying her unemployment benefits. The Division
of Employment Security (the “Division”) maintains Townsend voluntarily quit her job without
good cause. Because the briefing does not substantially comply with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 84.04,1 the appeal preserves nothing for our review. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal.
Discussion
For us to review an appeal, the appellant must comply with the minimum requirements
for appellate briefing set forth in Rule 84.04. Freeland v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 647 S.W.3d 22, 24
(Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Murphree v. Lakeshore Est., LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 623–24
1 All Rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P. (2022). (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). An appellant’s failure to adhere to the briefing standards outlined in
Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for appeal and is grounds for dismissal. Indelicato v. McBride &
Son Mgmt. Co., LLC, 646 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (quoting Hoover v. Hoover,
581 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)).
“Rule 84.04 is not merely a rule of technicalities” but instead “serves several necessary
functions.” Freeland, 647 S.W.3d at 24 (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624). “[C]ompliance
with Rule 84.04 ensures that the opposing party is adequately informed of the precise matters in
contention and informs this Court of the issues for review.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d
at 624). “Perhaps even more importantly, an appellant’s compliance with Rule 84.04 is
necessary to ensure that this Court retains its role as a neutral arbiter.” Id. (quoting Murphree,
636 S.W.3d at 624). “Deficient briefing runs the risk of forcing this Court to assume the role of
advocate by requiring us to sift through the legal record, reconstruct the statement of facts, and
craft a legal argument on the appellant’s behalf.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624).
“This requires this Court to speculate as to the facts and arguments that may have been
asserted.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624). “If this Court cannot reach the merits
without supplementing the appellant’s legal arguments, then nothing has been preserved for
review.” Id. (quoting Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624).
Further, “[p]ro se appellants must follow the same rules of procedure as parties
represented by attorneys, and they are not entitled to exceptions they would not receive if
represented by counsel.” Id. at 26 (quoting Barbero v. Wilhoit Props., Inc., 637 S.W.3d 590, 595
(Mo. App. E.D. 2021)); Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (citing Hoover, 581 S.W. at 640). “Our
application of the rules stems not from a lack of sympathy, but instead from a necessity for
judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties.” Freeland, 647 S.W.3d at 26
2 (quoting Barbero, 637 S.W.3d at 595). “Although our Court prefers to dispose of a case on the
merits whenever possible, we must dismiss the appeal if the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief
are such that no claims are preserved for appellate review.” Richardson v. Div. of Emp. Sec.,
573 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
Townsend’s amended pro se appeal from the Commission’s denial of unemployment
benefits fails to comply with Rule 84.04 in numerous respects and deprives this Court the
opportunity to meaningfully review the case. See id.; see also Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624. As
the Division notes in its motion to dismiss the appeal, which we took with the case, the contents
of Townsend’s brief are deficient under Rule 84.04(a) in omitting a table of statutes or other
authorities as well as in combining the table of contents for the brief and the appendix, which
also violates Rule 84.04(h)’s requirement for a separate appendix to be filed with its own table of
contents. See Rule 84.04(a), (h). The jurisdictional statement does not meet the minimum
requirements of Rule 84.04(b) because it states only Townsend’s argument and does not provide
a statement of jurisdiction. See Rule 84.04(b). Additionally, the brief statement of facts does not
consist of “a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for
determination without argument” and lacks any citations to the record on appeal. See Rule
84.04(c) (requiring that “[a]ll statements of facts shall have specific page references to the
relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits”). “A violation of
Rule 84.04(c), standing alone, constitutes grounds for dismissal of an appeal.” Indelicato, 646
S.W.3d at 307 (internal quotation omitted).
Next, although the point relied on identifies the challenged ruling and claims it was
contrary to law and not based on competent or substantial evidence, the point fails to “[e]xplain
in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of
3 reversible error.” Rule 84.04(d)(2). In this way, the point relied on fails to adequately state the
“in that” requirements of the rule. See T.G. v. D.W.H., 648 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Mo. App. E.D.
2022). The point is further deficient because it omits a “list of authorities, not to exceed four,
and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that
party principally relies.” Rule 84.04(d)(5); see also Carruthers v. Serenity Mem’l Funeral &
Cremation Servs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (internal quotation omitted)
(“[A]n appellant must cite legal authority to support [her] points relied on if the point is one in
which precedent is appropriate or available; if no authority is available, an explanation should be
made for the absence of citations.”). Indeed, Townsend identifies no legal authority in support of
her allegation that the Commission impermissibly put the burden on her to prove she did not
voluntarily quit without good cause, and the absence of citations is unexplained. See Carruthers,
576 S.W.3d at 305.2 The point relied on is deficient in multiple respects, and “[a] point relied on
that fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d) preserves nothing for appeal” and warrants dismissal.
Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (internal quotation omitted).
We further note that the argument section of the brief does not limit the discussion to the
error raised in Townsend’s point relied on and neglects to include either the applicable standard
of review or a statement of how the error was preserved for review. See Rule 84.04(e). “Both of
these items are required by Rule 84.04(e), and both are essential to this Court’s review of the
case.” Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 625. Further, the argument fails to “explain why, in the context
of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error by showing how the principles of law
and the facts of the case interact.” Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 307 (quoting Burgan v. Newman,
2 The absence of legal citations may in part be attributable to the fact that Townsend’s allegation is contrary to law. See, e.g., Koenen v. BRG Liberty, LLC, 647 S.W.3d 47, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal quotation omitted) (“[W]here an employer claims the employee voluntarily left without good cause, the employee/claimant has the burden of proving eligibility for unemployment benefits.”).
4 618 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). “It is not our duty to supplement the deficient
brief with our own research, thus noncompliance with Rule 84.04(e) justifies dismissal.”
Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 625 (quoting Burgan, 618 S.W.3d at 716).
While we have discretion to review a brief that has deficiencies under Rule 84.04 when
its argument is readily understandable, “notwithstanding minor shortcomings” in complying
with the rules of appellate procedure, “when the deficiencies affect our ability to understand and
adequately address the claims of error, the brief preserves nothing for review.” Murphree, 636
S.W.3d at 624 (internal quotations omitted). After our review of the record and Townsend’s
brief, we are challenged to find that the nature of Townsend’s claim and argument on appeal is
that which was presented before the Division. The record lists multiple claims and renewed
claims for unemployment benefits against different employers. The claims for unemployment
benefits, questionnaire, and online appeal filed by Townsend address her dissatisfaction with her
work schedule with Aureus Medical,3 in particular her desire to work on day shifts as opposed to
night shifts. Yet in her appeal before us, Townsend alleges she was fired after being falsely
accused of smelling of marijuana—an issue not raised in her claim for unemployment benefits.
We acknowledge that the record and transcript are confusing at times in their reference to both
Aureus Medical and Opusing LLC as Townsend’s employer. This lack of clarity may be the
genesis of some of the substantial deficiencies of Townsend’s brief. But despite this confusion,
what is clear is that Townsend filed her claim and sought unemployment benefits following the
end of her employment with Aureus Medical and stated her reason for leaving the employ of
Aureus Medical was her dissatisfaction with working the night shift and preference for working
the day shift. The claim Townsend filed with the Division makes no reference to being
3 Townsend’s employer is referred to as both Aurues Medical and Aureus Medical in the legal file. We will limit our reference to Aureus Medical for consistency.
5 discharged due to either using or smelling of marijuana. The record reflects that the Division
determined Townsend was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she
voluntarily left her employment with Aureus Medical without good cause because she was
dissatisfied with the shift schedule. The Commission reviewed the same issue relating to Aureus
Medical. Critical to her appeal, the record simply lacks any reference to the alleged marijuana
use that Townsend now asserts on appeal was the reason for her involuntary separation and the
basis for her unemployment claim. Saliently, in addition to the many briefing deficiencies,
Townsend’s brief simply does not present a factual basis for us to consider this appeal. See
McGinnis v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 202, 203 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (quoting Morgan
v. Psych Care Consultants, LLC, 341 S.W.3d 217, 218 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)) (“On appeal, this
Court may only address those issues determined by the Commission and may not consider any
issues that were not before the Commission.”).
In conclusion, although we dismiss appeals only with great reluctance given our stated
preference for reaching the merits if the briefing so allows, Townsend’s brief so substantially
fails to comply with the mandatory briefing requirements of Rule 84.04 that we cannot undertake
review without going outside the record on appeal and improperly assuming the role of advocate
in order to decipher her argument. See Indelicato, 646 S.W.3d at 308; Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at
626. Accordingly, we must grant the Division’s motion to dismiss the appeal. See Freeland, 647
S.W.3d at 26 (citing Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 626); Richardson, 573 S.W.3d at 128 (internal
citation omitted).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed.
_________________________________ KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge 6 Lisa P. Page, P.J., concurs. Thomas C. Clark II, J., concurs.