Laszloffy v. Garcia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-3934
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 20 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN LASZLOFFY, No. 24-3934 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:19-cv-01173-JAD-BNW v. MEMORANDUM* CINDY ZORAIDA GARCIA; LEON SYMANSKI; MERCURY INSURANCE; FRIAS HOLDING COMPANY, doing business as ANLV Cab LLC; ANLV CAB LLC, doing business as ANLV Cab,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 15. 2025**

Before: FRIEDLAND, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

John Laszloffy appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). his diversity action alleging various state law claims arising from an insurance

settlement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laszloffy’s

concert of action claim because Laszloffy failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Garcia and Symanski committed a tortious act or

“agreed to conduct an inherently dangerous activity or an activity that poses a

substantial risk of harm to others.” Abrams v. Sanson, 458 P.3d 1062, 1070 (Nev.

2020) (describing elements of a claim for concert of action).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laszloffy’s

defamation and libel claims because Laszloffy failed to raise a triable dispute as to

whether the statements in Symanski’s letter were untrue. See Pegasus v. Reno

Newspapers, Inc., 57 P.3d 82, 88 (Nev. 2002) (explaining that a statement is not

defamatory “if it is absolutely true, or substantially true”); see also Posadas v. City

of Reno, 851 P.2d 438, 444 (Nev. 1993) (addressing similar requirements for libel).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laszloffy’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim because Laszloffy failed

to raise a triable dispute as to any of the elements of his claim. See Miller v. Jones,

970 P.2d 571, 577 (Nev. 1998) (describing elements of an IIED claim).

2 24-3934 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laszloffy’s motion

that his requests for admission be deemed admitted or his motion to compel

production of Garcia’s medical records. See Laub v. United States Dep’t of

Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court is vested with

broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will

not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery

results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3934