Lassiter v. American Fibers Yarn Co.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedOctober 12, 2005
DocketI.C. NO. 339223
StatusPublished

This text of Lassiter v. American Fibers Yarn Co. (Lassiter v. American Fibers Yarn Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lassiter v. American Fibers Yarn Co., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2005).

Opinion

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The Full Commission reviewed the prior Opinion and Award, based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Chapman and the briefs and oral arguments before the Full Commission. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award, except for minor modifications. Accordingly, the Full Commission affirms the Opinion and Award of Deputy Commissioner Chapman, with minor modifications.

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RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendants have made motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal for plaintiff's failure to file a Form 44 and brief in this matter pursuant to Rule 701 of the Rules of the Industrial Commission. The Full Commission takes notice that plaintiff's Form 44 and brief was not filed with the condition, and plaintiff did not appear at oral argument before the Full Commission.

In its discretion, the Full Commission hereby DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss; however, in light of plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 701, the Full Commission deems it proper to SANCTION plaintiff as provided herein.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the Commission and the Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.

2. At all times relevant to the claim, an employer-employee relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant-employer.

3. Clarendon National Insurance Company is the carrier for the employer.

4. The defendants have denied liability and the plaintiff has not received any disability benefits.

5. At the time of the alleged injury by accident, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

6. On April 5, 2003, the plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant-employer.

7. The parties stipulated into evidence the following:

a. Packet of medical records and statements;

b. Packet of discovery responses; and

c. Packet of Industrial Commission forms.

8. The Pre-Trial Agreement dated August 5, 2004, which was submitted by the parties, is incorporated by reference.

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Based upon all of the competent evidence of record and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiff, who was fifty-one years old at the time of the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, was employed by the defendant-employer for over fifteen years. As of April 5, 2003, his position was second operator on the take-up machine, which was a textile machine. His duties included doffing the yarn off of the machine, inspecting the thread and yarn, replacing guides on the machine and cleaning the area. He used an air hose to vacuum dust from around the machine.

2. On April 5, 2003, the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident when the air hose he was holding became disconnected from its attachment point over the machine and the upper end of the hose struck him on the head. He testified that the hose flailed around until he turned off the vacuum and that it struck him three times. However, the evidence of record shows that once the hose became loose, there would have been no air pressure going through it and, thus, the hose struck the plaintiff just once as it fell.

3. Following the incident, a co-worker summoned the supervisor, who took the plaintiff to the nurse's station and applied ice to plaintiff's head. The injury occurred on a Saturday, so the nurse was not a nurse present. The next day, a supervisor took the plaintiff to the hospital. The medical report from that examination was not placed into evidence, but the plaintiff was given a work excuse for forty-eight hours.

4. The plaintiff was not scheduled to work on Monday or Tuesday but subsequently returned to work. The plaintiff's testimony was very vague about when he returned to work and no company records were submitted on that issue. Based upon the evidence of record, it appears that the plaintiff had a work excuse for April 7 and 8, 2003, which were scheduled days off work for the plaintiff.

5. The plaintiff subsequently returned to work and was observed to not to have any visible signs of injury. However, at his request, the plaintiff was sent to Rocky Mount Medical Center where he saw Physician Assistant Peter White on April 14, 2003. On that occasion, he complained of headaches and dizziness since being struck by the hose on April 5, 2003. There was no visible sign of injury and the plaintiff's examination was normal, except for complaints of tenderness at the spot where the hose struck him. Because his complaints were consistent with a mild concussion, P.A. White prescribed Voltaren and gave the plaintiff work restrictions for no lifting, bending, or stooping, and no working around machinery. The plaintiff's employer limited his work duties in accordance with the restrictions. The plaintiff returned to P.A. White on April 28 and May 13, 2003, reporting persistent symptoms, and P.A. White recommended that the plaintiff be evaluated by a neurologist.

6. During this time, the defendant-employer was severely affected by a downturn in business for the textile industry and began laying off large numbers of employees. On approximately May 24, 2003, the company laid off the plaintiff, who had continued working up until that date. The Full Commission finds that the plaintiff's layoff was not related to his injury.

7. The plaintiff finally saw a neurologist, Dr. Jeffrey Siegel, on June 20, 2003. Dr. Siegel noted that the plaintiff appeared angry at the outset and appeared to have a bad attitude. The plaintiff complained of persistent but improving symptoms of headaches, dizziness, confusion, and nausea since the accident, and said that he had not been taking any medication. Accepting the complaints as valid, Dr. Siegel diagnosed the plaintiff with mild post-concussive syndrome, recommended that he rest for two weeks, and prescribed Panelor for his headaches.

8. The plaintiff returned to Dr. Siegel on July 18, 2003, stating that he had never gotten the prescription filled and that his symptoms were no better. Since he was not willing to take the medication prescribed, because he appeared well and his neurological examination remained normal, Dr. Siegel released the plaintiff from his care with no restrictions and no permanent impairment.

9. Not being satisfied with Dr. Siegel's findings, the plaintiff then went to Dr. Michael Kushner, another neurologist, on August 26, 2003, and complained of daily headaches since the injury. Dr. Kushner reviewed the CT scan performed at the request of the emergency room physician and found it to be normal. Based upon the plaintiff's complaints, he diagnosed the plaintiff with post-concussion syndrome, prescribed medications, and ordered an EEG, which also proved to be normal. The plaintiff returned to the doctor on October 24, 2003, reporting improvement in his headaches and indicating that he was sleeping better. Dr. Kushner adjusted his medication. The plaintiff returned once more for evaluation on December 19, 2003, with only minor complaints and reported that he had continued to improve.

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Related

Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.
64 S.E.2d 265 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co.
290 S.E.2d 682 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Lassiter v. American Fibers Yarn Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lassiter-v-american-fibers-yarn-co-ncworkcompcom-2005.