Lasonthia Sandles, Individually as as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Rollins v. Deanna Louise Laskoskie, as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr., and Louise Clymer Laskoskie

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 13, 2024
Docket14-22-00879-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Lasonthia Sandles, Individually as as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Rollins v. Deanna Louise Laskoskie, as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr., and Louise Clymer Laskoskie (Lasonthia Sandles, Individually as as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Rollins v. Deanna Louise Laskoskie, as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr., and Louise Clymer Laskoskie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lasonthia Sandles, Individually as as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Rollins v. Deanna Louise Laskoskie, as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr., and Louise Clymer Laskoskie, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 13, 2024

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00879-CV

LASONTHIA SANDLES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CHRISTINE ROLLINS, Appellants

V.

DEANNA LOUISE LASKOSKIE, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATES OF GEORGE DELBERT LASKOSKIE, SR., AND LOUISE CLYMER LASKOSKIE, Appellees

On Appeal from the 344th District Court Chambers County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 20-DCV0416

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Lasonthia Sandles, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Christine Rollins, appeals the trial court’s final judgment granting no evidence summary judgment that she take nothing on her claims against appellee Deanna Louise Laskoskie as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr. and Louise Clymer Laskoskie. 1 We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rollins was an in-home care giver for George and Louise. She worked daily at the home for about two years. One day she arrived at George and Louise’s home and upon exiting her car she was attacked by an animal or animals. Rollins suffered a fatal injury during the attack and died. It is undisputed by the parties that feral hogs fed on Rollins’s body and mutilated her legs and much of her body. There were no witnesses to the attack. George discovered Rollins’s body outside of the home in the general area of the front lawn and the driveway.

Rollins’s daughter, Sandles,2 filed a suit against the property owners, George and Louise alleging strict liability, negligent handling, and premises liability. In her original petition Sandles alleged that wild feral hogs attacked Rollins, knocked her to the ground and killed her. After appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the doctrine of ferae naturae barred Sandles’s claims, Sandles amended her petition to allege that George and Louise’s Labrador, Lucky, and possibly four other smaller dogs, attacked Rollins when she arrived at the house that morning. Sandles alleged that the dog or dogs knocked Rollins to the ground and, as a result, Rollins was either killed or severely injured. Sandles then alleged that while Rollins was on the ground that feral hogs fed on her body. Sandles retained the same causes of action in the amended petition—strict liability, negligent handling, and premises liability.

1 Sandles filed suit against George and Louise. Both died during the pendency of this case. The administrator of their estates, Deanna Laskoskie, appeared and filed an answer on behalf of the estates. References to “appellee” will be to Deanna as administrator of the estates of George and Louise. 2 Sandles filed suit individually and as the personal representative of Rollins’s estate.

2 Appellee then filed an amended motion for summary judgment and a no evidence motion for summary judgment. In the no evidence summary judgment motion, appellee attacked every element of Rollins’s claims and argued that there was no evidence to support them.

In her response, Sandles attached the sheriff’s records of the investigation and the opinion of her expert. The sheriff’s records include written reports from officers that were on the scene the day of the attack, written opinions from wildlife specialists opining on the cause of the extensive wounds to Rollins’s body, the medical examiner’s autopsy report, and photographs from Rollins’s autopsy.

Prior to the hearing, appellee filed a “Supplemental Reply” to address issues with Sandles’s summary judgment evidence. Regarding the expert report, appellee argued that the report is speculative and conclusory, the expert is not qualified to opine about Rollins’s cause of death, Sandles failed to designate the expert timely, and that the expert’s opinions are not clear, positive, direct, or reliable. Appellee argued that the expert’s methodology for determining that two of the bites were purportedly from the Labrador, Lucky, instead of from a hog was “unscientific” because she based her conclusion on her review of images of Lucky and measuring her own rottweilers’ bite widths.

At the hearing on appellee’s motion for traditional and no evidence summary judgment, the trial court listened to arguments from counsel regarding the expert report. Ultimately the trial court concluded at the hearing that it “made a reading of [the expert report] and has a question about whether that would even be admissible, and therefore, I guess, I didn’t consider [the] expert’s testimony in making my ruling, even though you presented it.” The trial court rendered a final judgment granting the no evidence motion for summary judgment on all of Rollins’s claims.

3 EXPERT REPORT

Before considering whether Sandles brought forth sufficient evidence to defeat appellee’s summary judgment motions, we must first consider the matter of the expert report. In the trial court appellee filed objections to the expert report and argued that the report should be excluded because it was speculative and conclusory; appellee continues those arguments on appeal. Sandles argued at the hearing that the trial court should consider the report as evidence of causation.

A. General Legal Principles

“Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact ‘more probable or less probable.” Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. R. Evid. 401). Such testimony is “incompetent evidence” and such conclusory testimony cannot support a judgment. Id.; see also Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997) (“[A]n expert witness’s conclusory statement . . . will neither establish good faith at the summary judgment stage nor raise a fact issue to defeat summary judgment.”). “No-evidence challenges to allegedly conclusory expert testimony require us to examine the record on its face to determine whether the evidence lacks probative value.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Merrell, 313 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. 2010). “[C]onclusory statements cannot support a judgment even when no objection was made to the statements at trial.” Coastal Transp. Co., Inc., 136 S.W.3d at 232. “An expert’s bald assurance of validity is not enough.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997). If there are other plausible causes of the injury or condition that could be negated, the plaintiff must offer evidence excluding those causes within reasonable certainty. Id. at 720.

4 “In short, under well-established case law of this Court, an expert’s statement or opinion is conclusory when: (1) he asks the jury to take his word that his opinion is correct but offers no basis for his opinion or the bases offered do not actually support the opinion; or (2) he offers only his word that the bases offered to support his opinion actually exist or support his opinion.” Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Tex. 2019).

B. Background

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Lasonthia Sandles, Individually as as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christine Rollins v. Deanna Louise Laskoskie, as Administrator of the Estates of George Delbert Laskoskie, Sr., and Louise Clymer Laskoskie, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lasonthia-sandles-individually-as-as-the-personal-representative-of-the-texapp-2024.