Lasman v. Calhoun, Denny & Ewing

191 P. 409, 111 Wash. 467, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 651
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 9, 1920
DocketNo. 15689
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 191 P. 409 (Lasman v. Calhoun, Denny & Ewing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lasman v. Calhoun, Denny & Ewing, 191 P. 409, 111 Wash. 467, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 651 (Wash. 1920).

Opinion

Tolman, J.

This action was commenced in Grant county, upon a complaint alleging fraud in consummating a sale of real estate, and praying for a rescission of the sale and a recovery of the purchase price. A change of venue was had to King county, and there, and before any of the defendants had answered, appellants, who were plaintiffs below, filed an amended [468]*468complaint, alleging fraud and misrepresentation in the negotiations leading up to the purchase of the land by them, upon which they relied in making the purchase; that they expended considerable sums of money in buying lumber and materials for buildings, fences and improvements; that they also purchased farm implements, work horses, feed and supplies, and expended their own labor and that of hired help over a considerable period of time, relying upon the representations made as to the character of the land, and before they could discover the falsity of such representations; that the land proved to be worthless for agricultural purposes, for which it was purchased, or for any purpose, and alleged that they had been damaged in the sum of $8,894.85, for which amount, together with interest and costs, they demanded judgment.

After moving to strike the amended complaint, respondents answered by making general denials, and pleading affirmatively

"That the said plaintiffs at all times knew and were advised that this answering defendant was agent only of the defendants Connell and Patten, Trustees, . . . that the said plaintiffs never assumed to hold the answering defendant responsible for any statement, representation, act or deed, save as agent acting for its principal, and the principals . . . were and are known to the said plaintiffs.”

A demurrer to this affirmative defense having been overruled and the remaining defendants having answered, the cause proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict in favor of appellants and against all of the defendants in the sum of $6,632. This verdict was set aside and a new trial granted. Upon the second trial, a verdict against all of the defendants in the sum of eight thousand dollars was rendered. A mo[469]*469tion for judgment non obstante veredicto was made, which was denied as to the defendants Joseph Connell and Alfred Patten, Trustees (against whom judgment was rendered on the verdict, from which they have not appealed), and granted as to respondent, and judgment rendered in its favor dismissing the action- as to it and awarding it costs. The plaintiffs have appealed from such judgment of dismissal. We are therefore confronted by the single question, Was the respondent, Calhoun, Denny & Ewing, entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury?

It appears that title to the land sold was in the defendants Joseph Connell and Alfred Patten, Trustees, who resided in Chicago, and who appeared in the transaction with appellants only through their agent, Calhoun, Denny & Ewing, and perhaps other agents located in the vicinity of the land sold. It is not claimed that Connell and Patten were guilty of any active fraud or misrepresentation. Their liability having arisen solely by reason of the acts of their agent, Calhoun, Denny & Ewing, and appellants, in addition, seek to hold Calhoun, Denny & Ewing for its own alleged fraud, under authority of Garrett v. Sparks Brothers, 61 Wash. 397, 112 Pac. 501, where it is said:

“It is fundamental that a party, whether acting for himself or another, is liable in damages for his own fraud. The fact that the principal is also liable does not relieve from responsibility the party who actually commits the wrong. In such cases, the liability of the. principal can only rest upon the delict of its agent. The party who has been wronged may elect to sue either or both.”

Respondent does not dispute the correctness of this rule, but argues that, since the agent is one who is employed by, and authorized to act for, his principal, [470]*470third parties knowing him to he such agent, are bound to take- notice of the fact that he is so acting for his principal, and if the agent speaks honestly and in good faith from information furnished to him by his principal, with a belief in the truth of his statements, there can be no liability upon the part, of the agent, though, if the information furnished by the principal be false and untrue, the principal may be liable. In support of this position respondent cites the following cases, which, so far as the facts there involved appear to go, so hold: Hillis Logging Co. v. Mescher, 69 Wash. 454, 125 Pac. 768; Lipscomb v. Kitrell, 11 Humphr. (30 Tenn.) 256; Barton v. Cox, 176 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 793; Vertress v. Head & Matthews, 138 Ky. 83, 127 S. W. 523; Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1034.

In the case last cited, what we conceive to be the true rule is stated in the following language:

“If, under the circumstances stated, the agent becomes liable to the purchaser for damages suffered by him, it is by force of other principles of law than those which measure and fix the rights of parties to a contract. His liability, under such circumstances, must be measured by the law of torts. For his fraudulent acts he is responsible to the buyer. He is not liable on the contract negotiated by him for his principal, but he is liable for his own fraud and deceit practiced on the purchaser to induce him to enter into the contract. If the fraud or deceit charged consists of false representations as to material facts made to the purchaser, to show a liability on the part of the agent it must be made to appear that he made such representations knowing them to be false, or, as stated by a writer in 20 Cyc. 24, that he made them ‘as a positive assertion calculated to convey the impression that he had actual knowledge of their truth, when in fact he was conscious that he had no such knowledge.’ It follows,, from the principles stated, that when the agent, so acting within the scope of his employment [471]*471as to bind bis principal, honestly believes representations made by him to induce the purchaser to contract with his principal to be true, he is not liable either on the contract or as for a tort.”

We must, therefore, turn to the record to determine whether or not there was any evidence sufficient to go to the jury upon the question of statements and representations having been made by Calhoun, Denny & Ewing to appellants to induce them to purchase the land in question, with the knowledge that such statements were false; or, if not actually known to be false, were they made as a positive assertion calculated to convey the impression that respondent had actual knowledge of their truth, when in fact it was conscious of the fact that it had no such knowledge, and was by it intended that appellants should rely thereon in making the contemplated purchase?

The witness Elwell, who was employed by Calhoun, Denny & Ewing at the time of the sale, testified that he was an experienced land salesman; that, before his employer accepted the agency of the land, he went over and examined it, reported favorably upon it, and his report, coupled with a like favorable report from the immigration agent of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company induced his firm to accept the agency; that thereafter they were furnished with a technical report made by an engineer from Chicago, and that Calhoun, Denny & Ewing made up the advertising circular from this report.

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Bluebook (online)
191 P. 409, 111 Wash. 467, 1920 Wash. LEXIS 651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lasman-v-calhoun-denny-ewing-wash-1920.