USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1471
LASHAUN CURRY
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:22-cv-00911-JFA)
Submitted: April 22, 2025 Decided: July 1, 2025
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: James Paul Porter, Elizabeth Millender, CROMER, BABB & PORTER, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Derwood L. Aydlette III, Fred A. Williams, BETTIS LAW GROUP, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
LaShaun Curry, a Black woman, filed a civil action against her former employer,
the South Carolina State Election Commission (the Commission), alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17. Curry asserted that she was
terminated from her employment based on disparate treatment and retaliation for
participating in protected activities, including reporting instances of alleged racial animus
by her supervisors. * The district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary
judgment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
“We review an award of summary judgment de novo.” Haynes v. Waste
Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment is appropriate
if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Id.
“Title VII forbids (i) employment practices that discriminate against an employee
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... and (ii) retaliation against an
employee for opposing adverse actions that she [or he] reasonably suspects to be unlawful
* Curry also alleged claims of disparate pay and defamation under South Carolina state law. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Commission on those claims, and Curry does not challenge those rulings on appeal.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
under Title VII.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted). When, as here, a plaintiff does not allege direct evidence of
discrimination, a plaintiff asserting discriminatory treatment under Title VII may proceed,
as Curry has done here, under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. In the present
case, this framework also applies to Curry’s retaliation claim. Id.
“[T]he elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1)
membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment
action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); see McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. Prima facie proof of retaliation “requires proof that: (1)
the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or
nonretaliatory justification for its adverse employment action. Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223.
If the employer satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the employer’s purportedly neutral reasons were pretextual for
discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. Id. Ultimately, the burden of persuasion
rests with the plaintiff to show that she was subjected to racial discrimination, or to
retaliation for her protected activity. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133,
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
143 (2000). We have reviewed the record and hold that, even assuming Curry established
prima facie cases of discrimination and retaliation, she failed to show that a reasonable trier
of fact could find that her employer’s legitimate reasons for terminating her employment
were pretextual or otherwise discriminatory.
We reach this conclusion after considering the three arguments presented by Curry
on appeal. Curry first argues that the district court applied an incorrect standard to her
retaliation claim. The court stated that Curry failed to show that retaliation for her protected
activity, “and nothing else, was the reason for her termination.” Instead, the causation
standard requires that the employee show “that retaliation was a but-for cause” of the
termination and does not require that retaliation was the singular “but-for” cause. Guessous
v. Fairview Prop. Invests., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing
Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015)). Nevertheless, the
record demonstrates that, despite the court’s misstatement of the evidentiary standard in
one sentence of its decision, the court did not improperly hold Curry to a stricter standard
than is required.
The record shows that the Commission set forth numerous non-retaliatory reasons
for Curry’s termination, including that she made a false statement to her supervisor,
engaged in improper conduct, failed to maintain harmonious work relationships, and
engaged in insubordination. Additionally, the record shows that after receiving previous
written reprimands, Curry did not improve in the identified areas. Curry contended in the
trial court, and reasserts on appeal, that her employer’s stated reasons for her termination
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1471
LASHAUN CURRY
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:22-cv-00911-JFA)
Submitted: April 22, 2025 Decided: July 1, 2025
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: James Paul Porter, Elizabeth Millender, CROMER, BABB & PORTER, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Derwood L. Aydlette III, Fred A. Williams, BETTIS LAW GROUP, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
LaShaun Curry, a Black woman, filed a civil action against her former employer,
the South Carolina State Election Commission (the Commission), alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17. Curry asserted that she was
terminated from her employment based on disparate treatment and retaliation for
participating in protected activities, including reporting instances of alleged racial animus
by her supervisors. * The district court granted the Commission’s motion for summary
judgment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
“We review an award of summary judgment de novo.” Haynes v. Waste
Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment is appropriate
if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Id.
“Title VII forbids (i) employment practices that discriminate against an employee
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... and (ii) retaliation against an
employee for opposing adverse actions that she [or he] reasonably suspects to be unlawful
* Curry also alleged claims of disparate pay and defamation under South Carolina state law. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Commission on those claims, and Curry does not challenge those rulings on appeal.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
under Title VII.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted). When, as here, a plaintiff does not allege direct evidence of
discrimination, a plaintiff asserting discriminatory treatment under Title VII may proceed,
as Curry has done here, under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. In the present
case, this framework also applies to Curry’s retaliation claim. Id.
“[T]he elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1)
membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment
action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); see McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. Prima facie proof of retaliation “requires proof that: (1)
the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or
nonretaliatory justification for its adverse employment action. Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223.
If the employer satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the employer’s purportedly neutral reasons were pretextual for
discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. Id. Ultimately, the burden of persuasion
rests with the plaintiff to show that she was subjected to racial discrimination, or to
retaliation for her protected activity. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133,
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
143 (2000). We have reviewed the record and hold that, even assuming Curry established
prima facie cases of discrimination and retaliation, she failed to show that a reasonable trier
of fact could find that her employer’s legitimate reasons for terminating her employment
were pretextual or otherwise discriminatory.
We reach this conclusion after considering the three arguments presented by Curry
on appeal. Curry first argues that the district court applied an incorrect standard to her
retaliation claim. The court stated that Curry failed to show that retaliation for her protected
activity, “and nothing else, was the reason for her termination.” Instead, the causation
standard requires that the employee show “that retaliation was a but-for cause” of the
termination and does not require that retaliation was the singular “but-for” cause. Guessous
v. Fairview Prop. Invests., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing
Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015)). Nevertheless, the
record demonstrates that, despite the court’s misstatement of the evidentiary standard in
one sentence of its decision, the court did not improperly hold Curry to a stricter standard
than is required.
The record shows that the Commission set forth numerous non-retaliatory reasons
for Curry’s termination, including that she made a false statement to her supervisor,
engaged in improper conduct, failed to maintain harmonious work relationships, and
engaged in insubordination. Additionally, the record shows that after receiving previous
written reprimands, Curry did not improve in the identified areas. Curry contended in the
trial court, and reasserts on appeal, that her employer’s stated reasons for her termination
were not legitimate and, so, necessarily those reasons were pretextual. But Curry failed to
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1471 Doc: 46 Filed: 07/01/2025 Pg: 5 of 6
produce any evidence from which a jury could conclude that the Commission’s stated
reasons were pretextual. We therefore conclude that the district court correctly held that
Curry failed to satisfy her burden to show that she was terminated based on retaliation.
Curry next argues that the district court engaged in improper credibility
determinations, weighing the Commission’s version of events more favorably than Curry’s
view. See Tekman v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 55 F.4th 951, 959 (4th Cir. 2022)
(explaining that generally in the context of summary judgment a court may not weigh
evidence or engage in credibility findings). After reviewing the details of Curry’s
argument and the record, we conclude that her argument fails. To the extent that the district
court disregarded minor factual discrepancies, we hold that none of those discrepancies
created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reason the Commission terminated
Curry’s employment. Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that a plaintiff cannot seek to expose that rationale as pretextual by focusing
on minor discrepancies that do not cast doubt on the explanation’s validity).
In Curry’s third argument, she contends that the district court erred in refusing to
consider written notes by a state employee who had investigated Curry’s charges of
discrimination and retaliation. In those notes, the investigator recorded two statements by
Commission employees who stated in part that Curry’s supervisor “treated [B]lack
employees differently than other employees,” and that Curry’s supervisor treated Curry
poorly because “she was [B]lack.” We conclude that the district court properly refused to
consider the investigator’s notes because they contained hearsay statements by individuals
whom Curry had failed to identify during the discovery process as potential witnesses.
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Giles v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 704 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that
inadmissible evidence may not be considered in a motion for summary judgment (citation
omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (stating that “[i]f a party fails to provide information or
identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that
information or witness to supply evidence on a motion”); see also Brown v. Perez, 835
F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a plaintiff failed to show that she “could
put the substance of a letter into admissible form” because she did not submit an affidavit
or suggest that the author of the letter could testify to its contents).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the Commission.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED