Larue's Heirs v. Larue's Executors

26 Ky. 156, 3 J.J. Marsh. 156, 1830 Ky. LEXIS 4
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 1, 1830
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 26 Ky. 156 (Larue's Heirs v. Larue's Executors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Larue's Heirs v. Larue's Executors, 26 Ky. 156, 3 J.J. Marsh. 156, 1830 Ky. LEXIS 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1830).

Opinion

Judge Ukdeuwood

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause was, heretofore before this court. See II. Litt. 258. Upon the return of it to the circuit court, at the March term, 1823, an order was entered, in pursuance of the mandate of this court, reversing and setting aside the order, made on the application of Charles Campbell, which set aside the final decree, rendered in January, 18.16, and permitted Campbell to file his answer.

The circuit court, likewise, upon the return of the cause, proceeded to adjudicate upon the application or motion of the-defendants, Dickey, Buckhannon, and the representatives, and grantees, of Robert Johnson, deceased, and Michael Campbell, made at the March term, 1816, in the character of non-residents, to open the final decree of the preceding January, and to permit them to fil.e their answers.

Upon consideration, the decree, in respect to these defendants, was annulled; they having tendered bond, with security, in the penalty of $300, conditioned as the law requires, for securing costs. See I. Dig. 60,

Motion fay non-residents, to open decree within 7 years, and entered of record, no objection to motion, that court did not acton it, mt in. years

[157]*157It is here necessary to dispose,of two errors assigned, which question the legality of the proceedings of the circuit court, upon the return of the cause this court, in its first steps. It is alleged, that the circuit court did not carry into effect, the mandate of this court, in respect to Charles Campbell; and also, that it erred, in setting aside the final decree, of January, 1816, and reinstating the cause on the docket, as it respects Dickey, Buckhannon, Johnson’s representatives, and Michael Campbell. The first objection W'e deem unavailing, it sufficiently appears, that the circuit court, by its order, on the .return of the cátrse, meant to rid the final decree of 1816, from the effects of the order, setting aside, upon the application of Charles Campbell. If the circuit court had not proceeded to open the final decree of 1816, by acting upon the motion of the non-resident defendants, entered at the term next after the final decree was rendered, the final decree must have remained unaltered, and should have been ¿arded into effect. Did the court err in thus acting? We think it did not. It is true, that the motion to open the decree, on the part of the non-residents, had been entered, and permitted to rest for many yeárs, without being noticed. It was, however, attached to the cause, and this court, when the cause was before it, considered the motion as still pending, and undisposed of. It was, therefore, proper on the return of the case to the circuit court, for that tribunal to act upon, and dispose of the motion. Did the inferior court dispose of it correctly? We think it did,-so far as to open the decree for the purpose of admitting the answers of the non-resident defendants, and fixing the terms and conditions, upon which their answers were to be filed. No plausible objection has been urged against this, but the lapse of time.

This objection ought not to prevail, because, within the seven year.s, allowed by law, for opening decrees, in such cases, the non-resident defendants, had moved the court, to open the decree, and to receive their answers, and their motion had been entered of record. It was the duty of the court to act earlier upon their motion. The failure of the court to perform Its duty, ought not to operate, so as to deprive them [158]*1580f a right, secured to them by law, and exercised on-their Part within proper time. Regarding the properly opened, so far as it affected the rights of the non-residents, how does the case stand? rpjie f0|i0wing facts, are the basis, upon which the law must operate to decide the cause.

On the 24th July, 1?95, the executors of John Larue, conveyed to Joseph Kirkpatrick, six tracts of land, by metes and bounds, amounting in the whole, to 6900 acres, on Nolin. The deed speaks of conveying 9510 acres, on the Ohio and Nolin; but nothing is said in the deed of the land, on the Ohio.

From other things in the cause, it would seem there was a tract on the Ohio, at the- mouth of Doe run, for 3610 acres, for which the executors made a transa fer of the plat and certificate, and that may be the reason, why this .tract, although contracted to Kirkpatrick, was not described by metes and bounds in the deed, the consideration expressed, in which was £100.

On the 17th August, 1795, said Kirkpatrick, for the consideration expressed in the deed of £1000, conveyed said charts of land, containing 5900 acres, to Michael and Charles Campbell.

Said Campbells, on the 11th March, 1796, conveyed said charts, to Robert Johnson, James Dickey, and James Buckhannon. The proof, however, is deficient as to the execution of the deed by Michael Campbell; but this, cannot affect the controversy, as the bill admits such conveyance.

The proof is satisfactory, that the executors of Larue, in selling these lands, transcended the powers vested-in them by, his will. They were only authorized-to sell so much land, as was necessary to raise funds to pay the debts. The debts, according.to the proof,; did not exceed £30. It is also well establish-. ed,.that the executors acted with bad faith;; that the sale was in reality, made to Philip Philips, one of the executors; and that the - conveyance was made to Kirkpatrick, (as. a. device to conceal the improper conduct of the executors, in selling to one of their pwn body) who held the land, for the benefit of [159]*159Philips. This is confirmed by the fact, that Philips united with Kirkpatrick, in the deed to the Camp-bfells.

jíex,IS hav., jns power by will, to soli land for payment of debts, sell more than necessary to pay debts, responsible to heirs or devi-sees, but bona fide purchasers ofland, having no notice of fraud of ex’rs. cannot be affected

[159]*159Dickey and Buckhannon, on the 8th of June, 1809, conveyed to Bard, Findley, and R. Johnson, as executors of Doctor Robert Johnson, deceased, 2900 acres, of the 5900 acres, on Nolin, being, as it would seem from the deed, the share allotted to the executors, in a division of the land.

On the 28th March, 1814, Bard andFndley, two of the executors of Doctor Robert Johnson, conveyed to John Johnson and John Beaty, the 2900 acres, previously conveyed to them by Dickey and Buckhannon. John Johnson, in October, 1820, conveyed his undivid¿ ed moiety of the 2900 acres, in trust to Thomas Johnson*

In 1821, John Johnson,, and Thomas Johnson, the trustee, conveyed their interest to Doctor William S. Young, who, by petition to the court, was admitted a defendant, after the return of the cause, from this court.

in July, 1827, the circuit court rendered a decree, dismissing the bill of the complainants, as to Michael Campbell, executor of Philip Philips, and as to him, in his - own right-, and also, as to Dickey, Buckhannon, Johnson’s representatives, William S. Young, and the heirs of Philip Philips, and' decreed costs, in favor of these defendants, against the complainants. In respect to the other defendants, the decree of 1816, was directed to remain in full force, except so far as it was necessarily midifled by dismissing the bill, as to the defendants, above named.

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Bluebook (online)
26 Ky. 156, 3 J.J. Marsh. 156, 1830 Ky. LEXIS 4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larues-heirs-v-larues-executors-kyctapp-1830.