LARSON TEXTS, INC. v. O'NEIL

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided September 1, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-00297·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LARSON TEXTS, INC., et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-297-SPB Page | 1 v. ) ) SCOTT O’NEIL, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION The instant civil action arises out of an attempt by shareholders in a closely held corporation to effectuate a distribution of additional shares of stock to certain of the voting members. Plaintiffs in this case are Larson Texts, Inc. and four of its voting shareholders (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). The Defendant is Scott O’Neil, a voting shareholder who would not be receiving additional stock shares under the subject stock distribution plan. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that would establish the validity and fairness of the plan and foreclose any countersuit by Defendant for breach of fiduciary duty or self-dealing. Pending before the Court is the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the instant action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. I. Background Larson Texts, Inc. (“Larson Texts” or the “Company”) is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the creation and publication of math textbooks for students ranging from kindergarten 1 age through college age. Compl. ¶¶1, 9.1 Larson Texts has been operating in the textbook industry for decades. Id. ¶10. The Company has a total of seven shareholders, five of whom hold voting shares. Page | 2 Compl. ¶¶11-12. Those with voting shares include Defendant Scott O’Neil (hereafter, “O’Neil” or “Defendant”) as well as Plaintiffs Roland Larson, Deanna Larson, Timothy Larson, and Jill Larson Im (hereafter, the “Individual Plaintiffs” or “Shareholder Plaintiffs”). Id. Each of these five individuals holds 60,000 Class A voting shares in the company. Id. Due to the buying patterns of the Company’s customers, Larson Texts receives much of its yearly revenue between the months of July and September. Compl. ¶13. To provide the necessary cash flow for its operations throughout the fiscal year, Larson Texts has historically utilized various loans and lines of credit. Id. ¶14. Since at least 2004, the Company’s lender has required that all voting shareholders provide personal guaranties to secure the Company’s lines of credit. Id. ¶15. Up until 2019, all of the voting shareholders agreed to do so. Id. ¶16. In early 2019, however, Larson Texts needed to increase its borrowing capacity through

an additional $3,000,000 loan with one of its lenders. Compl. ¶17. Consistent with prior practice, the lender requested that all voting shareholders provide personal guaranties to secure the loan. Id. ¶18. Although O’Neil refused to provide a personal guaranty for the new loan, the lender ultimately agreed to provide the loan if the other four voting shareholders covered the requisite guaranty. Id. ¶¶19, 21-23. As an incentive to secure the necessary guaranties, Larson Texts offered a guaranty compensation plan (the “Guaranty Plan”) to all of the voting shareholders. Compl. ¶¶24-25.

1 For present purposes we assume the truth of the well-pled allegations in the Complaint. 2 Under the terms of this plan, any voting shareholder who agreed to provide a personal guaranty for the new loan would receive additional voting shares in Larson Texts. Id. ¶26. The amount of additional shares was to be calculated based upon the number of voting shareholders who Page | 3 participated in the Guaranty Plan, the value of the guaranties, and the current value of Larson Texts’ voting shares. Id. ¶¶27-28. To that end, Larson Texts retained an outside accounting firm to perform a valuation of the Company, the personal guarantees, and the voting shares. Id. ¶¶27, 29, 36. The firm ultimately determined that the collective value of the guarantees was at least $60,000.00, and the value of each Class A voting share in the Company was worth $24.53. Compl. ¶¶29-30, 37. Based upon these valuations, the Guaranty Plan called for each participating shareholder to receive 611 additional shares of Class A voting stock. Id. ¶38. Although the Guaranty Plan was offered to all voting shareholders, O’Neil declined to participate in the plan. Compl. ¶¶32-35. The remaining voting shareholders did agree to participate and gave their personal guarantees for the additional $3 million loan. Id. ¶¶34-35.

When Larson Texts attempted to obtain formal approval of its plan to issue the additional shares at a special shareholder meeting, O’Neil objected on the grounds that he believed the Guaranty Plan was inappropriate and the $24.53 valuation of the voting shares was too low. Compl. ¶¶39-41. O’Neil further accused the Plaintiff Shareholders of intentionally supplying the outside valuation firm with information that was designed to suppress the value of the stock and thereby allow the Plaintiff Shareholders to acquire more shares for themselves. Id. ¶42. Plaintiffs now claim that O’Neil has engaged in a “series of actions . . . in which he ha[s] refused to agree on a value for Larson Texts’ stock.” Compl. ¶43. According to the Plaintiffs, this has created “a significant problem for Larson Texts because the Company and its 3 shareholders are parties to a Shareholder Agreement which requires the Company to repurchase stock in certain circumstances at an agreed upon or arrived at value.” Id. “Without an agreed- upon value in place,” Plaintiffs say, “Larson Texts is unable to properly plan for its potential Page | 4 repurchase obligations.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that, since 2003, when the Shareholder Agreement was executed, the Company’s shareholders have utilized an established process to arrive at an agreed-upon value of Company shares for purposes of carrying out the Shareholder Agreement. Compl. ¶44. That process has included the retention of a particular outside firm to conduct a valuation of both voting and non-voting shares. Id. On at least two occasions since 2018, however, O’Neil has refused to agree to the value arrived at by this outside firm. Id. ¶45. This includes not only the firm’s most recent valuation but also a prior valuation dated December 31, 2017. Id. ¶45. Plaintiffs believe that O’Neil would presently value the stock at $67.23 per share, or greater, based upon the December 31, 2017 valuation, which O’Neil himself rejected at the time. Id. ¶¶47-48. If this higher valuation is accepted, it would mean that the shares the Company seeks

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