Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad

Michigan Supreme Court

Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad

227 N.W. 665, 248 Mich. 506, 1929 Mich. LEXIS 599

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 3, 1929

DocketDocket No. 95, Calendar No. 32,407.

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 227 N.W. 665 (Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad, 227 N.W. 665, 248 Mich. 506, 1929 Mich. LEXIS 599 (Mich. 1929).

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Opinions

Clark, J.

Plaintiff, on his way to work, just before daylight, driving his automobile on a street in Flint, came to a railroad crossing of defendant. The crossing was protected by a lighted wigwag and a bell. The positive testimony, against which the negative testimony made no issue, is that as plaintiff approached the crossing the bell was ringing and the wigwag was operating showing a red light. The crossing was near a large automobile plant. The night shift was leaving, and the day shift entering. Many automobiles were in the street, to which plain *507 tiff in driving gave his attention. A. sudden movement of an automobile ahead caused plaintiff to stop, and in doing so he stalled his motor. He stopped on the crossing. The train was approaching on a curve. There were cars on a side track. At what distance from the crossing the enginemen might have observed plaintiff’s peril the record is not clear. Probably it was nearly 400 feet. Perhaps, on plaintiff’s own testimony, it was much less. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case a verdict was directed for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

A theory of recovery is that defendant was guilty of gross negligence. This assumes antecedent negligence of plaintiff as a remote cause, and subsequent negligence of defendant as the proximate cause. It is that defendant by the exercise of ordinary care ought to have discovered plaintiff’s peril produced by his negligence and avoided injuring him. The record is barren of evidence to sustain this theory. The evidence does not establish at what point plaintiff’s peril ought to have been discovered by the use of ordinary care, nor that, after discovery, the injury could have been avoided.

The other theory of recovery is ordinary negligence, so-called. It is that plaintiff was guilty of no contributory negligence, and that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause' of his injury. If defendant’s negligence be assumed, plaintiff’s contributory negligence precludes recovery. The record shows an almost total failure of plaintiff to take precaution for his own safety, and a lack of proper attention to the crossing and its warnings.

We find no error.

Judgment affirmed.

North, C. J., and Fead, Butzel, Wiest, McDonald, Potter, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred.

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Clark, J.

Plaintiff, on his way to work, just before daylight, driving his automobile on a street in Flint, came to a railroad crossing of defendant. The crossing was protected by a lighted wigwag and a bell. The positive testimony, against which the negative testimony made no issue, is that as plaintiff approached the crossing the bell was ringing and the wigwag was operating showing a red light. The crossing was near a large automobile plant. The night shift was leaving, and the day shift entering. Many automobiles were in the street, to which plain *507 tiff in driving gave his attention. A. sudden movement of an automobile ahead caused plaintiff to stop, and in doing so he stalled his motor. He stopped on the crossing. The train was approaching on a curve. There were cars on a side track. At what distance from the crossing the enginemen might have observed plaintiff’s peril the record is not clear. Probably it was nearly 400 feet. Perhaps, on plaintiff’s own testimony, it was much less. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case a verdict was directed for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

A theory of recovery is that defendant was guilty of gross negligence. This assumes antecedent negligence of plaintiff as a remote cause, and subsequent negligence of defendant as the proximate cause. It is that defendant by the exercise of ordinary care ought to have discovered plaintiff’s peril produced by his negligence and avoided injuring him. The record is barren of evidence to sustain this theory. The evidence does not establish at what point plaintiff’s peril ought to have been discovered by the use of ordinary care, nor that, after discovery, the injury could have been avoided.

The other theory of recovery is ordinary negligence, so-called. It is that plaintiff was guilty of no contributory negligence, and that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause' of his injury. If defendant’s negligence be assumed, plaintiff’s contributory negligence precludes recovery. The record shows an almost total failure of plaintiff to take precaution for his own safety, and a lack of proper attention to the crossing and its warnings.

We find no error.

Judgment affirmed.

North, C. J., and Fead, Butzel, Wiest, McDonald, Potter, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

227 N.W. 665, 248 Mich. 506, 1929 Mich. LEXIS 599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larsen-v-grand-trunk-western-railroad-mich-1929.

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