Larry Williams v. State of Florida

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-11044
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11044 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/05/2025 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11044 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

LARRY JEROME WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, versus STATE OF FLORIDA JACKSON COUNTY,

Respondent,

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent-Appellee. USCA11 Case: 24-11044 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/05/2025 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11044

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cv-00013-TKW-MJF ____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Larry Jerome Williams, pro se, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his state court conviction and sentence. The district court determined Williams’ § 2254 petition was an unauthorized second or successive petition. We review de novo whether a habeas corpus petition is sec- ond or successive. Ponton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 891 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2018). A second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 peti- tion requires prior authorization from this Court in order to be filed in district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The district court lacks jurisdiction to consider an unauthorized second or successive peti- tion. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). When a petitioner seeks to challenge the same judgment that was challenged in the first § 2254 petition, the petition will be deemed second or successive. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 323-24 (2010). Petitions dismissed as time-barred are consid- ered to have been dismissed with prejudice, and subsequent peti- tions qualify as second or successive. See Jordan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of USCA11 Case: 24-11044 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 03/05/2025 Page: 3 of 3

24-11044 Opinion of the Court 3

Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007). We have recognized “the phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining and does not refer to all habeas applications filed second or successively in time.” Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-44 (2007)). Petitions that are not considered successive present new claims that could not have been raised previously, because the basis of the claim had not existed. Id. at 859, 863. The district court did not err in dismissing Williams’ petition as an unauthorized successive petition. Williams’ first § 2254 peti- tion challenged the same judgment and was dismissed as time- barred, so subsequent petitions would be second or successive within the meaning of § 2244 and require our prior authorization. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Magwood, 561 U.S. at 323-24; Jordan, 485 F.3d at 1353. Williams’ present amended petition did not raise a new claim, the basis for which did not previously exist, and Wil- liams did not receive authorization to file the instant petition. See Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859, 863. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Williams’ amended § 2254 petition for lack of jurisdic- tion. See Williams, 510 F.3d at 1295. AFFIRMED.