STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2025 CA 0294
DEC 19 2025 Judgment Rendered:
ON APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 5 IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA DOCKET NUMBER 19- 05009
r ' r ' • ! • r i qw. r
Andrew C. Blasini Attorneys for Defendant -Appellant John J. Rabalais City of Baton Rouge/ Parish of Joshua B. Couvillion East Baton Rouge Covington, Louisiana
Ted Williams Attorney for Plaintiff A - ppellee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Larry Ned
BEFORE: MILLER, EDWARDS, AND FIELDS, JJ. FIELDS, J.
In this workers' compensation proceeding, employer, City of Baton
Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge ( City/Parish), appeals a judgment awarding
employee, Larry Ned, supplemental earnings benefits ( SEBs). For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 20, 2017, Mr. Ned was employed as a police officer with the
Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) when he was involved in a motor vehicle
accident while operating his squad car, resulting in disabling injuries. The accident
occurred after Mr. Ned' s full-time employment with the BRPD was completed for
the day, but prior to the start of his " extra -duty" detail.' The accident was deemed
compensable under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act (LWCA), and Mr.
Ned received indemnity and medical benefits from City/Parish. In October 2018,
Mr. Ned was released by his physician to full-time employment with light-duty
restrictions. It is the policy of the BRPD that an officer with light-duty restrictions
may not work extra -duty detail.
On August 6, 2019, Mr. Ned filed a disputed claim for compensation,
asserting that he was entitled to SEBs from October 15, 2018 to the present.
City/Parish answered the claim, admitting to Mr. Ned' s original compensable injury
and his return to work status.
On or about April 30, 2024, City/Parish filed an unopposed motion to set this
matter for a trial on the briefs. City/Parish referenced a prior telephone status
conference held with the Workers' Compensation Judge ( WCJ), during which the
parties represented that there were no disputes over material facts relevant to the
issue of law; the only dispute between the parties concerned the calculation of Mr.
I Extra -duty employment is an employment opportunity offered by the BRPD to eligible, commissioned, full-time police officers to provide security to approved establishments or agencies. 2 Ned' s average weekly wage for purposes of determining his entitlement to SEBs.
Specifically, the sole issue before the WCJ was whether Mr. Ned' s extra -duty compensation should be aggregated with his pre -injury BRPD wages to calculate his
average weekly wages and entitlement to SEBs.
Following the submission of briefs and evidence by the parties, the WCJ
signed a judgment in favor of Mr. Ned on June 27, 2024, and ordered that Mr. Ned' s
average weekly wage calculation include wages from his full-time employment with
the BRPD and his part-time extra -duty employment. The WCJ then set out the
amounts Mr. Ned was owed in SEBs by City/Parish and denied Mr. Ned' s claims
for penalties and attorney' s fees. It is from this judgment that City/Parish appeals.
In its sole assignment of error, City/Parish asserts the WCJ erred in its
interpretation of the law in awarding SEBs under the LWCA based on a calculation
of Mr. Ned' s average weekly wage that included wages from both his regular
employment with the BRPD and " his successive employment with separate
employers for paid [ extra -duty] detail work."
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Legislation is the solemn expression of the will of the legislature. La. Civ.
Code art. 2; First National Bank, USA v. DDS Construction, LLC, 2011- 1418
La. 1/ 24/ 12), 91 So. 3d 944, 953. The determination of the legislature' s will must
start with the language of the statute itself. First National Bank, 91 So. 3d at 953.
The words used must be interpreted as they are generally understood. La. Civ. Code
art. 11; First National Bank, 91 So. 3d at 953. The rules of statutory construction
provide that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, and the
application of the law does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be
applied as written and no further effort should be made to determine the legislature' s
intent. See La. Civ. Code art. 9; see also La. R.S. 1: 4; First National Bank, 91
So. 3d at 953. When the language is susceptible of different meanings, it must be
ki La. interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.
Civ. Code art. 10; M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007- 2371 ( La.
7/ l/ 08), 998 So.2d 16, 27.
Applicable Law
The LWCA was enacted to provide for the timely payment of temporary and
permanent disability benefits to all injured workers who suffer an injury or disease La. R.S. arising out of and in the course and scope of their employment.
23: 1020. 1( B)( 1). The LWCA is to be interpreted so as to assure the delivery of
benefits to an injured employee. La. R.S. 23: 1020. 1( C)( 1).
The purpose of SEBs is to compensate the injured employee for the wage-
earning capacity he has lost as a result of his accident. Ziegler v. Slidell Memorial
Hospital, 2017- 0671 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 17), 236 So. 3d 565, 568, citing Pinkins
v. Cardinal Wholesale Supply, Inc., 619 So. 2d 52, 55 ( La. 1993). An employee is
entitled to receive SEBs if he sustains a work-related injury that results in his
inability to earn ninety percent or more of his average pre -injury wage. See La. R.S. 23: 1221( 3)( a)( i). The LWCA defines " wage" as " average weekly wage at the time
of the accident." La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13).
Historically, the LWCA made no specific provision for the computation of
the average weekly wage of an employee who might be employed by more than one
employer. H. Alston Johnson III, "Employees of more than one employer," 14 La.
Civ. L. Treatise, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 325, ( 5th ed. October
2025 Westlaw Update). Such employment may be successive or joint, and wages
were calculated differently based on these classifications. Id. Joint employment
was jurisprudentially defined as multiple employers engaged in a common enterprise
that contemplates the employment and control of the employee by one of the
interested parties for the benefit of all. See Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling
Corp., 170 So.2d 518, 529 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ( en Banc), writs refused, 172
M So. 2d 700 ( 1965); Roberson v. Gordon, 2009- 0472 ( La. App. lst Cir. 10/ 23/ 09),
2009 WL 34543409 * 6 ( unpublished). Successive employment was found in cases
where an employee is engaged in multiple tasks for multiple employers, but not at
the same time. H. Alston Johnson 111, " Multiple employment relationship —
Successive employment," 13 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Workers' Compensation Law and
Practice § 60 ( 5th ed. October 2025 Westlaw Update); see also City of Shreveport
v. Kingwood Forest Apartments, 32,370 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 10/ 29/ 99), 746 So. 2d
234, 239. In cases ofjoint employment, the aggregate of multiple wage sources was
the proper basis upon which benefits should be calculated. However, in successive
employment scenarios the employer in whose employ the injury occurred is
responsible for the payment of compensation. See Johnson, 14 La. Civ. L. Treatise
325.
The LWCA was amended to acknowledge the aggregate computation in joint
employment as found in La. R.S. 23: 1031, whereas the codified reference to
successive employment and wage computation is more vague and found only in the
definitions" section of the LWCA, specifically under " Wages". Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23: 1021( 13) provides the following guidance as to the manner of calculating
an hourly employee' s wages in successive employment scenarios:
13) " Wages" means average weekly wage at the time of the accident. The average weekly wage shall be determined as follows:
a) Hourly wages.
i) If the employee is paid on an hourly basis and the employee is employed for forty hours or more, his hourly wage rate multiplied by the average actual hours worked in the four full weeks preceding the date of the accident or forty hours, whichever is greater[.]
iv) A part-time employee, as defined in R.S. 23: 1021( 9) and who is employed by two or more different employers in two or more successive employments, shall be entitled to receive benefits as follows:
E aa) If an employee is employed by two or more different employers in two or more successive employments and the employee incurs a compensable injury under the provisions of this Chapter in one of the employments, the employer in whose service the employee was injured shall pay the benefits due the employee as provided in this Chapter. bb) If the employee is a part-time employee in one of the successive employments, is injured in that employment, but as a result of the injury also incurs loss of income from other successive employments, that employee shall be entitled to benefits computed by determining wages under the provisions of this Subsection using his hourly rate in employment at the time of injury and using the total hours worked for all employers of the part-time employee, but not to exceed his average, actual weekly hours worked or forty hours weekly, whichever is less. Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed
by appellate courts under the de novo standard of review, and the appellate court is not required to give deference to the lower court in interpreting a statute. Odoms v.
2021- 0828 ( La. 1st Cir. 3/ 3/ 22), 2022 WL 620773, * 3 Cammon, App.
unpublished), writ denied, 2022- 00560 ( La. 5/ 24/ 22), 338 So. 3d 1186.
Judicial Interpretation of Multiple Employment Relationships under the LWCA
Citing to City of Shreveport, 746 So.2d at 239, City/Parish asserts that Mr.
Ned' s extra -duty as security for separate employers is successive employment.
City/Parish accordingly argues that Mr. Ned' s wage computation for his successive employment is based on wages from his employment with BRPD alone. In support
of its contention, City/Parish argues that Holden v. City of New Orleans (NOPD),
2011- 2075 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 8/ 12), 93 So.3d 729, is the case most directly on
point to the facts at issue in this matter. However, the Holden court is not
authoritative in this matter because no evidence of the successive employment or
moonlighting jobs" was ever submitted in that case. Rather, the Holden court
provided dicta on successive employment stating in a footnote, "[ i] t is ... evident that
the only time wages from other employers are included in computing the employer' s
workers' compensation liability is when the employers are joint employers of the
same employee." Holden, 93 So. 3d at 732 n. 5. The Holden court' s dicta is not
R precedent, nor was it based on any actual evidence of the employers' relationships
to each other or to the employee.
Light Co., 377 City/Parish further relies on Lott v. Louisiana Power & In So. 2d 1277 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 1232 ( La. 1980).
Lott, an employee worked in the same capacity for two separate companies. After
the employee' s death, the decedent' s family sought to increase the amount of
benefits they were receiving, claiming that benefits should be based on the combined
weekly earnings of the decedent. The Lott court determined that wages paid by a
second employer are not considered in determining the compensation liability of the
employer for whom the employee was working at the time of his death. Id. at 1281.
The court held, "[ La.] R.S. 23; 1031 evidences the intent of the legislature to make
an employer' s workmen' s compensation liability to an injured employee depend
only upon the wages which that employer pays to the employee and not upon the
total income of the employee." Id. at 1280. Accordingly, the Lott court determined
that the only time wages from other employers are included in computing the
employer' s workers' compensation liability is when the employers are joint
employers of the same employee. Id. at 1281. The Lott court further noted that " to
fix an employer' s liability for payment of benefits on all income of the employee,
regardless of the source, would be patently unfair to the employer responsible for
the payment of benefits." Id.
City/Parish further cites to Guillory v. Interstate Hotels & Resorts, 2005-
650 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 30/ 05), 918 So. 2d 550, and Phillips v. United Parcel
Service, 28, 110 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 2/ 28/ 96), 669 So. 2d 1375, in support of its
argument. In Guillory, the employee was injured while in the course and scope of
his full-time employment but was also employed part-time with a different
employer. The WCJ determined that the average weekly wage calculation for an
employee injured in the course and scope of his full-time employment should not
VA On include wages from his part-time employer. See Guillory, 918 So.2d at 550.
appeal, the Guillory court summarized the holding in Lott, but then noted that the legislature' s 1991 amendment of La. R.S. 23: 1021 carved out an exception to Lott
by allowing a part-time employee injured at his part-time employment to cumulate wages from another unrelated part-time or full-time employer, not to exceed forty
hours. Guillory, 918 So.2d at 551- 52. Since the claimant was injured in his full-
time employment, the Guillory court noted that any cumulation with an unrelated
employer would take the claimant beyond the forty -hour limit; therefore, the
claimant' s part-time wages could not be considered. Id. at 552.
In Phillips, the injured employee worked full-time at a bank and had a part-
time job at UPS. 669 So. 2d at 1376. The claimant' s injury occurred while at his
part-time job. The claimant never missed work from the full-time position, but
sought SEBs, arguing that he was eligible for SEBs until he was able to earn ninety
percent of the combined wages he was earning from both jobs when he was injured.
The Phillips court acknowledged that the LWCA does not explicitly limit
computation of the average wages to the wages earned in the employment in which
the employee was injured. Id. The Phillips court concluded that subsection ( bb)
of the former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv))2 applies when the
injury sustained in one successive employment disables the employee from
performing work for that employer and for his other employer( s), while subsection
aa) ( of the former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv))3 applies to
successive employees, like the claimant in Phillips, when the injury and resulting
disability occur in the service of one successive employer, but not the other.4 Id. at
2 At the time Phillips was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(bb) was designated as " La. R.S. 23: 1021( 10)( a)( iv)(bb)"; however, the language is identical. 3 At the time Phillips was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(aa) was designated as " La. R.S. 23: 1021( 10)( a)( iv)(aa)' ; however, the language is identical. 4 The Phillips court noted that paragraph ( iv), which immediately precedes subsections ( aa) and bb) applies the subsections to a part-time employee as defined in now redesignated La. R.S. 23: 1021( 11), who is employed by two or more employers in successive employments, whereas the 1378. When subsection ( aa) of La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv) applies, the calculation
may be made in either of two ways: by including the claimant' s full-time earnings and comparing his combined pre -accident earnings from both jobs to his post- accident earnings from the full-time job, or by excluding the full-time earnings and
comparing his pre -accident earnings from his part-time job alone to his part-time earnings after the injury. See Phillips, 669 So. 2d at 1378.
Mr. Ned also cites to the Phillips case and its discussion of aggregating wages
and directs this court' s attention to jurisprudence that holds despite successive
employment classification, weekly wage calculations should be based on aggregate
wages of all employment. The court in Leger v. Calcasieu Parish School Board,
2009- 1261 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 4/ 7/ 10), 34 So. 3d 1042, writ denied, 2010- 1005 ( La.
6/ 25/ 10), 38 So. 3d 348, was tasked with deciding whether the claimant' s average
weekly wage should include, in addition to her wages from her full-time
employment ( where she sustained her injuries), her wages from her part-time
employment. 34 So. 3d at 1043. The claimant in Leger was unable to continue either
employment until approximately a year after the accident. Id. While the parties
seemed to agree that subsection ( bb) ( of the former version of what is now La. R.S.
23 :102 l (13)( a)( iv))5 applied, they disagreed as to the meaning of the phrase " that
employment" therein. See Leger, 34 So. 3d at 1044. The employer argued that the
phrase should be interpreted as referring to part-time employment only, while the
claimant contended that it refers to any of her successive employments. Id. The
Leger court reasoned:
If the [ employer' s] reading is correct, it would mean that, because [ the claimant] was not injured in the course and scope of her employment with [ her only part-time employment], the statute would not apply in this case. If [the claimant] is correct in her reading that the
claimant worked full-time for the bank and was a part-time employee only of UPS. 669 So. 2d at 1377 n. l. Since the litigants did not argue the inapplicability of the subsections, the court did not address the issue of the " definition problem." Id. 5 At the time Leger was decided, La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv)(bb) was designated as " La. R.S. 23: 1021( 12)( a)( iv)(bb)"; however, the language is identical.
0 statute refers to either of the successive employments, then the statute would be applicable in this case as she was injured in her successive employment as a school bus driver.
Id. at 1045. After recognizing that both interpretations of the statute are plausible,
the court noted that workers' compensation statutes are to be interpreted liberally in
favor ofthe employee. Id., 61ing McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc.,
2002- 1539 ( La. 7/ 2/ 03), 851 So. 2d 1135, 1139. In light of the ambiguity of the
former version of what is now La. R.S. 23: 1021( 13)( a)( iv), the liberal construction
in favor of the employee regarding workers' compensation laws, and the cases cited
in its opinion, the Leger court found that the WCJ was correct in including the
claimant' s wages from her part-time employment in its calculation of her average
weekly wages. Leger, 34 So. 3d at 1046.
Mr. Ned argues the same conclusion was reached in Jones v. Orleans Parish
School Board, 370 So.2d 677 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), where the claimant was a
teacher who was injured while breaking up a fight between two students; he was also
employed as a used -car salesman. 370 So. 2d at 679. The Jones court held that in
order to determine the difference between the claimant' s pre -injury earnings and
post -injury earnings, his salaries from both positions should be considered. Id. at
680. The Jones court reasoned that, otherwise, this would unjustly penalize
potential claimants from moonlighting to pay for family expenses. Id.
Mr. Ned also cited to Glynn v. City of New Orleans, 95- 1353 ( La. App. 4th
Cir. 4/ 3/ 96), 672 So. 2d 1112, which dealt specifically with SEBs. The claimant in
Glynn was an employee of the City of New Orleans, and was injured in that
employment. Glynn, 672 So. 2d at 1113. The employee filed a workers'
compensation action in which he sought SEBs. Id. at 1114. The WCJ awarded
SEBs, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1114- 16. Citing Jones, the Glynn
court determined that the claimant' s additional revenues from employment other
than the city and his state supplemental pay were properly included in his earnings
10 to calculate his SEBs. Id. at 1115. See also Mitchell v. Winnfield Holding Corp.,
2003- 677 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 12/ 17/ 03), 861 So. 2d 931, 934, writ denied, 2004- 0191
La. 4/ 2/ 04), 869 So.2d 878, citing Glynn, 672 So.2d 1112 ( finding that excluding
the wages from the claimant' s part-time employment in the wage calculation was
improper).
Analysis
In the instant matter, we note that both City/Parish and Mr. Ned relied on
much of the same evidence including, in pertinent part, BRPD' s policy regarding
extra -duty work. The BRPD' s extra -duty policy initially provides that the BRPD
regulates off-duty employment for all officers. The policy states that officers are
restricted to working a set number of hours per day, including regular duty, overtime,
and extra -duty, and that a process is employed to document such hours. As the
policy explains, "[ e] xtra-duty employment is a job where one of the requirements is
being a sworn law enforcement officer[,]" and provides examples of " suitable"
extra -duty jobs, which include traffic control, crowd control, security and protection
of life and property, and routine law enforcement for public authorities. The policy
provides eligibility qualifications for extra -duty work, including being an officer in
good standing and a full-time employee. The policy further provides that
misconduct or poor performance may result in revocation of approval for extra -duty.
According to the policy, employers who wish to employ extra -duty officers must
complete an application and submit same to the Extra -Duty Office, which processes
the application and gives it to the Chief of Police who approves or denies the
employer' s request. The Chief of Police also has sole authority to establish
minimum extra -duty rates and approve officers for extra -duty work following the
officer' s formal request for approval. A police officer engaged in any outside
employment who is called -out by BRPD is expected to leave his extra -duty job.
Furthermore, the policy provides that Extra -Duty Administrative Officers exist and
11 are responsible for scheduling officers to cover the hours needed by the extra -duty
employers and making sure all paperwork that is needed for officers working extra -
duty is provided to the Extra -Duty Office. Finally, the policy specifically states that officers that are on workers compensation shall not work extra[ -]duty or secondary
employment."
In his affidavit, Mr. Ned attested to being a twenty -five-year employee of the
BRPD. Mr. Ned stated that prior to his injury, his weekly wages were made up of
his BRPD employment and extra -duty details with Our Lady of the Lake Regional
Medical Center and the Louisiana Department of Agriculture. Mr. Ned further stated
that his " extra -duty" job assignments had to be approved by the BRPD and that he
could not work these extra -duty job assignments unless they were so approved. He
stated that his extra -duty assignments were coordinated by an Extra -Duty Officer.
Mr. Ned stated that BRPD required him to submit monthly documentation of the
dates and hours he worked extra -duty as well as the pay he received. Mr. Ned
attested that BRPD required him to wear an issued departmental uniform during his
extra -duty assignments and that he was also required to check in with BRPD at the
start of every extra -duty assignment to give his location and hours. Mr. Ned also
stated that he was authorized to make arrests while on extra -duty and did so on
several occasions. Finally, Mr. Ned attested that his extra -duty job assignments
made up thirty- six percent of his wages at the time of the accident, which he has
been unable to earn otherwise.
Based on the evidence provided regarding Mr. Ned' s extra -duty details, we
find the cases cited by City/Parish discussing successive employment factually
distinguishable. Although City/Parish attempts to deemphasize the issue of BRPD' s
control over Mr. Ned' s extra -duty details such that the court considers these details
as completely separate employment, BRPD' s own policies provide otherwise. Mr.
Ned did not find part-time employment on his own, unrelated to his full-time
12 position as a police officer, but applied within the BRPD to work an extra -duty detail
for a BRPD- approved employer. In so doing, he had to meet certain qualifications
within the BRPD in order to be considered for such assignments, such as be a full-
time employee, commissioned, and a police officer in good standing. The BRPD
was in charge of setting officer pay rates and administering paperwork and schedules
to ensure that officers stay in compliance with BRPD policies. This factual scenario
is more akin to a borrowed employer relationship wherein both employers are
considered jointly liable for an injured employee, thereby making an aggregate
calculation of all wages appropriate for the determination of the employee' s average
weekly wage and entitlement to SEBs. Accordingly, we find no error in the WC' s
calculation of Mr. Ned' s average weekly wage taking all of his income into account
and finding Mr. Ned to be entitled to SEBs.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the WCJ' s June 27, 2024
judgment. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $ 1058. 00 to be borne by the
appellant, City of Baton Rouge/ Parish of East Baton Rouge.
AFFIRMED.