LARRY INOA v. PAMELA CASEY O'BRIEN & Others.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedMay 18, 2026
Docket25-P-0719
StatusUnpublished

This text of LARRY INOA v. PAMELA CASEY O'BRIEN & Others. (LARRY INOA v. PAMELA CASEY O'BRIEN & Others.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LARRY INOA v. PAMELA CASEY O'BRIEN & Others., (Mass. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-719

LARRY INOA

vs.

PAMELA CASEY O'BRIEN & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff appeals from orders of a single justice of

this court denying (1) his motion to docket his appeal in this

case late and (2) his motion to reconsider that denial. Because

we discern neither an abuse of discretion nor other error in the

challenged rulings, we affirm.

Background. The appellant filed the underlying complaint

in the Superior Court in 2021. In January 2022, after a

hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants'

1Vinela Marmolejos, Christopher C. Harding, Theresa A. Bisenius, Mary Mcduald, Dina Carter, Geoffrey E. Snyder, Michelle A. Cristelb, and Randy J. Kaplan. As is our custom, we spell the defendants' names as they are set forth on the complaint. motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against them. The

plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of

dismissal and, on June 7, 2022, the Superior Court clerk sent

notice of the assembly of the record to the parties and to the

clerk of this court. The plaintiff failed to docket his appeal

within the fourteen-day time limit established by Mass. R. A. P.

10 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1618 (2019) (rule

10 [a] [1]).

In July 2022, this court sent notice of the plaintiff's

failure to docket the appeal; the notice informed the parties

that "[i]f an appellant . . . wishes to pursue the appeal, the

party must file a motion to the single justice for leave to

docket the appeal late." The plaintiff did not file such a

motion until nearly three years later, on May 6, 2025.

Presented with the motion, the single justice found that the

plaintiff had "failed to establish excusable neglect and at

least one meritorious appellate issue," and denied the motion.

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but the single justice

denied the motion based on his conclusion that the plaintiff

"failed to establish excusable neglect." This appeal followed.

Discussion. Where an appellant fails to docket a civil

appeal in the time permitted under rule 10 (a) (1), the

appellant must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that the

delay was caused by excusable neglect. See Howard v. Boston

2 Water & Sewer Comm'n, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 122 (2019).

"[E]xcusable neglect refers to circumstances that are unique or

extraordinary, not to any garden-variety oversight" (quotations

omitted). Id. at 123, quoting Shaev v. Alvord, 66 Mass. App.

Ct. 910, 911 (2006). We review the action of the single justice

on an appellant's motion to docket an appeal late for abuse of

discretion. See Tisei v. Building Inspector of Marlborough, 3

Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (1975).

Here, the plaintiff argued that his delay amounted to

excusable neglect for two reasons -- first, because he was self-

represented at the time the deadline to enter the appeal passed

and, second, because he experienced "personal and legal hardship

arising from ongoing proceedings with the Massachusetts

Department of Revenue (DOR) and the Child Support Enforcement

Division." We discern no abuse of discretion in the single

justice's determination that neither of these explanations

demonstrated that the plaintiff's delay was the result of

excusable neglect.

As to the first point, the plaintiff represented himself

from the inception of the underlying lawsuit, including when he

filed his notice of appeal. "Although some leniency is

appropriate in determining whether pro se litigants have

complied with rules of procedure, the rules nevertheless bind

pro se litigants as all other litigants." Brown v. Chicopee

3 Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710, IAFF, 408 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4

(1990). Where "[t]he appellate rules 'put the responsibility

for expediting the appeal squarely on the appellant,'" Neuwirth

v. Neuwirth, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 248, 256-257 (2014), quoting

Mailer v. Mailer, 387 Mass. 401, 407 (1982), the single justice

acted within his discretion in rejecting the plaintiff's

argument.

We reach a similar conclusion as to the plaintiff's second

argument. Although the plaintiff's motion outlined his

challenges to child support orders entered by the Probate and

Family Court and to the lawfulness of certain defendants'

efforts to enforce those orders, nothing in the plaintiff's

affidavit or other supporting materials detailed any resulting

"hardship" or explained how it prevented him from docketing his

appeal for nearly three years. We are not persuaded that the

record before the single justice compelled the conclusion that

the plaintiff's ongoing dispute about his child support payments

created "unique or extraordinary" circumstances, Howard, 96

Mass. App. Ct. at 123, quoting Shaev, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 911,

and we therefore conclude that the single justice acted within

his discretion when he rejected this argument. See Lawrence

Sav. Bank v. Garabedian, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 161 (2000)

(excusable neglect "is meant to take care of emergency

situations only" [citation omitted]). Where the single justice

4 properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to show excusable

neglect on any of the theories raised in his motion to docket

the appeal late, we affirm the order denying that motion.

Having done so, we also affirm the order denying the plaintiff's

motion to reconsider. The plaintiff's remaining requests for

relief are not before us, and we do not consider them.

Single justice order dated May 9, 2025, denying motion to docket appeal late, affirmed.

Single justice order dated May 28, 2025, denying motion to reconsider, affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Hand, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: May 18, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Tisei v. Building Inspector of Marlborough
330 N.E.2d 488 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1975)
Mailer v. Mailer
439 N.E.2d 811 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1982)
Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710
562 N.E.2d 87 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1990)
Lawrence Savings Bank v. Garabedian
727 N.E.2d 97 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2000)
Shaev v. Alvord
848 N.E.2d 438 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2006)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Neuwirth v. Neuwirth
8 N.E.3d 757 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2014)

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