IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11-00368-CR
LARRY G. WATSON, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2010-1136-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Larry G. Watson, was charged by indictment with one count of
aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (e) (West Supp. 2011); one count of indecency with a child by contact,
a second-degree felony, see id. § 22.11(a)(1), (d) (West 2011); and one count of indecency
with a child by exposure, a third-degree felony.1 See id. § 21.11(a)(2)(A), (d) (West 2011).
1The jury assessed punishment at seventy-five years’ confinement for the count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, twenty years’ confinement for the count of indecency with a child by contact, In one issue, Watson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him his
right of confrontation and prohibiting him from properly impeaching the complainant
pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 613. See TEX. R. EVID. 613. We affirm.2
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1067-68, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); De La Paz v. State, 273
S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right not only to confront the
witnesses against him, but to cross-examine them as well. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L .Ed. 2d 347 (1974). “The exposure of a witness’
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17, 94 S. Ct. at 1110. The
accused is entitled to great latitude to show a witness’ bias or motive to falsify his
testimony. See Hodge v. State, 631 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
However, the right of cross-examination is not unlimited. The trial court retains
wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. See Delaware v. Van
and ten years’ confinement for the count of indecency with a child by exposure. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
2 Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Watson v. State Page 2 Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1434-35, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). The trial court
must carefully consider the probative value of the evidence and weigh it against the
risks of admission. See Hodge, 631 S.W.2d at 758. These potential risks include “the
possibility of undue prejudice, embarrassment or harassment to either a witness or a
party, the possibility of misleading or confusing a jury, and the possibility of undue
delay or waste of time.” Id.; see Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
see also Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Moreover, “the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, or to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1985) (emphasis in original); see Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 844-45 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).
II. ANALYSIS
Here, the complainant, fourteen-year-old B.D., testified that, when she was
eleven years old, Watson exposed himself to her, masturbated in front of her, took
pictures of her naked, fondled her breasts, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.
B.D. described the incidents using graphic terminology, including “jacking off” and
“cum.” After inquiring about the incidents allegedly involving Watson, the prosecutor
then asked B.D. about a prior sexual assault she allegedly endured at the hands of her
mother’s ex-boyfriend, Danny Suarez. On cross-examination, defense counsel
questioned B.D. about Suarez’s actions and also began to ask about an incident in 2004
involving “a young person,” which required Child Protective Services to intervene. The
Watson v. State Page 3 State objected to defense counsel’s line of questioning pertaining to the young person as
being irrelevant and deliberately confusing and asserted that B.D. had denied that
anything transpired in that incident. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial
court sustained the State’s objection. In response to the trial court’s ruling, defense
counsel made the following statement:
Okay. And, Judge, I’ll have to except to that because I think the child’s experience—the State has talked about how many times she’s been talked to about things, sexual questions. There’s always the issue that when you’re talking to a child just the questioning puts ideas into their mind, gives them information about things sexual, makes them aware of the affect [sic] of allegations of sexual misconduct and so forth. And this has been going on in this child’s life for many years. And I think that’s critical to this Defendant having a fair trial. Just—I understand the ruling.
At no point in trial did defense counsel argue that the trial court’s ruling on the
State’s objection violated Texas Rule of Evidence 613 or the Confrontation Clause;
instead, he made a vague objection without citing any authority. Based on our review
of the record, Watson’s complaint on appeal does not comport with his objection in the
trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (stating that a complaining party must make a timely and specific objection
to preserve error for appellate review); see also Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that points of error on appeal must
correspond or comport with objections and arguments made at trial) (citing Dixon v.
State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998))). “Where a trial objection does not
comport with the issue raised on appeal, the appellant has preserved nothing for
Watson v. State Page 4 review.” Wright, 154 S.W.3d at 241; see Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11-00368-CR
LARRY G. WATSON, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2010-1136-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Larry G. Watson, was charged by indictment with one count of
aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (e) (West Supp. 2011); one count of indecency with a child by contact,
a second-degree felony, see id. § 22.11(a)(1), (d) (West 2011); and one count of indecency
with a child by exposure, a third-degree felony.1 See id. § 21.11(a)(2)(A), (d) (West 2011).
1The jury assessed punishment at seventy-five years’ confinement for the count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, twenty years’ confinement for the count of indecency with a child by contact, In one issue, Watson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him his
right of confrontation and prohibiting him from properly impeaching the complainant
pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 613. See TEX. R. EVID. 613. We affirm.2
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1067-68, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); De La Paz v. State, 273
S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right not only to confront the
witnesses against him, but to cross-examine them as well. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L .Ed. 2d 347 (1974). “The exposure of a witness’
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17, 94 S. Ct. at 1110. The
accused is entitled to great latitude to show a witness’ bias or motive to falsify his
testimony. See Hodge v. State, 631 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
However, the right of cross-examination is not unlimited. The trial court retains
wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. See Delaware v. Van
and ten years’ confinement for the count of indecency with a child by exposure. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
2 Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Watson v. State Page 2 Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1434-35, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). The trial court
must carefully consider the probative value of the evidence and weigh it against the
risks of admission. See Hodge, 631 S.W.2d at 758. These potential risks include “the
possibility of undue prejudice, embarrassment or harassment to either a witness or a
party, the possibility of misleading or confusing a jury, and the possibility of undue
delay or waste of time.” Id.; see Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
see also Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Moreover, “the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, or to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1985) (emphasis in original); see Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 844-45 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).
II. ANALYSIS
Here, the complainant, fourteen-year-old B.D., testified that, when she was
eleven years old, Watson exposed himself to her, masturbated in front of her, took
pictures of her naked, fondled her breasts, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.
B.D. described the incidents using graphic terminology, including “jacking off” and
“cum.” After inquiring about the incidents allegedly involving Watson, the prosecutor
then asked B.D. about a prior sexual assault she allegedly endured at the hands of her
mother’s ex-boyfriend, Danny Suarez. On cross-examination, defense counsel
questioned B.D. about Suarez’s actions and also began to ask about an incident in 2004
involving “a young person,” which required Child Protective Services to intervene. The
Watson v. State Page 3 State objected to defense counsel’s line of questioning pertaining to the young person as
being irrelevant and deliberately confusing and asserted that B.D. had denied that
anything transpired in that incident. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial
court sustained the State’s objection. In response to the trial court’s ruling, defense
counsel made the following statement:
Okay. And, Judge, I’ll have to except to that because I think the child’s experience—the State has talked about how many times she’s been talked to about things, sexual questions. There’s always the issue that when you’re talking to a child just the questioning puts ideas into their mind, gives them information about things sexual, makes them aware of the affect [sic] of allegations of sexual misconduct and so forth. And this has been going on in this child’s life for many years. And I think that’s critical to this Defendant having a fair trial. Just—I understand the ruling.
At no point in trial did defense counsel argue that the trial court’s ruling on the
State’s objection violated Texas Rule of Evidence 613 or the Confrontation Clause;
instead, he made a vague objection without citing any authority. Based on our review
of the record, Watson’s complaint on appeal does not comport with his objection in the
trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (stating that a complaining party must make a timely and specific objection
to preserve error for appellate review); see also Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that points of error on appeal must
correspond or comport with objections and arguments made at trial) (citing Dixon v.
State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998))). “Where a trial objection does not
comport with the issue raised on appeal, the appellant has preserved nothing for
Watson v. State Page 4 review.” Wright, 154 S.W.3d at 241; see Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, when
complaining about the exclusion of evidence, the proponent is required to make an offer
of proof and obtain a ruling in order to preserve error. Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173,
176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Watson did not make a particularized showing that the
2004 allegation he wished to reference was where B.D. gained knowledge about “sexual
things” or that it actually made her aware of the effect of allegations of sexual
misconduct.3 Watson also failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on his objection.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Watson failed to preserve his appellate
complaints in this matter. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 176; Wilson, 71
S.W.3d at 349; see also Wright, 154 S.W.3d at 241. Accordingly, Watson’s sole issue is
overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Watson’s only issue on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.
AL SCOGGINS Justice
3 In fact, it is arguable that B.D. gained the “sexual knowledge” that Watson complains about as a
result of the sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by Suarez and that questioning about the 2004 incident would confuse or mislead the jury or serve to embarrass or harass B.D. See Hodge v. State, 631 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); see also Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Watson v. State Page 5 Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed May 23, 2012 Do not publish [CR25]
Watson v. State Page 6