Larry Eddington, Vincent J. Aurentz, and William J. Butler v. Dallas Police and Fire Pension System and William F. Quinn, in His Official Capacity as Board Chair

CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 8, 2019
Docket17-0058
StatusPublished

This text of Larry Eddington, Vincent J. Aurentz, and William J. Butler v. Dallas Police and Fire Pension System and William F. Quinn, in His Official Capacity as Board Chair (Larry Eddington, Vincent J. Aurentz, and William J. Butler v. Dallas Police and Fire Pension System and William F. Quinn, in His Official Capacity as Board Chair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Larry Eddington, Vincent J. Aurentz, and William J. Butler v. Dallas Police and Fire Pension System and William F. Quinn, in His Official Capacity as Board Chair, (Tex. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 444444444444 NO. 17-0058 444444444444

LARRY EDDINGTON, VINCENT J. AURENTZ, AND WILLIAM J. BUTLER, PETITIONERS,

v.

DALLAS POLICE AND FIRE PENSION SYSTEM AND GEORGE TOMASOVIC, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS BOARD CHAIR, RESPONDENTS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444 ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444

Argued October 11, 2018

CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE GUZMAN and JUSTICE BROWN did not participate in the decision.

Public pension systems are struggling to maintain solvency, whether due to poorly

constructed benefit plans, unrealistic investment expectations, the economic downturn of the past

decade, or the aging of the population.1 Article XVI, Section 66 of the Texas Constitution prohibits

1 See, e.g., Sarah Krouse, State and Local Pension Woes Are Starting to Bite—The Shortfall Is Hitting Retirees with Little Time to Engineer a Plan B, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2018, at A1 (estimating that the liabilities of public defined- benefit pension plans in the U.S. are in the trillions of dollars); Nathan H. Jeppson et al., Defining and Quantifying the Pension Liabilities of Government Entities in the United States, 29 J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 98, 98 (2018) (estimating public defined-benefit pension liabilities to be more than $5 trillion). As of December 2015, there were 93 actuarially funded, defined-benefit public retirement systems in Texas with some $241 billion in net assets and about 2.4 million members. TEX. PENSION REVIEW BD., GUIDE TO PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS IN TEXAS 4 (Report to the 85th Leg., Feb. the reduction or impairment of certain benefits under local public retirement systems.2 The Dallas

Police and Fire Pension System (“the System”) amended its pension plan to reduce the interest rate

paid on Deferred Retirement Option Plan (“DROP”) accounts. Petitioners contend that the reduction

violates Section 66. We disagree because the change was prospective only and did not impact

benefits accrued or granted within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.3

I

The System provides comprehensive retirement, death, and disability benefits for some 9,300

Dallas police officers, firefighters, pensioners, and qualified survivors.4 Officers and firefighters

become System members automatically when they enter the training academy. While in active

service, they and the City of Dallas contribute to their accounts. We describe the System’s retirement

plan in general terms, ignoring various exceptions and specific provisions that do not affect our

analysis of the constitutional issue presented here.

A member reaching retirement age can leave active service and begin drawing a monthly

annuity based on the product of his average pay and length of service. A member can also continue

working and when leaving active service, draw a higher monthly annuity due to his longer term of

service and the pay raises received after reaching retirement age. The plan’s DROP program, created

2017). 2 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 66. 3 508 S.W.3d 774. 4 The pension plan is authorized by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243a-1.

2 in 1993,5 gives members who continue working past retirement eligibility another option. The

member’s annuity is fixed at retirement age and does not increase with continued service, but while

he continues to work, monthly payments are credited to his DROP account, accessible upon leaving

active service. In effect, members working past retirement eligibility can choose between a higher

annuity on leaving active service, or a lower annuity plus a forced savings account, as it were—a

lump sum of payments that accrued while they continued working.6 Over 1,400 active members

elected DROP when it was first offered.

At first, DROP accounts bore interest.7 In 1998, the System guaranteed a rate of not less than

8% nor more than 10%. Years later, when 40% of System assets were in DROP accounts, the

growing disparity between DROP interest owed and the declining return on System investments

created a deficit to be made up from the plan’s general assets. The System determined that, unless

the DROP interest rate was reduced, the plan would become unstable, and the System could not meet

its monthly payment obligations.

5 See Act of May 26, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 872, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3432, 3465–3467 (codified as amended at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6243a-1, § 6.14). 6 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6243a-1, § 6.14(c). Until 2017, the statute provided, with exceptions and restrictions, that “on leaving active service . . . , a member who participates in DROP shall begin to receive the balance in the person’s DROP account under one of the following methods of distribution elected by the member: (1) a single-sum distribution . . . ; (2) an annuity to be paid in equal monthly payments for the life of the member, . . . determined as of the date the member leaves active service based on the person’s account balance and age . . . ; or (3) substantially equal monthly or annual payments of the person’s account balance . . . extending over a fixed period that does not exceed the life expectancy of the member”. 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3465–3466. 7 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3465 (“Amounts held in a member’s DROP account shall be credited at the end of each calendar month with interest”.). The amended statute in 2017 dropped this requirement. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6243a-1, § 6.14(c) (“Amounts held in the DROP account of a member shall be credited at the end of each calendar month.”); id. § 6.14(f-1) (“The DROP account of a member who begins participating in DROP on or after September 1, 2017, does not accrue interest.”).

3 In 2014, the retirement plan was amended with the approval of the System board and 88%

of the active members voting. The amendment provided that the DROP floor interest rate would be

reduced 1% each year for three years, from 8% to 5%, beginning in 2015. After that, DROP interest

would be based on investment performance and could range between 7% and zero. The reductions

were prospective only. They did not affect interest already accrued. The decision to enter DROP is

irrevocable. Recognizing that a member’s decision might have been based on the prospective

interest rate, the amendments allowed active DROP participants a one-time opportunity to revoke

their election.8

Petitioners, three pensioners who elected DROP before the 2014 amendment,9 sued the

System, asserting that the change in interest rate reduced or impaired service retirement benefits

granted or accrued in violation of Article XVI, Section 66 of the Texas Constitution. Petitioners

contend that the DROP program is itself a benefit protected by Section 66, or if not, the formula for

calculating annuities is, or at least the interest rate is. The System contends that only annuity

payments themselves are protected benefits.

Initially, after a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment that the lowering of the DROP

interest rate violated Section 66. But the court granted the System’s motion for reconsideration and

ruled instead that reducing the DROP account interest rate prospectively did not violate Section 66.

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Larry Eddington, Vincent J. Aurentz, and William J. Butler v. Dallas Police and Fire Pension System and William F. Quinn, in His Official Capacity as Board Chair, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larry-eddington-vincent-j-aurentz-and-william-j-butler-v-dallas-police-tex-2019.