Larry Daniel Walker, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
This text of Larry Daniel Walker, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Larry Daniel Walker, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, McClanahan and Petty Argued at Lexington, Virginia
LARRY DANIEL WALKER, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0791-09-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS JUNE 22, 2010 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE David A. Melesco, Judge
Mark T. Williams (Williams, Morrison, Light & Moreau, on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Larry Daniel Walker, Jr. (“Walker”) was convicted in a bench trial of driving after having
been declared a habitual offender, second offense in violation of Code § 46.2-357. He was
sentenced to three years of imprisonment, with all but twelve months suspended for ten years of
good behavior. On appeal, Walker claims that the trial court erred in using a prior conviction for
driving as a habitual offender under the City Code of Danville, Virginia, to enhance the habitual
offender punishment under the Virginia Code to a felony as a second or subsequent offense. For
the following reasons, we disagree and affirm.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Walker contends the trial court erred in using the prior conviction under the
City Code of Danville to enhance the habitual offender conviction to a felony as a second or
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. subsequent offense. Specifically, he claims that the habitual offender statute does not permit the
use of similar ordinances to enhance the conviction pursuant to Code § 46.2-357.
“A matter of statutory interpretation . . . presents a pure question of law, which we review
de novo.” Giles v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 369, 373, 672 S.E.2d 879, 882 (2009) (citations
omitted).
“Under basic rules of statutory construction, we examine a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases. When the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. We must determine the General Assembly’s intent from the words appearing in the statute, unless a literal construction of the statute would yield an absurd result.”
Harris v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 253, 255-56, 692 S.E.2d 656, ___ (2010) (quoting
Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 407, 450, 611 S.E.2d 631, 653 (2005)). “‘[A] statute
should be read to give reasonable effect to the words used and to promote the ability of the
enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed.’” Id. at 256, 692 S.E.2d at ____
(quoting Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 484, 489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995)).
“An undefined term must be ‘given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used.’” Sansom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (quoting Dep’t of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980)). We strictly construe penal statutes against the Commonwealth, Welch v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 558, 563, 628 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2006), but remember “that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction,” Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983). Hence, “we will not apply ‘an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute’ that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.” Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)).
Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 37-38, 675 S.E.2d 846, 849 (2009).
-2- The City of Danville ordinance § 21-3(a) under which Walker was previously convicted
states:
Pursuant to the authority of section 46.2-131 of the Code of Virginia, all of the provisions and requirements of the laws of the Commonwealth contained in title 46.2 of the Code of Virginia and in effect on July 1, 1998, except those provisions and requirements the violations of which constitute a felony and except those provisions and requirements which, by their nature, can have no application to or within the City, and except those provisions which by law may not be adopted or incorporated, are hereby adopted and incorporated mutates mutandis in this chapter by reference and made applicable within the City. References to “highways of the state” contained in such provisions and requirements hereby adopted shall be deemed to refer to the streets, highways and other public ways within the City. Such provisions and requirements are adopted and made a part of this chapter as fully as though set forth at length herein, and it shall be unlawful for any person within the City to violate, or fail, neglect or refuse to comply with, any such provision or requirement; provided that, in no event shall the penalty imposed for the violation of any such provision or a requirement exceed the penalty imposed for a similar offense under title 46.2 of the Code of Virginia.
Code § 46.2-357(A) makes it unlawful “for any person determined or adjudicated an
habitual offender to drive any motor vehicle or self-propelled machinery or equipment on the
highways of the Commonwealth while the revocation of the person’s driving privilege remains
in effect.” Code § 46.2-357(B)(3) provides “[i]f the offense of driving while a determination as
an habitual offender is in effect is a second or subsequent such offense, such person shall be
punished as provided in subdivision 2 of this subsection, irrespective of whether the offense, of
itself, endangers the life, limb, or property of another.”
The reference to subsection 2 enhances the punishment to a
felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than one year nor more than five years, one year of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of confinement or, in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury, by mandatory minimum confinement in jail for a period of 12 months.
-3- Code § 46.2-357(B)(2). The very last sentence of subsection 2 further notes that “[f]or the
purposes of this section, an offense in violation of a valid local ordinance, or law of any other
jurisdiction, which ordinance or law is substantially similar to any provision of law herein shall
be considered an offense in violation of such provision of law.” Id. (emphasis added).
In looking at Code § 46.2-357 in its entirety, we conclude that the plain meaning of the
last sentence of subsection 2 beginning “[f]or the purposes of this section” means that, in
determining what prior “offenses” are encompassed within this code section, the General
Assembly intended that the provisions of that subsection apply to that entire section of the Code,
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