Larry Cameron v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 12, 2015
• Docket: 49A02-1407-CR-505
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Feb 12 2015, 10:15 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Kenneth E. Biggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Larry Cameron, February 12, 2015

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1407-CR-505 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior State of Indiana, Court The Honorable David Cook, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49F07-1311-CM-73790

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issue [1] Following a bench trial, Larry Cameron was found guilty of resisting law

enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Cameron appeals, raising one issue for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 1 of 6 our review: whether Cameron committed resisting law enforcement when he

fled a building during the execution of a search warrant and continued to run

despite an officer’s order to stop. Concluding law enforcement had authority to

detain Cameron and that there was sufficient evidence to support his

conviction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On November 13, 2013, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Miguel Roa

assisted the police vice team in executing a search warrant on a residence in

which the police suspected illegal gambling took place. When police

announced their presence at the front door and entered the residence, Officer

Roa, who was standing along the side of the house, saw several persons run

from the back exit. Cameron was among the individuals who ran out the back

door. Officer Roa chased after Cameron, yelling for him to stop and identifying

himself as a police officer. Officer Roa pursued Cameron the length of two

house lots before Cameron stopped running. Cameron claimed he did not hear

the officer yelling at him to stop.

[3] The State charged Cameron with resisting law enforcement by fleeing, a Class

A misdemeanor, and unlawful gambling, a Class B misdemeanor. Following a

bench trial, the court found Cameron not guilty of unlawful gambling but guilty

of resisting law enforcement. The trial court imposed a one-year sentence, with

two days credit and 363 days suspended to probation. Cameron was also

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 2 of 6 ordered to complete forty-eight hours of community service. This appeal

followed.

Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [4] When reviewing a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, the reviewing

court will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the

witnesses, and we must respect the trier of fact’s ability to weigh conflicting

evidence. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We consider only

the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supporting the

verdict. Id. And we must affirm “if the probative evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of

fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation

omitted).

II. Cameron’s Duty to Stop [5] A person commits resisting law enforcement by fleeing as a Class A

misdemeanor if he “knowingly or intentionally . . . flees from a law

enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, . . .

identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-

44.1-3-1(a)(3). Cameron argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him

of resisting law enforcement because he did not have a duty to stop and Officer

Roa did not have authority to detain him.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 3 of 6 [6] Just last year, our supreme court resolved a conflict between Indiana Court of

Appeals’ decisions as to whether an officer’s order to stop must be lawful in

order to sustain a conviction under Indiana’s resisting law enforcement statute.

See generally Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014). The court’s decision in

Gaddie focused on rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, which states

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

[7] The Fourth Amendment requires that a law enforcement officer must have at

least a minimal level of objective justification for detaining an individual—

namely, reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “[W]hen an officer, without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore

the police and go about his business.” Id. at 125. With those constitutional

principles in mind, our supreme court reasoned that “[i]f a citizen’s freedom to

walk away is deemed a criminal offense merely because it follows an officer’s

command to halt—even in the absence of probable cause or reasonable

suspicion—then the citizen’s freedom is restrained contrary to the protections of

the Fourth Amendment.” Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1254. Accordingly, the court

held that “[t]o avoid conflict with the Fourth Amendment, Indiana Code

section 35–44.1–3–1(a)(3) . . . must be construed to require that a law

enforcement officer’s order to stop be based on reasonable suspicion or probable

cause.” Id. at 1256.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 4 of 6 [8] Cameron contends that he had no duty to stop when ordered to do so by

Officer Roa. He claims that there was no evidence that he had committed a

crime and that Officer Roa did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that he

was involved in any sort of criminal activity. We disagree. Officer Roa was

aware that the residence being searched was suspected of hosting illegal

gambling activity, and he witnessed Cameron flee from the back door of that

residence at the same moment that police officers announced themselves and

entered to execute a search warrant. We believe that at that moment there were

“specific and articulable facts,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), giving rise

to reasonable suspicion justifying Officer Roa’s order for Cameron to stop.

[9] Even if Officer Roa did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Cameron was

involved in criminal activity, his conviction for resisting law enforcement by

fleeing would still be appropriate under the circumstances. Although Gaddie’s

holding specifically made reference to a requirement for “reasonable suspicion

or probable cause,” it is quite clear that the decision was meant to prevent

convictions that offend Fourth Amendment principles. 10 N.E.3d at 1256.

“[A] warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly

carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises

while a proper search is conducted.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705

(1981) (footnotes omitted); see also Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct.1031, 1037-38

(2013) (“The rule in Summers . . . does not require law enforcement to have

particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a

specific danger to the officers.”). Here, Cameron was an occupant of a building

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 5 of 6 being subjected to the execution of a valid search warrant. As such, Officer

Roa’s detention of Cameron—with or without particularized reasonable

suspicion—would not run afoul of Fourth Amendment protections. Therefore,

Cameron had a duty to stop when ordered, and there was sufficient evidence to

support his conviction for resisting law enforcement by fleeing.

Conclusion [10] Concluding law enforcement had authority to detain Cameron during the

execution of a search warrant and that there was sufficient evidence to support

his conviction, we affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-505 | February 12, 2015 Page 6 of 6