Larrauri v. Larrauri

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Larrauri v. Larrauri

584 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 6131, 1991 WL 116854

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 2, 1991

DocketNo. 90-601

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 584 So. 2d 31 (Larrauri v. Larrauri) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Larrauri v. Larrauri, 584 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 6131, 1991 WL 116854 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals and the wife cross-appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm the final judgment, but reverse the attorney’s fee award.

First, we address the trial court’s lump sum alimony award to the wife. The husband characterizes the award as an equitable distribution of his medical degree based on his future earnings. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 451 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1984); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We disagree. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), the court recognized that the trial court may premise a lump sum alimony award on property distribution or on traditional alimony principles. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So.2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1986). In the case before us, the award was apparently intended as a permanent alimony award based on traditional alimony principles.¹ Permanent alimony may be awarded in lump sum or in installments. § 61.08(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); see Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201. In making the award, the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in section 61.08(1), the wife’s demonstrated need and the husband’s present ability to pay. See Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201; Maddux v. Maddux, 495 So.2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting alimony to the wife.

Second, we consider the court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony. See Barko v. Barko, 557 So.2d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Under the facts of the case before us, the trial court may make a determination that the “[wjife is entitled to reasonable rehabilitative alimony ... to enable her to have the same [educational] opportunity as the [h]us-band.” Blumberg v. Blumberg, 498 So.2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 508 So.2d 13 (Fla.1987); Mayor v. Mayor, 570 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). [33]*33We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony.

Finally, we reverse the attorney’s fee award; the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and to make the requisite findings. Martin v. Martin, 561 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

The remaining point lacks merit.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

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PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals and the wife cross-appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm the final judgment, but reverse the attorney’s fee award.

First, we address the trial court’s lump sum alimony award to the wife. The husband characterizes the award as an equitable distribution of his medical degree based on his future earnings. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 444 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 451 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1984); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We disagree. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), the court recognized that the trial court may premise a lump sum alimony award on property distribution or on traditional alimony principles. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So.2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1986). In the case before us, the award was apparently intended as a permanent alimony award based on traditional alimony principles.¹ Permanent alimony may be awarded in lump sum or in installments. § 61.08(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); see Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201. In making the award, the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in section 61.08(1), the wife’s demonstrated need and the husband’s present ability to pay. See Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201; Maddux v. Maddux, 495 So.2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting alimony to the wife.

Second, we consider the court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony. See Barko v. Barko, 557 So.2d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Under the facts of the case before us, the trial court may make a determination that the “[wjife is entitled to reasonable rehabilitative alimony ... to enable her to have the same [educational] opportunity as the [h]us-band.” Blumberg v. Blumberg, 498 So.2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 508 So.2d 13 (Fla.1987); Mayor v. Mayor, 570 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). [33]*33We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to award rehabilitative alimony.

Finally, we reverse the attorney’s fee award; the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing and to make the requisite findings. Martin v. Martin, 561 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

The remaining point lacks merit.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

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Bluebook (online)

584 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 6131, 1991 WL 116854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larrauri-v-larrauri-fladistctapp-1991.

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