IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION PSHATOIA LAROSE, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:24-cv-2375-X-BN § ALEXIS MCFARLAND, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Pshatoia LaRose filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Alexis McFarland and others. See Dkt. No. 4. LaRose also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 5. So United States District Judge Brantley Starr referred LaRose’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The undersigned then entered an order explaining that the verified financial information in the IFP motion prevented a finding that requiring LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee will cause undue financial hardship and requiring that LaRose pay the filing fee by November 18, 2024. See Dkt. No. 7. Rather than paying the filing fee, LaRose submitted a motion for reconsideration. See Dkt. No. 9. But the motion did not provide new or corrected financial information in a verified manner. So the undersigned recommended that the Court should deny the IFP motion and order LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee. See Dkt. No. 11. On January 22, 2025, the Court accepted the recommendation and ordered LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee within 21 days. See Dkt. No. 12. The Court warned LaRose that, if she did not pay the filing fee by the deadline, “the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) without further notice.” Id.
The 21-day deadline for LaRose to pay the filing fee passed more than two weeks ago on February 12, 2025, but the fee has not been paid. Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Discussion Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for
failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d
798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))). This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the
defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))). And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding
pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))). A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,
77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996). Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’” Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser
sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))). “When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming
dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”). By not complying with the Court’s order to pay the filing fee despite being warned that failure would result in dismissal, LaRose has prevented this action from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION PSHATOIA LAROSE, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:24-cv-2375-X-BN § ALEXIS MCFARLAND, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Pshatoia LaRose filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Alexis McFarland and others. See Dkt. No. 4. LaRose also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 5. So United States District Judge Brantley Starr referred LaRose’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The undersigned then entered an order explaining that the verified financial information in the IFP motion prevented a finding that requiring LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee will cause undue financial hardship and requiring that LaRose pay the filing fee by November 18, 2024. See Dkt. No. 7. Rather than paying the filing fee, LaRose submitted a motion for reconsideration. See Dkt. No. 9. But the motion did not provide new or corrected financial information in a verified manner. So the undersigned recommended that the Court should deny the IFP motion and order LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee. See Dkt. No. 11. On January 22, 2025, the Court accepted the recommendation and ordered LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee within 21 days. See Dkt. No. 12. The Court warned LaRose that, if she did not pay the filing fee by the deadline, “the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) without further notice.” Id.
The 21-day deadline for LaRose to pay the filing fee passed more than two weeks ago on February 12, 2025, but the fee has not been paid. Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Discussion Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for
failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d
798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))). This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the
defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))). And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding
pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))). A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,
77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996). Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’” Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser
sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))). “When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming
dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”). By not complying with the Court’s order to pay the filing fee despite being warned that failure would result in dismissal, LaRose has prevented this action from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit.
A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted under these circumstances. Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as LaRose decides to obey the Court’s order, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b). And, while it is not apparent based on the record here that dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice at this time would effectively be a dismissal with prejudice,
insofar as the recommended dismissal may somehow prejudice LaRose, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide notice, and the opportunity to file objections (as further explained below) provides a means to respond, to explain why this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an
opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)). Recommendation The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: February 28, 2025
DAVIDL.HORAN —s—SsS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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