LaRose v. Combs

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02242
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION PSHATOIA LAROSE, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:24-cv-2242-L-BN § SEAN COMBS, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Pshatoia LaRose filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Sean Combs and others, alleging violations of federal law. See Dkt. No. 3. LaRose also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 4. So United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred LaRose’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The undersigned then entered an order explaining that the verified financial information in the IFP motion prevented a finding that requiring LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee will cause undue financial hardship and requiring that LaRose pay the filing fee by October 10, 2024. See Dkt. No. 6. Rather than paying the filing fee, LaRose submitted two motions for reconsideration. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 11. But neither motion provided new or corrected financial information in a verified manner. And the undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny the IFP motion and order LaRose to pay the $405 filing fee within 21 days of any order accepting or adopting this recommendation (or within some other reasonable time to be set by the Court), and, if she fails to do so, the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) without further notice. Legal Standards The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “was designed to ensure that litigants would not be deprived of meaningful access to the federal judicial system due to their financial circumstances.” Bucklew v. St. Clair, No. 3:18-cv-2117-N-BH, 2019 WL 2250886, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2019) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 2249718 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2019). But, to gain access,

“[a] litigant seeking IFP status must submit an affidavit identifying all assets he possesses, as well as a statement that he is unable to pay the necessary fees of bringing a federal civil action.” Smith-Garcia v. Harrison Cnty., 776 F. App’x 226, 227 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). The Court must then examine the financial condition of the applicant in order to determine whether the payment of fees would “cause undue financial hardship.”

Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). “This entails a review of other demands on individual [applicants’] financial resources, including whether the expenses are discretionary or mandatory.” Id. And, while “[t]he term ‘undue financial hardship’ is not defined and, therefore, is a flexible concept[,] ... a pragmatic rule of thumb contemplates that undue financial hardship results when prepayment of fees or costs would result in the applicant’s inability to pay for the ‘necessities of life.’” Walker v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, No. 1:08-CV-417, 2008 WL 4873733, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2008) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)); see also Williams v. Louisiana, Civ. A. No. 14-00154-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL

3124332, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2017) (noting that the applicable standard “requires a showing of more than an inconvenience to the applicant” (citations omitted)). “[W]hether the litigant is ‘unable to pay’ the costs [associated with initiating a lawsuit also] ... depend[s] in part on [the] litigant’s actual ability to get funds from a spouse, a parent, an adult sibling, or other next friend.” Williams v. Spencer, 455 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978); see Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a

court may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get from those who ordinarily provide the applicant with the necessities of life, such as from a spouse, parent, adult sibling or other next friend.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Pisano v. Astrue, No. 11-30269-KPN, 2012 WL 79188, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2012) (collecting cases). And a financial affidavit that is either “incomplete” or “internally inconsistent”

is insufficient to find that a movant qualifies for leave to proceed IFP. Muhammad v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., Civ. A. No. 09-3431, 2009 WL 3150041, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2009) (citing Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]here the in forma pauperis affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question ... of whether the asserted claim is frivolous or malicious.”); collecting cases). Discussion These legal standards were set out in the notice of deficiency sent to LaRose. Here, the IFP motion and financial affidavit reflect that LaRose earns more than

$4,000 per month; that what LaRose brings in per month exceeds what she spends per month; that the balance of LaRose’s checking account exceeds $9,000; and that LaRose owns jewelry valued at $4,800 and a Mercedes Benz. See Dkt. No. 4. Considering the IFP motion as filed, the undersigned cannot recommend that the IFP motion be granted consistent with the legal standards set out above. Recommendation The Court should deny Plaintiff Pshatoia LaRose leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, see Dkt. No. 4, and order that she pay the $405 filing fee within 21 days of any order accepting or adopting this recommendation (or within some other reasonable time to be set by the Court), and, if she fails to do so, the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) without further notice. A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: December 4, 2024

DAVIDL.HORAN —s—SsS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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