Laronda Freelon a/k/a Denise L. Freelon a/k/a Denise Pearson v. State of Mississippi;
This text of Laronda Freelon a/k/a Denise L. Freelon a/k/a Denise Pearson v. State of Mississippi; (Laronda Freelon a/k/a Denise L. Freelon a/k/a Denise Pearson v. State of Mississippi;) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2018-CP-00551-COA
LARONDA FREELON A/K/A DENISE L. APPELLANT FREELON A/K/A DENISE PEARSON
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/05/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN ANDREW GREGORY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CALHOUN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LARONDA FREELON (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/26/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Laronda Freelon pleaded guilty in the Calhoun County Circuit Court to aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon. Appearing pro se, Freelon
appeals the circuit court’s denial of her motions for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR).
After review of the record, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On October 24, 2016, a Calhoun County grand jury indicted Freelon for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon (Count I) and robbery with a deadly weapon (Count II) in
violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)(b) (Rev. 2006) and Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev. 2014). The indictment also charged Freelon as a
habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015), citing
three prior felony convictions.
¶3. On January 10, 2017, the court entered an “Order Reducing Charge” pursuant to an
“Agreed Motion to Reduce Charge.” In accordance with the plea agreement negotiated by
Freelon’s attorney, the order removed the habitual-offender designation. Freelon executed
and submitted her “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty” before the court on the same day. The
petition reflected the negotiated sentences and indicated that Freelon would be sentenced as
a non-habitual offender. Prior to accepting Freelon’s guilty plea, the circuit court engaged
Freelon in an exhaustive examination, during which Freelon was asked several questions
about her understanding of the charges, sentencing, inappropriate influences, and the rights
she would waive by pleading guilty. The circuit court accepted Freelon’s guilty plea and
followed the State’s recommendation for sentencing. The court’s sentencing order provided
that as to Count I, Freelon was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC), with three years suspended and seventeen years to
serve, and for Count II, Freelon was sentenced to thirty years in MDOC custody, with
thirteen years suspended and seventeen years to serve. The two sentences were set to run
concurrently. The order does not reflect a habitual-offender enhancement.
¶4. On May 26, 2017, Freelon filed her first PCR motion, which the circuit court denied
on August 21, 2017. Freelon filed another PCR motion on March 5, 2018. The circuit court
denied the motion and entered an “Order Denying Relief Requested” on April 5, 2018, noting
2 the second PCR motion as successive. Aggrieved, Freelon now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. We will only disturb a trial court’s denial of a PCR motion where that court’s decision
was clearly erroneous. Kirksey v. State, 728 So. 2d 565, 567 (¶8) (Miss. 1999) (citing State
v. Tokman, 564 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Miss. 1990)). However, questions of law are reviewed
de novo. Rice v. State, 910 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brown v.
State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
¶6. The State correctly notes that because Freelon cites no authority to support her
arguments, this Court is not required to lend its consideration to her claims. Farr v. State,
238 So. 3d 1177, 1179 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). Providing no caselaw or meaningful
argument in support of her assignments of error, Freelon’s claims are waived. M.R.A.P.
28(a)(7); Bell v. State, 879 So. 2d 423, 434 (¶28) (Miss. 2004); Doss v. State 956 So. 2d
1100, 1102 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Freelon also failed to designate excerpts of the
record as required by Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1) and Van Meter v.
Alford, 774 So. 2d 430, 432 (¶6) (Miss. 2000).
¶7. In addition to a lack of evidentiary or legal support for her argument, Freelon wholly
misrepresents the facts surrounding her assignments of error.
¶8. Freelon alleges a denial of due process and asserts that the MDOC, in violation of the
court’s orders, has converted her sentences to that of a habitual offender. The assertion is
false. The record provides a copy of the MDOC “Notice of Criminal Disposition,” and while
3 the habitual status is noted under the “Indictment Charges,” the designation is not present
under the “Sentenced Charges.” The removal of the habitual-status charge is consistent with
the plea agreement and the court’s sentencing order. Freelon does not and cannot point to
any evidence within the record that indicates otherwise. Thus, the assertion that Freelon is
serving time as a habitual offender is simply false.
¶9. By Freelon’s account, the MDOC informed her that her seventeen years of time to
serve would be “day for day” and that she was not eligible for parole or good time. This is
consistent with the statutory guidelines for “crimes of violence” listed in Mississippi Code
Annotated section 97-3-2(1) (Rev. 2014). Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section
47-7-3(1)(g)(i) (Rev. 2015) and the Mississippi Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Fogleman v. State, 2016-CT-01244-SCT, 2019 WL 4071866, at *5 (¶¶22-24) (Miss. Aug.
29, 2019), Freelon, a person convicted of two statutorily enumerated violent crimes, is not
eligible for parole.
¶10. Freelon also claims that police officers and the court misinformed her regarding the
charges and sentencing guidelines related to her guilty plea, specifically that the seventeen
years to serve were non-mandatory. However the record does not reflect any basis for the
development of that understanding, and we can only conclude the issue is without merit.
There was no mention of “non-mandatory” time during her plea hearing before the court or
in the signed plea petition. The petition, signed by Freelon, states in relevant part:
I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has advised me of the nature of the charge(s) and the possible defenses that I have to the charge(s) . . . . I declare that no officer or agent of any branch of government or any other person has made me any promises or inducements of
4 any kind to me or within my knowledge to anyone else that I will receive a lighter sentence, probation, early release or any other form of leniency if I plead “guilty”. . . . My lawyer has informed me as to the maximum and minimum punishment which the law provides for the offense charged in the indictment or criminal information.
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