VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Case No. 24-CV-01896 65 State Street Montpelier VT 05602 802-828-2091 www.vermontjudiciary.org
Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al
Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
The current allegations of the pleadings show that Plaintiff Lorie LaRock
constructed a house, at which she currently lives, on real property owned by Defendants
Tyler Fisk, Shane Fisk, and Cathy Fisk. Tyler lives on the property in a separate home.
Shane and Cathy live elsewhere. Ms. LaRock’s daughter was in a romantic relationship
with Tyler and, for a time, lived with him. During that time, Ms. LaRock alleges that
she entered into an oral agreement permitting her to build the house and remain in
possession for life, after which her daughter and Tyler would inherit it. After Tyler and
her daughter split up and her daughter vacated the property, Defendants sought to expel
Ms. LaRock from the property. In the complaint, Ms. LaRock seeks an order enforcing
the oral agreement, allowing her to remain in possession for life. She requests, in the
alternative only, damages for the value of improvements.
Defendants have filed a counterclaim asserting trespass, seeking ejectment, and
claiming unjust enrichment.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings. They argue that Ms. LaRock’s attempted reliance on an oral agreement for
the conveyance of an easement or life estate is barred by the Statute of Frauds, 12 V.S.A.
§ 181, which requires a writing as evidence of the agreement. They maintain that the Order Page 1 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al facts do not support any equitable exception to the requirement for a writing because: (1)
there is no allegation of any agreement at all with Shane and Cathy; (2) without any
effective agreement with all owners, there could not have been any reasonable reliance
on an agreement; and (3) regardless, equitable relief would be inappropriate because Ms.
LaRock admits that legal damages would be adequate compensation for any violation of
her rights. Defendants urge the Court to rule that Ms. LaRock has no equitable right to
remain at the property and grant their claim for ejectment, all based solely on the
pleadings. Ms. LaRock opposes the motion.
I. Procedural Standard
As the Vermont Supreme Court has explained, the question posed by a Vt. R. Civ.
P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “is whether, once the pleadings are closed,
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the pleadings. For
the purposes of [a] motion [for judgment on the pleadings] all well pleaded factual
allegations in the nonmovant’s pleadings and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom are assumed to be true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s
pleadings are taken to be false. A defendant may not secure judgment on the pleadings if
contained therein are allegations that, if proved, would permit recovery.” Island Indus.,
LLC v. Town of Grand Isle, 2021 VT 49, ¶ 10, 215 Vt. 162, 169 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
II. Analysis
Defendants’ arguments are predicated on the Statute of Frauds, which provides in
relevant part as follows:
An action at law shall not be brought in the following cases unless the promise, contract, or agreement upon which such action is brought or some Order Page 2 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al memorandum or note thereof is in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized:
* * *
(5) A contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of an interest in or concerning them. Authorization to execute such a contract on behalf of another shall be in writing.
12 V.S.A. § 181.
Here, Ms. LaRock alleges only an oral agreement that ordinarily would not be
enforceable under § 181. Not surprisingly, though, the statute is intended to prevent
fraud, not to foster it. An equitable exception to the requirement of a writing exists: “the
court may enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of land where the plaintiffs can
show that: (1) there was an oral agreement (2) upon which they reasonably relied (3) by
changing their position so that they cannot be returned to their former position, and (4)
the other party to the agreement knew of such reliance.” In re Est. of Gorton, 167 Vt.
357, 362 (1997).
Defendants argue that there is no effective oral agreement in this case that Ms.
LaRock could have reasonably relied upon because she alleges an agreement only with
one of three owners of the real property. That inference is clearer to Defendants than it
is to the Court, however. The complaint itself is extremely vague as to the negotiations
leading up to an agreement. The complaint is clear that Tyler was a principal party to
the agreement. As to Shane and Cathy, Ms. LaRock asserts that they “were aware of the
agreement and supported the idea of Ms. LaRock building on the property.” Complaint ¶
14 (filed May 15, 2024). It is further alleged that “Cathy and Shane went to the building
site periodically to check on the progress, and would lend a hand here and there.” Id. ¶
20. Order Page 3 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al These allegations are too vague for the Court to conclude that Cathy and Shane
were not parties to the agreement. Unanswered questions raised by the allegations
include, for example: whether Tyler, who is alleged to have a 75% interest in the
property, was acting on Cathy and Shane’s behalf in making the agreement with Ms.
LaRock. Also in question is whether Cathy and Shane’s participation in the project
operates as a manifestation of assent by performance. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 50 (“Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the offer
requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by a performance which
operates as a return promise.”). Exactly what happened and its legal effect will be more
reliably determined once the evidence has developed. At this early stage, Plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of all potentially positive inferences from the existing allegations.
Those suffice.
Defendants’ argument that Ms. LaRock cannot be entitled to equitable relief, as a
matter of law, because she can always be compensated with damages if she ultimately
demonstrates a basis for it is not persuasive. The law is not so linear when reliance has
led to substantial improvements to real property. See In re Est. of Gorton, 167 Vt. 357,
362 (1997) (“Possession coupled with substantial improvements may be such that the
plaintiffs cannot be restored to their former position.”); see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 129 cmt. B, illus. 3 (“A and B make an oral agreement for the sale of
Blackacre by A to B. With A’s consent B takes possession of the land, pays part of the
price, builds a dwelling house on the land and occupies it. Two years later, as a result of
a dispute over the amount still to be paid, A repudiates the agreement. B may obtain a
decree of specific performance.”). The present allegations are insufficient for the Court to
Order Page 4 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al conclude as a legal matter that the home Ms.
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VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Case No. 24-CV-01896 65 State Street Montpelier VT 05602 802-828-2091 www.vermontjudiciary.org
Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al
Opinion and Order on Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
The current allegations of the pleadings show that Plaintiff Lorie LaRock
constructed a house, at which she currently lives, on real property owned by Defendants
Tyler Fisk, Shane Fisk, and Cathy Fisk. Tyler lives on the property in a separate home.
Shane and Cathy live elsewhere. Ms. LaRock’s daughter was in a romantic relationship
with Tyler and, for a time, lived with him. During that time, Ms. LaRock alleges that
she entered into an oral agreement permitting her to build the house and remain in
possession for life, after which her daughter and Tyler would inherit it. After Tyler and
her daughter split up and her daughter vacated the property, Defendants sought to expel
Ms. LaRock from the property. In the complaint, Ms. LaRock seeks an order enforcing
the oral agreement, allowing her to remain in possession for life. She requests, in the
alternative only, damages for the value of improvements.
Defendants have filed a counterclaim asserting trespass, seeking ejectment, and
claiming unjust enrichment.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings. They argue that Ms. LaRock’s attempted reliance on an oral agreement for
the conveyance of an easement or life estate is barred by the Statute of Frauds, 12 V.S.A.
§ 181, which requires a writing as evidence of the agreement. They maintain that the Order Page 1 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al facts do not support any equitable exception to the requirement for a writing because: (1)
there is no allegation of any agreement at all with Shane and Cathy; (2) without any
effective agreement with all owners, there could not have been any reasonable reliance
on an agreement; and (3) regardless, equitable relief would be inappropriate because Ms.
LaRock admits that legal damages would be adequate compensation for any violation of
her rights. Defendants urge the Court to rule that Ms. LaRock has no equitable right to
remain at the property and grant their claim for ejectment, all based solely on the
pleadings. Ms. LaRock opposes the motion.
I. Procedural Standard
As the Vermont Supreme Court has explained, the question posed by a Vt. R. Civ.
P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “is whether, once the pleadings are closed,
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the pleadings. For
the purposes of [a] motion [for judgment on the pleadings] all well pleaded factual
allegations in the nonmovant’s pleadings and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom are assumed to be true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s
pleadings are taken to be false. A defendant may not secure judgment on the pleadings if
contained therein are allegations that, if proved, would permit recovery.” Island Indus.,
LLC v. Town of Grand Isle, 2021 VT 49, ¶ 10, 215 Vt. 162, 169 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
II. Analysis
Defendants’ arguments are predicated on the Statute of Frauds, which provides in
relevant part as follows:
An action at law shall not be brought in the following cases unless the promise, contract, or agreement upon which such action is brought or some Order Page 2 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al memorandum or note thereof is in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized:
* * *
(5) A contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of an interest in or concerning them. Authorization to execute such a contract on behalf of another shall be in writing.
12 V.S.A. § 181.
Here, Ms. LaRock alleges only an oral agreement that ordinarily would not be
enforceable under § 181. Not surprisingly, though, the statute is intended to prevent
fraud, not to foster it. An equitable exception to the requirement of a writing exists: “the
court may enforce an oral agreement for the transfer of land where the plaintiffs can
show that: (1) there was an oral agreement (2) upon which they reasonably relied (3) by
changing their position so that they cannot be returned to their former position, and (4)
the other party to the agreement knew of such reliance.” In re Est. of Gorton, 167 Vt.
357, 362 (1997).
Defendants argue that there is no effective oral agreement in this case that Ms.
LaRock could have reasonably relied upon because she alleges an agreement only with
one of three owners of the real property. That inference is clearer to Defendants than it
is to the Court, however. The complaint itself is extremely vague as to the negotiations
leading up to an agreement. The complaint is clear that Tyler was a principal party to
the agreement. As to Shane and Cathy, Ms. LaRock asserts that they “were aware of the
agreement and supported the idea of Ms. LaRock building on the property.” Complaint ¶
14 (filed May 15, 2024). It is further alleged that “Cathy and Shane went to the building
site periodically to check on the progress, and would lend a hand here and there.” Id. ¶
20. Order Page 3 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al These allegations are too vague for the Court to conclude that Cathy and Shane
were not parties to the agreement. Unanswered questions raised by the allegations
include, for example: whether Tyler, who is alleged to have a 75% interest in the
property, was acting on Cathy and Shane’s behalf in making the agreement with Ms.
LaRock. Also in question is whether Cathy and Shane’s participation in the project
operates as a manifestation of assent by performance. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 50 (“Acceptance by performance requires that at least part of what the offer
requests be performed or tendered and includes acceptance by a performance which
operates as a return promise.”). Exactly what happened and its legal effect will be more
reliably determined once the evidence has developed. At this early stage, Plaintiff is
entitled to the benefit of all potentially positive inferences from the existing allegations.
Those suffice.
Defendants’ argument that Ms. LaRock cannot be entitled to equitable relief, as a
matter of law, because she can always be compensated with damages if she ultimately
demonstrates a basis for it is not persuasive. The law is not so linear when reliance has
led to substantial improvements to real property. See In re Est. of Gorton, 167 Vt. 357,
362 (1997) (“Possession coupled with substantial improvements may be such that the
plaintiffs cannot be restored to their former position.”); see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 129 cmt. B, illus. 3 (“A and B make an oral agreement for the sale of
Blackacre by A to B. With A’s consent B takes possession of the land, pays part of the
price, builds a dwelling house on the land and occupies it. Two years later, as a result of
a dispute over the amount still to be paid, A repudiates the agreement. B may obtain a
decree of specific performance.”). The present allegations are insufficient for the Court to
Order Page 4 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al conclude as a legal matter that the home Ms. LaRock built and the real property at issue
might be recompensed, in full, with money damages.
To the extent that Defendants assert that Ms. LaRock has conceded that monetary
relief would be a sufficient remedy on the face of the complaint, there is no such
allegation. Rather, Ms. LaRock has sought money damages only if she is determined to
have no right to enforcement of the agreement. Her request for such alternative relief
does not somehow invalidate her other request for performance of the alleged agreement.
The Court cannot conclude, based on the pleadings, that Ms. LaRock has no
possible legal right to possession under the present allegations and inferences; and,
therefore, also cannot conclude that Defendants are entitled to ejectment.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings is denied.
Electronically signed on Thursday, August 22, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).
_______________________ Timothy B. Tomasi Superior Court Judge
Order Page 5 of 5 24-CV-01896 Lorie LaRock v. Tyler Fisk et al