Larochelle v. Hickory House, Inc.

96 A.2d 830, 80 R.I. 334, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 72
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMay 20, 1953
DocketEq. No. 2168
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 96 A.2d 830 (Larochelle v. Hickory House, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Larochelle v. Hickory House, Inc., 96 A.2d 830, 80 R.I. 334, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 72 (R.I. 1953).

Opinion

*335 Capotosto, J.

This is an employee’s petition for review,' under the workmen’s compensation act, general laws 1938, chapter 300, article III, §13, seeking to amend an existing preliminary agreement on the ground that the average weekly wage as therein set forth is erroneous. The case was heard by a justice of the superior court on an agreed *336 statement of facts. Thereafter, in accordance with his decision, a decree was entered granting partial relief. The case is before us on petitioner’s appeal from such decree.

The case was certified to this court without a transcript and no agreed statement of facts was found by us among the papers. Consecutive entries on the jacket show that on March 10,1952 the case was “Heard and parties to submit agreed statement of facts in 2 weeks,” and on June 18, 1952, “Decision filed.” If such statement was filed it is not known what became of it. Great care should be exercised in the filing, notation on the jacket, and preservation of important papers and records. Otherwise this court will be subjected to unnecessary inconvenience resulting in delay and possible loss of rights to the parties. However, we shall adopt for our opinion the agreed statement of facts, which is not questioned by the respondent, and which is set forth in full in petitioner’s brief as follows:

“Agreed Statement of Facts
The petitioner sustained an injury July 1, 1949, in the course of her employment for respondent.
The preliminary agreement sets forth an average weekly wage of $4.80, ordering compensation at the rate of $15.00 per week which the petitioner has received continuously to the present. This average weekly wage is erroneous.
It is agreed that the period for computing petitioner’s; average weekly wage should be the four weeks immediately preceding her injury and that she worked just weekends. Specifically, in hours she worked as follows:
Week ending July 3, 1949 16 hours
^ ^ TnnA Ofi 1 O/í O 1 O L June 26, 1949 12 hours
U u June 19, 1949 20 hours
June 12, 1949 16 hours
64
Average weekly hours — 16 hours
*337 It is agreed that during said four weeks she received in wages, as follows:
Week ending July 3, 1949 $4.68
“ “ June 26, 1949 3.76
“ “ June 19, 1949 5.60
“ “ June 12, 1949 4.68
Total $18.72
Average wages paid weekly 4.68
It is agreed that the average hourly wage in actual salary, therefore, is $.2924, and that this part of her wages, on a 40 hour basis would be an average of $11.70 weekly.
It is agreed that she received $3.00 worth of meals, which $3.00 should not be pro-rated on a 40 hour basis, bringing these portions of her salary to $14.70.
It is agreed that in addition to the above she received $15.00 each week in tips.
This brings us to the sole point of argument, i. e., whether these tips should be merely added to the $14.70 already agreed on, as the respondent contends; or whether these tips should be pro-rated as the cash salary is, on a 40 hour basis.
If the Court rules the tips should be merely added to the amount above agreed to, it is agreed that the average weekly wage would be $29.70, and that payments from injury to the present, and until further agreement or decree, should be $17.82.
If the Court rules that tips should be pro-rated on a 40 hour basis, then it is agreed that the average hourly wage in tips would be $.9375, and that the average weekly wage in tips would be, for 40 hours, $37.50, which when added to the $14.70 agreed upon would make petitioner's average weekly wage $52.20. On this basis, therefore, payments, from injury to the present and until further agreement or decree should be $28.00 weekly, the maximum.”

On the issue raised by the above agreement, the sixth finding of the trial justice was as follows: “That the amount *338 of tips does not lend itself to the method of determining the average weekly wage given in the statute.” The decree appealed from therefore ordered petitioner’s average weekly wage amended to $29.70, and the weekly compensation payments amended to $17.82.

Before proceeding further we advert briefly to respondent’s contention that this court, by force of the act and its own decisions, is without power to disturb such finding of fact as it is supported by legal evidence. We do not agree with that contention. In our judgment the sixth finding is not one of pure fact based on legal evidence but rather is a conclusion of law giving a reason for not making a pertinent finding of fact. As a question of law, therefore, it is open to review.

The precise issue in dispute is whether the average weekly wage set forth in the preliminary agreement should be amended to $29.70, as the trial justice decided, or to $52.20, as petitioner contends. In other words, the question raised is whether the employee, a part-time worker, is entitled only to the amount of the tips actually received by her, or whether such tips should be prorated on a 40-hour basis in the same manner as the amount of wages paid her directly by the employer. The answer to that question depends on the construction of G. L. 1938, chap. 300, art. II, §13, as amended by public laws 1941, chap. 1057, which reads as follows: “The ‘average weekly wages, earnings, or salary’ of an injured employee shall be ascertained as follows: (a) ‘Average weekly wages, earnings or salary,’ shall mean the average weekly wage earned by the employee at the time of the injury, reckoning wages as earned while working full time. ‘Full time’ shall mean not less than 40 times the hourly rate of wages or earnings.”

Heretofore this court has not considered whether in a proper case tips are in substance part of an employee’s wages or earnings. Following respondent’s admission in the instant case that they should be so treated to the limited extent for *339 which it contends, we made an independent examination of the decisions in point and we are in agreement with the great weight of authority which holds that in certain employments the nature of the contract between employer and employee is such that tips are considered by both as part of the compensation which the employee receives for his services.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
96 A.2d 830, 80 R.I. 334, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larochelle-v-hickory-house-inc-ri-1953.