Lapeyrouse v. Lapeyrouse
This text of 729 So. 2d 682 (Lapeyrouse v. Lapeyrouse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Paul A. LAPEYROUSE
v.
Beryl H. LAPEYROUSE.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*683 Paul A. Lapeyrouse, Chauvin, Appellant, in pro per.
Alexander M. Crighton, III, Houma, for Defendant/Appellee, Beryl H. Lapeyrouse.
Before: CARTER, C.J., SHORTESS, and WHIPPLE, JJ.
CARTER, C.J.
This is an appeal by Mr. Lapeyrouse from a judgment of the trial court sustaining a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.
BACKGROUND
After many years of marriage, plaintiff, Mr. Lapeyrouse, and defendant, Ms. Lapeyrouse, engaged in a bitter and protracted divorce. A final judgment of divorce was rendered on May 17, 1991, and a judgment partially partitioning the community property was filed on January 8, 1992. Both parties sought a partition of the community property under LSA-R.S. 9:2801. On March 3, 1993, the court set deadlines for the exchange of sworn detailed descriptive lists and traversals, and a pre-trial conference was held on March 25, 1993. The trial to partition the community property was scheduled for May 28, 1993. However, prior to trial, the parties notified the court that the matter had been settled and both parties executed a partition of community property agreement. In addition to the agreement, a consent judgment was prepared and approved as to form and content both by plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney and was signed by the trial court on August 10, 1993. The consent judgment provided as follows, in pertinent part:
The Court considering the pleadings filed herein, the law and the evidence, and for the reasons this day orally assigned,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached Partition of Community Property Agreement Between PAUL A. LAPEYROUSE and BERYL HEBERT LAPEYROUSE, be and is hereby made a part of the Judgment.
The community property agreement was attached to the judgment and, by the terms of the judgment, made a part thereof. Subsequently, Mr. Lapeyrouse filed the present proceedings entitled "Petition for Rescission of Lesionary Partition of Community of Acquets and Gains." In response to Mr. Lapeyrouse's petition, Ms. Lapeyrouse filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of res judicata and no cause of action. The trial court concluded that the partition at issue was a judicial partition, that an action for lesion would lie only against an extrajudicial partition and therefore upheld the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissed plaintiffs suit. We agree that judicial partitions are not subject to an action for rescission based on lesion. Rescission based on lesion is available only for extrajudicial partitions. The trial court did not address the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Lapeyrouse cites four cases which he contends support his position that this partition is subject to being rescinded on the grounds of lesion beyond moiety.[1] These cases provide that although a partition of community property may sometimes be in the nature of a compromise and is sometimes even referred to as a compromise, it is subject to rescission or partition for lesion under LSA-C.C. art. 814.[2]
*684 However, each of these cases cited by appellant can be distinguished from the instant case because in each of these cases there was no pending litigation and each of these cases pertain to extrajudicial partition. In the instant case, all issues were hotly disputed and litigation was progressing under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:2801.[3] In the instant case, a judgment of partial partition was rendered after trial. The remainder of the property was partitioned after the court ordered descriptive lists and traversals, conducted a pre-trial conference, and set a trial date. The actual partition was adopted and made a part of the judgment of the court. Once this was accomplished, the partition became a judicial partition not subject to being set aside by lesion under article 814 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
In Dornier v. Live Oak Arabians, Inc., 602 So.2d 743, 747-48 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 608 So.2d 177 (La.1992), this court found that an agreement entered into by the parties for the explicit purpose of settling their community property partition suit was a transaction or compromise and could not be attacked on the basis of lesion beyond moiety. A transaction or compromise as defined by LSA-C.C. art. 3071 is "an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which any one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing."
Like the instant case, Dornier presented a scenario where the settlement agreement partitioning the community property had been attached to and made part of the judgment which dismissed the suit. The partition agreement at issue before the court is also a compromise, entered into for the purpose of settling the partition suit. Accordingly, it cannot be attacked on the basis of lesion beyond moiety. An action for lesion simply does not lie against a judicial partition as opposed to an extrajudicial partition. We conclude the trial court was correct in sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.
Since the trial court properly sustained the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, it was unnecessary to rule on the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata. Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed at appellant's costs.
AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX A
LSA-R.S. 9:2801 provides as follows:
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules:
(1)(a) Within forty-five days of service of a motion by either party, each party shall file a sworn detailed descriptive list of all community property, the fair market value and location of each asset, and all community liabilities. For good cause shown, the court may extend the time period for filing a detailed descriptive list. If a party fails to file a sworn detailed descriptive list timely, the other party may file a rule to show cause why its sworn detailed descriptive list should not be deemed to constitute a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities. At the hearing of the rule to show cause, the court may either grant the request or, for good cause shown, extend the time period for filing a sworn detailed descriptive list. If the court grants the request, no traversal shall be allowed.
(b) Each party shall affirm under oath that the detailed descriptive list filed by that party contains all of the community assets and liabilities then known to that party. Amendments to the descriptive *685 lists shall be permitted. No inventory shall be required.
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729 So. 2d 682, 1999 WL 98981, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lapeyrouse-v-lapeyrouse-lactapp-1999.