L.A.P. v. A.A.S.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 27, 2025
• Docket: A-0885-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0885-24

L.A.P.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.A.S.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted September 23, 2025 – Decided October 27, 2025

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FV-20-0619-25.

Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Collis, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victims in these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM

Defendant, A.A.S., appeals from the October 2024 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff, L.A.P., under the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant argues

the trial court erred in finding plaintiff established both the predicate act of

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and the need for permanent restraints under

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). Following a

review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

A.

After ending her romantic relationship with defendant, plaintiff obtained

a temporary restraining order (TRO) on October 3, 2024, alleging the predicate

act of harassment and a prior history of domestic violence. The following facts

are derived from the FRO hearing, during which both plaintiff and defendant

testified.

Plaintiff described her relationship with defendant as follows. She met

defendant in June 2023, the two began dating the following November, and

defendant moved into plaintiff's home in January 2024. From the beginning, the

two argued. Plaintiff indicated defendant's verbal abuse began in November

A-0885-24 2 2023. She characterized his behavior as "yelling, screaming, violen[t], angry,

upset, [and] unhappy."

Regarding the predicate act of harassment, plaintiff described an

encounter with defendant on September 30, 2024, when she was finishing the

laundry and asked defendant for assistance with folding the last load. He refused

to help and left the house, after which plaintiff got dressed to leave. She

indicated defendant returned home "in anger" as she was leaving with the dog,

and he "pushed [her] out the door," hitting her right shoulder with his hand. She

realized she had left her wallet behind and went back to retrieve it when

defendant locked the door at the top and the bottom and told her to put the dog

down. When she complied, defendant "pushed [her] across from the front door

to the middle of the living room," and she landed on the floor. Defendant called

her "dramatic" in a "raised" and "threatening" voice, causing her to feel "very

scared and confused."

Defendant told her to get up, and as she moved toward a corner, defendant

unplugged "a puppy camera," which was capable of recording what took place.

Defendant began "poking [her] in [her] chest, [her] heart," and she described

defendant "shoving his two fingers in her jaw, and her teeth just [] threatening

[her] and yelling at [her]." When asked to clarify, she stated, "he used his right

A-0885-24 3 hand[] above me pressing down into my face, into my teeth talking to me trying

to get me to understand that I'm doing something wrong to him. . . . It was an

act of discipline." She added that defendant's poking her chest "was more

threatening like, okay, I dare you to try to hit me because I am actually going to

attack you if you try to put your hands on me." She explained that her history

of panic attacks, about which defendant was aware, required her to "control

[her]self" to avoid passing out.

She recalled defendant ran to the front door at one point and returned with

a mannequin she used "for designing." He "approach[ed her] trying to almost

hit her with the mannequin, but not actually hitting [her] with it, just attempting

to put fear in [her] heart." He continued "punching the air very close to [her]

saying, '[t]his is what I want to do to you right now.'" He ordered her to sit on

the couch. After trying to "rip [her] hoodie," he told her to remove it, which she

did. He then "ripped her . . . tank top." She recounted feeling "very scared,

confused, threatened" without "any space to defend [her]self." She believed

"[t]his person is actually trying to harm me."

Plaintiff explained defendant "t[ook] her to the bedroom," "close[d] the

bedroom door," and "t[old] her to sit on the bed." He was angry and yelling,

and he took her phone from her. He said, "[o]h, we're crashing out," which she

A-0885-24 4 understood as meaning when "you like lose total control of any mental capacity

to recognize that you're actually endangering someone and you can't bring

yourself back down." She indicated she was not free to leave the room.

Thirty minutes later, defendant returned her phone, opened the door, and

told her she was "free to go." She did not leave that night, but decided to end

the relationship, although she knew defendant would never leave.

Plaintiff described "looking over [her] shoulders at night" and being

"scared in [her] space that [she] pa[ys] for." She then "planned her escape," and

on October 2, she told defendant she no longer "fe[lt] safe" and asked that he

not return that night. She believes defendant allowed her to leave because she

told him she was meeting her mother after work. She planned to return home

with a friend to pack defendant's belongings and drop them to his parents. After

contacting building staff to attempt to change the digital door security code, she

texted defendant to remind him he was not to return.

As she and her friend finished packing defendant's belongings that

evening, she received a text from defendant stating, "[o]h you locked me out,

lol?" She knew it would not be long before defendant found a way inside, as he

sent thirty-three text messages. She presented certain messages at trial,

admitted without objection to their authenticity, including one in which

A-0885-24 5 defendant indicated he had "been roaming around here for hours," and another

stating, "[y]ou f'ing liar. You spilled my news and now it's out. I want my stuff.

I need my stuff. Open the door." 2 He began "banging on the door," and,

"afraid," she called the police and obtained the TRO.

Plaintiff also testified regarding earlier incidents of abuse. She indicated

defendant began cursing and calling her "b[****]" in November 2023. She

recounted defendant's episodes or anger, explaining, out of rage, he "destroyed

a bathroom" and "shattered it." She described an incident on August 11, 2024,

when he struck her when she tried to remove his headphones during an argument

after he called her "the B word" and the devil. Two weeks later, when the two

were away, he became angry, took her phone, and locked her in a room.

Plaintiff presented additional screenshots of text and social media

messages, which she characterized as threatening, including several from

August 11. Plaintiff read one message during her testimony stating, "You will

cry. I promise you, because this 'blank,' you're going to pay for it." Another

message chain was provided in which plaintiff identified threatening language.

Additional communications sent by defendant after entry of the TRO were

2 The text messages were not included in the record on appeal, so we rely on the testimony about and characterizations of the messages. Plaintiff read only some of the content into the record. A-0885-24 6 presented in which defendant apologized and admitted to "the trauma and the

hurt" he caused.

Plaintiff testified that she believed she needed a permanent restraining

order because, without protection, defendant "w[ould] find a way to come get

[her] and finish what he wants to do." She explained:

I don't feel safe. Every time I leave the house I'm [] afraid that this person is going to come and get me or find me and I still have plans to travel abroad and that's scary and frightening to think that someone will actually choose to invoke harm, danger, and violence on another person not just once but several times.

Defendant then testified, denied plaintiff's allegations, and claimed he had

been "abused physically and emotionally in the relationship." He acknowledged

the two argued on September 30, but indicated that he never held plaintiff

"hostage" and he never "took her phone. . . . [He] asked her to give [him] her

phone." He explained that he asked for her phone in response to her accusing

him of "infidelity." He admitted telling her they should go in the room in order

"to calm the situation by bringing the volume down." He indicated he "didn't

push her out" but he "did touch her because [they] touch each other ," but he

never hit her. He claimed plaintiff hit him in the past. He testified plaintiff has

called his mother a "b[****]."

A-0885-24 7 Defendant denied ever holding plaintiff against her will and explained the

two "always talk[ed] to each other," and "the whole captive situation, that's just

not true." He explained, although his messages included an admission that he

"hurt," "raised his voice," and "rough[ed] [plaintiff] up," he was apologizing

"out of desperation," but not admitting plaintiff's allegations. He called plaintiff

manipulative and deceitful, and he denied abusing or harming her.

B.

The court rendered its oral decision after closing arguments, placing its

findings on the record and entered an FRO. The court found jurisdiction under

the PDVA based on the parties' prior dating relationship. The court then made

detailed credibility findings, deeming plaintiff "incredibly credible," noting her

"good eye contact," preparation, and "prompt and intelligent answers."

Describing her "very even tone[]," the court found plaintiff "was not dramatic

at all," showing appropriate emotion without "exaggeration." It noted her

willingness to answer all questions, finding her "completely believable and her

testimony carried the day."

The court noted defendant appeared to "make good eye contact," was

"prepared," and "initially appeared a bit credible." However, the court found,

once defendant perceived "the case wasn't going well," he "played the victim

A-0885-24 8 card and claimed to be the one that was manipulated and the victim here, which

the court does not believe."

The court found plaintiff established the predicate act of harassment.

Specifically, it found an argument occurred over the laundry on September 30,

2024, after which defendant "berated" plaintiff, called her names, made

accusations, "pushed her into the door," and "poke[d] her in the chest." The

court noted defendant behaved in this manner even while he was aware of

plaintiff's mental health issues. It found defendant, in his denials, "actually

admitted to everything the plaintiff said," including entering the bedroom to

"diffuse the situation." Further, the court emphasized that defendant admitted

he took plaintiff's phone, claiming he only did so after requesting she give it to

him. The court credited plaintiff's detailed account of the September 30

incident, stating it "d[id not] believe" defendant's claims. The court found the

"coercive control by defendant" "extremely troubling." It noted defendant's

"taking the phone, putting her in a room, cutting off contact with family or

friends and then saying you are free to go as if he own[ed] her or control[led]

her."

Regarding the events of October 2, 2024, the court concluded the evidence

was "overwhelming[ly] consistent with what the plaintiff testified to." The court

A-0885-24 9 cited to the contemporaneous communications from defendant "hurling insults

and insults," and threatening, "you will cry, I promise you bro because this

sh[**] you're going to pay for it." It found the behavior and communications

were "meant to harass and annoy." The court highlighted defendant's later

admission: "I apologize for all the harm I've caused you and I take full

responsibility for the things that can't be undone. I hurt you when I raised my

voice at you. I hurt you when I rough you up trying to get a point across." The

court referenced defendant's social media post apologizing for "all the trauma

[he] caused," "the hurt," and the "abuse[]," noting defendant's testimony blaming

plaintiff for "manipulat[ing] him." It explained, "the court doesn't believe that."

Addressing the need for future restraints, the court relied upon plaintiff's

testimony regarding defendant's conduct and the history of domestic violence,

which began as verbal abuse and escalated. The court found plaintiff reasonably

feared for her safety and concluded an FRO was needed to safeguard her from

danger of future abuse.

II.

Defendant appeals and argues the court erred in finding defendant

committed the predicate act of harassment and future restraints were necessary.

He contends plaintiff did not establish he possessed an intent to harass and

A-0885-24 10 presented only her "subjective fears" of future abuse by defendant, which was

insufficient to warrant permanent restraints.

An appellate court's review of an FRO is generally limited. See C.C. v.

J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). "We accord substantial

deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and

are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and

more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v.

M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)); see also S.K. v. J.H., 426 N.J. Super. 230,

238 (App. Div. 2012). "Appellate courts owe deference to the trial court's

credibility determinations as well because it has 'a better perspective than a

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J.

428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).

Findings by a trial court "are binding on appeal when supported by

adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P., 450 N.J. Super.

499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12

(1998)). This court does not disturb a trial court's findings unless they are "so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154

A-0885-24 11 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974)). Further, we may review the FRO record to determine whether

the record as a whole supports issuance of the FRO. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 488.

Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428-29.

When determining whether to issue an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, trial

courts must engage in a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-

27. The trial court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. Upon a finding of

a predicate act of domestic violence, the court must then determine whether an

FRO is required to protect the party seeking restraints from future acts or threats

of violence. Id. at 126-27. "[T]here [must] be a finding that 'relief is necessary

to prevent further abuse.'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

We first address defendant's challenge to the court's finding defendant

committed the predicate act of harassment. To establish harassment under

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person must act "with purpose to harass another" when that

person:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely

A-0885-24 12 inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

Defendant specifically alleges the court erred in finding that plaintiff

established the requisite intent to harass. Intent to harass is often difficult to

prove, so "purpose may and often must be inferred from what is said and done

and the surrounding circumstances." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 226

(App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App.

Div. 2006)). "'A finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the

evidence presented' and from common sense and experience." H.E.S. v. J.C.S.,

175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997)).

We are satisfied that the court's finding of harassment was sufficiently

anchored in the record. The court made detailed credibility determinations,

explaining why it found plaintiff highly credible and disbelieved defendant. It

found plaintiff's account of events more believable and supported by the

attendant communications than defendant's and noted defendant's denials further

corroborated plaintiff's account.

A-0885-24 13 We perceive no error in the court's finding that defendant physically and

verbally abused plaintiff, on September 30, 2024, October 2, 2024, and the days

in between, attempting to threaten, alarm, control, and harass her. The record

amply demonstrated defendant's behavior—including shoving and poking

plaintiff, cordoning her off and restricting her movement and ability to summon

help, taking her phone, texting insults and threats, and banging on the door to

gain entry to the home after being told to leave—reflected sufficient purpose to

harass and constituted harassment within the meaning of the statute.

We next review and reject defendant's challenge to the court's conclusion

that the FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff under prong two of Silver. The

court found plaintiff's belief in the future risk of continued domestic violence

was genuine and objectively reasonable given the history of abuse and other

credible evidence in the record. The court detailed the history, emphasized the

features of coercive control in defendant's conduct, and noted defendant's

casting himself as a victim to justify his conduct. Accordingly, we conclude the

court's finding of the need for future restraints is firmly rooted in the record, and

we will not disturb the court's reasoned decision.

Affirmed.

A-0885-24 14