J-A07027-26
2026 PA Super 97
KYLE LANUNZIATA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL MUTUAL : No. 898 MDA 2025 CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY :
Appeal from the Order Entered June 11, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 202310651
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and NEUMAN, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 13, 2026
Appellant, Kyle Lanunziata, appeals from the June 11, 2025 order
entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty
Insurance Company (“Penn National”). The trial court dismissed Appellant’s
claims with prejudice in this declaratory judgment action in which Appellant
claimed that he was entitled to underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits under
his parents’ automobile policy. After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On May 13,
2020, a third-party tortfeasor struck Appellant with his vehicle as Appellant
was walking across an intersection in Kingston, Luzerne County. Following
the accident, Appellant submitted a UIM claim under an insurance policy (the J-A07027-26
“Policy”) that Penn National had issued to his parents. The Policy only listed
Appellant’s parents, and not the Appellant, as named insureds.
With respect to UIM benefits, the Policy defined an “insured” as the
“[named insured] or any family member.” Policy, 1/4/20, at UIM Coverage
Insuring Agreement. The policy defines “family member” as “a person related
to [the named insured] by blood, marriage[,] or adoption who is a resident
of your household.” Policy at Definitions (emphasis added).
On October 12, 2023, Appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaration
that he was a “resident” of his parents’ household and, thus, a covered insured
under the Policy. On December 14, 2023, Penn National filed an answer to
the complaint with new matter.
The parties conducted discovery, which established that Appellant
moved out of his parents’ home in 2017 or 2018 and rented an apartment in
2019. Discovery focused on Appellant’s activities at his parents’ house at the
time of the accident in 2020.
Following the completion of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment, addressing whether Appellant was a “resident” of his
parents’ household. On June 11, 2025, the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Penn National after finding that Appellant was not a
“resident” of his parents’ household at the time of the accident.
This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:
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1. Whether [Appellant] is an insured entitled to [UIM] benefits under [the Policy] because he is a resident of his parents’ household when the [Policy] is ambiguous, [Appellant] maintained contact with his parents’ household, and [Appellant] maintained dual-residency?
2. In the alternative, should [Penn National’s] summary judgment be denied because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of residency to be resolved by a factfinder?
Appellant’s Br. at 4.
Appellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s entry of summary judgment
in Penn National’s favor. Accordingly, our standard of review is for an abuse
of discretion or error of law, and our scope of review is plenary. Sokolsky v.
Eidelman, 93 A.3d 858, 861 (Pa. Super. 2014).
We also note that:
Generally, the proper construction of a policy of insurance is a matter of law which may properly be resolved by a court pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nixon, [] 682 A.2d 1310, 1313 ([Pa. Super.] 1996). Thus, the issue of whether a claim is within a policy’s coverage or barred by an exclusion is properly determined[,] provided that the policy’s terms are clear and unambiguous so as to preclude any issue of material fact. See Butterfield v. Giuntoli, [] 670 A.2d 646, 651 ([Pa. Super.] 1995).
As with all questions of law, our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary. Our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court; we must review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party granting it the benefit of all reasonable inferences and resolving all doubts in its favor. We will reverse the court’s order only where the appellant [] demonstrates that the court abused its discretion or committed legal error.
Lewis v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 833 A.2d 185, 190 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
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When interpreting a policy of insurance, we employ an analysis which, while derived from the law of contracts, recognizes that most insurance transactions are not freely bargained between equals but are largely adhesive in nature. See Betz. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 957 A.2d 1244, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Insurance policies, like all contracts, are enforceable in accordance with the language used[,] and the scope of their coverage may be determined by the court as a matter of law. See Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 856 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. Super. 2004). “In construing a contract, the intention of the parties is paramount and the court will adopt an interpretation which under all circumstances ascribes the most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished.” Charles D. Stein Revocable Tr. v. Gen. Felt Indus., Inc., 749 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. Super. 2000). . ..
Id. at 1252-53.
Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Berlin, 991 A.2d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting
Bishops, Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins., 984 A.2d 982, 989-90 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(footnotes omitted)). Moreover, “[w]hen construing a policy, words of
common usage [] are to be construed in their natural, plain and ordinary sense
[] and we may inform our understanding of these terms by considering their
dictionary definitions.” Wagner v. Erie Ins. Co., 801 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
***
In Appellant’s first issue, he claims that the trial court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that he was not a “resident” of his parents’ household.
Appellant argues that he resided at his parents’ home because he was
physically present there for lunch every weekday and on most weekend days,
had his mail delivered there and “sustained an ongoing, substantial
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relationship with his parents’ household . . . to classify him as a resident
thereof.” Appellant’s Br. at 23-24.
The Courts of this Commonwealth have historically recognized a
distinction between a person’s domicile and his residence. Krager v.
Foremost Ins. Co., 450 A.2d 736, 737-38 (Pa. Super. 1982). A person’s
“domicile” is where he or she has a “true, fixed and permanent home and
principal establishment,” whereas a person’s “residence” is his or her “factual
place of abode,” which requires only his or her physical presence. Id. at 738
(citation omitted).
“[T]he term ‘resident’ or ‘residency’ requires, at the minimum, some
measure of permanency or habitual repetition.” Wall Rose Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 965 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Erie Ins. Exch. v. Weryha, 931 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (same).
The majority of insurance coverage cases interpreting the term
“resident” analyze the issue with regard to the quantity of contacts an
individual has with an insured’s household. Cf. Manross, 939 A.2d at 968
(deposition testimony of family members and friends supported determination
that grandson was not resident of insured’s home, where he was a drifter
whose visits did not occur with any regularity, but were random at best);
Krager, 450 A.2d at 737-38 (where insured’s son was living with his mother
at the time of the accident, but had spent six months of each year living in his
New York mobile home).
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In this case, the trial court determined that Appellant was not a
“resident” of his parents’ household in 2020 because he had graduated from
college in 2016 and leased an apartment in 2019 and had no intention of
returning to live at his parents’ home:
This is not a college student living away temporarily but residing in their parents’ home when not in school; nor is this a situation where the [p]laintiff may have multiple residences due to separated parents. [Appellant] graduated from college in 2016. He started his career and eventually moved into an apartment in 2019. The accident occurred after that point.
In this case, [Appellant] moved into his childhood home and [then] into an apartment. From there, he did not have plans to return to his [parents’ home]. Following the apartment, he moved on to purchase a home where he currently resides.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/1/25, at 6-7.
We agree. By the time of the accident in 2020, Appellant had been
moved out of his parents’ home for several years and was renting his own
apartment. In other words, Appellant was an adult, living independently from
his parents. Although Appellant ate lunch periodically and left some personal
items at his parents’ home and used his parents’ address as his mailing
address, these facts do not overcome the fact that he was leasing an
apartment and spent the vast majority of his time sleeping, working, and living
in his apartment. The quantity of contacts and time spent in his apartment
greatly outweighed his contact with his parents’ home. Cf. Manross, 939
A.2d at 968.
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Our holding is consistent with this Court’s holding in Amica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 545 A.2d 343 (Pa. Super. 1988). In that case,
Donegal denied coverage for the insured’s daughter on the basis that she was
not a resident of her father’s household. Id. at 344. Her parents were
divorced, and the daughter was living with her mother. Id. This Court found
that although the daughter kept personal items at her father’s house,1 slept
there periodically and received mail there, she was not a “resident” for
purposes of the policy. Id. at 346.
The Court specifically rejected the fact that the daughter testified that
she intended to live at her father’s house. Id. at 348-49. The trial court
reasoned that the relevant time-period to consider the daughter’s status at
her father’s home was the time of the accident and found that, at that time,
she did not regularly reside at her father’s house. Id. at 349. Additionally,
her intention to live there in the future was not the litmus test to determine
residency status. Id.
Our holding in Grix v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 2020 WL
618557 (Pa. Super. 2020), is equally supportive of our holding. In Grix, this
Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Naomi Grix was not a “resident” of
her parents’ household when she had leased an apartment elsewhere and,
therefore, her estate did not have a valid claim for stacked uninsured motorist
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1 In particular, the daughter left 40 pairs of shoes, books, cosmetics, stuffed
animals, tennis equipment, and a pet rabbit at her father’s home. Id. at 345.
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benefits against her parents’ insurer. Id. at *1. In particular, Ms. Grix was
killed when she was a passenger in a vehicle that her parents owned and
insured through Progressive. Id. Six weeks prior to the accident, Ms. Grix
had signed a lease and moved into her own apartment. Id. We held that
“although Naomi received mail at her parents’ house, kept personal
belongings there, and continued to use their address as her address of record,
she could not be considered a ‘resident’ of the household because, among
other things, she slept elsewhere every night.” Id. at *5.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not placing sufficient weight
on the fact that Appellant ate lunch regularly at his parents’ home, had his
mail delivered and left valuable personal items there, and had no plans not to
return to live there. Appellant’s Br. at 21-23. He further argues, in an attempt
to distinguish the instant case from Grix, that the evidence showed that by
his consistent, daily “physical presence” he “continued an ongoing relationship
with [his] parents’ household.” Id. at 23-24.
First, we decline Appellant’s invitation to reweigh the evidence in his
favor. See Executive Risk Indem., Inc. v. Cigna Corp., 74 A.3d 179, 182
(Pa. Super. 2013) (“[W]here credibility and the weight to be accorded the
evidence are at issue, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the fact-finder.”). Simply, the trial court was free to accord more weight to
the evidence that Appellant was an adult who had moved out of his parents’
home several years before the accident and, at the time of the accident, was
leasing and living at his own apartment. The trial court was not required, as
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Appellant suggests, to find dispositive of Appellant’s residence that Appellant
ate lunch at his parents’ home most weekdays, visited there on the weekends,
and left valuable personal items there. Moreover, Appellant’s contention that
he had no plan not to return to live at his parents’ home is irrelevant and
speculative and, thus, “not pertinent to the present issue.” See Amica, 545
A.2d at 349 (explaining that evidence supporting the conclusion that the
insured’s daughter had lived in his home and intended to live there again was
irrelevant to the location of her current residence “as a matter of physical
fact”) (emphasis in original).
We next reject Appellant’s efforts to distinguish the facts of this case
from those in Grix. Appellant claims that the Grix facts—cherrypicked by
him—show that, unlike Appellant, Ms. Grix was committed to her new
apartment because she, inter alia, shared utility bills with her roommates,
moved her belongings out of her parents’ home, and expressed no interest in
moving back to her parents’ home. Appellant’s Br. at 23. Like Ms. Grix,
however, Appellant was an independent adult who had physically moved out
of his parents’ house, leased an apartment elsewhere, and lived there. His
contacts with his parents’ home were merely incidental when compared to his
contacts with his apartment.
Appellant, relying on Amica, supra, also claims that the evidence
demonstrates that he was a dual resident of his parents’ home and his
apartment. Id. at 25-28. Appellant has not, however, cited to any controlling
case law in support of the proposition that an independent adult, unlike a child,
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can be a dual resident of his own apartment which he leased in his own name
and of his parents’ home. Rather, Appellant contends that because the Amica
Court “specifically cautioned that an individual should not be automatically
rendered a resident of separate households if, as a matter of physical fact, he
lives at one and spends no significant time at the other[,]” we should consider
the “inverse . . . open question, i.e., whether an individual could be a resident
of separate households if, as a matter of physical fact, he lives at one and
spends significant time at the other[.]” Id. at 25 (citing Amica, 545 A.2d at
349). He urges this Court to find the significant time he spent at his parents’
home for lunch as compelling evidence that he resided there. Appellant’s Br.
at 25.
Appellant’s reliance on Amica to support his dual residency theory is
misplaced as the Amica Court’s discussion of dual residency was limited to
contemplating the hypothetical dual residency of a child of separated or
divorced parents where the “child divides his time between the two.” Amica,
545 A.2d at 348. The instant matter is clearly distinguishable from Amica
and the cases relied on by that Court for the simple reason that Appellant is
not a minor child, let alone a child of divorced parents between whom he
divides his time. He was, instead, a 26-year-old, gainfully-employed, college
graduate, seeking independence from his parents “as much as [any] out of
college guy.” N.T. Lanunziata Dep., 12/1/22, at 37. Thus, for the foregoing
reasons, Appellant’s claim that he was a resident of his parents’ home at the
time of the accident fails.
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In sum, the trial court properly concluded that Appellant was not a
“resident” of his parents’ home because at the time of the accident, he had
already moved out of his parents’ house for several years and had leased and
spent the majority of his time in his own apartment. The trial court correctly
rejected Appellant’s contention that he was a “resident” of his parents’ home
because he ate lunch there, had his mail delivered there, and left a few
personal items there.
In his second issue, Appellant claims in the alternative that the trial
court should have denied Penn National’s motion for summary judgment
because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to Appellant’s place
of residency at the time of the accident. Appellant’s Br. at 29-30. Our review
of the record indicates, however, that Appellant did not raise this issue in
opposition to Penn National’s motion for summary judgment. By not raising
this issue before the trial court, Appellant has waived it for our review. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
Even if not waived, we reject this argument. The record clearly shows
that Appellant had moved out of his parents’ home several years before the
accident and at the time of the accident and was leasing an apartment where
he was spending the vast majority of his time. Thus, the trial court properly
found that the material facts were not in dispute and, as a matter of law,
Appellant was not a “resident” of his parents’ home.
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In sum, we conclude that the evidence demonstrates that at the time of
the accident, Appellant was not a resident of his parents’ household.
Accordingly, Appellant was not entitled to UIM coverage under the Policy and,
therefore, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in Penn
National’s favor.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 05/13/2026
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