Lanny v. Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Association, Inc.

Opinion

Opinion issued July 21, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00402-CV ——————————— LANNY V. DAO, Appellant V. MISSION BEND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-81307

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Lanny V. Dao (“Dao”), appeals from the trial court’s order

granting the plea to the jurisdiction of appellee, Mission Bend Homeowners

Association, Inc. (“Association”), in Dao’s suit seeking access to the Association’s

books and records. In six issues, Dao contends the trial court erred in (1) concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Dao’s claims, (2) misinterpreting the

“amount in controversy” requirement, (3) finding that Texas Property Code section

209.005(n) grants exclusive jurisdiction to justice courts, (4) finding that the district

court was not the proper venue for Dao’s claims, (5) dismissing the case without

considering the substantive right of homeowners to access homeowner association

records under Texas Property Code section 209.005, and (6) ignoring Texas

Government Code section 24.007 which provides separate and independent bases

for district court jurisdiction.

We reverse and remand.

Background

Dao is a homeowner in Mission Bend, a residential deed-restricted community

in Harris County, Texas. The Association enforces the deed restrictions related to

properties within Mission Bend.

In November 2023, Dao, proceeding pro se, filed an original petition in district

court seeking injunctive relief against the Association, alleging that it had refused to

provide him with requested financial information in violation of Texas Property

Code section 209.005. Dao sought the production of:

“(1) All relevant financial statements from all financial institutions handling association funds from August 2022 to the present, including bank statements and meeting minutes[;]

2 (2) Documentation for check 7293 ($21,437.50) on August 17, 2018, including purpose, board authorization, vendor invoices, and vendor tax form 1099-MISC[;]

(3) Documentation of payments to Ramos, Lopez, and Classic Sports, including vendor invoices, contracts, and board authorization[;]

(4) Relevant records clarifying the $50,000 withdrawal by Terry Blair on May 30, 2018[;]

(5) A copy of the individual life insurance policy for board member Terry G. Blair and pertinent approval documents[;]

(6) Details of the fidelity bond insurance for the Treasurer’s position as mandated by the by-laws[; and]

(7) Documentation of payments to board member Lynne Alwine during the time frame of 2015 to 2022, including several large payments during the pandemic year (2020).”

The petition further alleged that Dao “reserves the right to amend these pleadings to

allege other and further damages as may be determined once discovery is complete

and before the case proceeds to trial.”

The Association filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss Dao’s

claims. It asserted that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims because

justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under Texas Property

Code section 209.005(n) relating to the denial of access to a homeowner

association’s books and records. The Association sought dismissal of Dao’s claims

against it for lack of jurisdiction.

3 In his response to the Association’s plea, Dao asserted that the district court

has original jurisdiction over civil matters in which, as here, the amount in

controversy is more than $500. He asserted that although Texas Property Code

section 209.005(n) does, in fact, provide an option for homeowners to file a petition

with the justice court, the statute does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on justice

courts as evidenced by the use of “may” in the statute, which is permissive rather

than mandatory. Dao further asserted that he had paid more than $1,500 in annual

assessments from 2015 to 2022 for the benefits and betterment of the community,

and the Association had collected more than $2 million in annual assessments from

more than 1,400 homeowners. Thus, Dao argued, the amount in controversy

exceeded the $500 threshold requirement to file suit in district court, and the

Association’s refusal to provide him with the requested records constituted an

injury-in-fact to his legally protected interests.

In its reply to Dao’s response, the Association argued that Dao’s petition

failed to substantiate an “amount in controversy” sufficient to confer jurisdiction

upon the district court. It asserted that Dao’s petition exclusively sought the

production of documents—association records, financial statements, and related

documents—without alleging any monetary damages directly attributable to the

Association’s actions. It asserted that the “amount in controversy” requirement

pertains to the monetary value of the claim itself and must be based on direct,

4 personal loss due to the Association’s actions, not the aggregate of unrelated

transactions or the total assessments collected over several years. The Association

noted that the clear legislative intent behind Texas Property Code section 209.005(n)

is that disputes concerning a property owner’s access to homeowner association

records are to be resolved within the jurisdiction of the justice court. It argued that

while it is true that the statute contains discretionary language by its use of “may,”

this discretion does not concern the selection of the court by the aggrieved party, but

rather the decision of whether to initiate the lawsuit in the first place.

Dao filed a sur-reply asserting that he sufficiently pleaded an amount in

controversy because his petition identified financial transactions and expenditures

by the Association totaling more than $500. He argued that the Association denied

him access to records which he had a legally protected right to obtain, and that this

denial constituted a direct, personal loss in itself, even if the precise monetary value

of the loss was not yet quantified. Dao asserted that the deprivation of his legally

protected right, combined with the possible financial implications of the information

contained in the records, was sufficient to establish the requisite “amount in

controversy” at this stage of the proceedings. He argued that the permissive

language in section 209.005(n), which allows for suits in justice court, does not

negate the district court’s general jurisdiction.

5 The trial court entered an order granting the Association’s plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissing Dao’s claims for lack of jurisdiction on May 22, 2024.

Upon Dao’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.1

This appeal followed.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be

challenged by a plea to the jurisdiction. See Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609,

612 (Tex. 2018). A plea to the jurisdiction is the proper procedural device for

challenging a suit brought in one court when another court has continuing and

exclusive jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Bovee, 632 S.W.3d 244, 251

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). We review the trial court’s denial

of such a plea de novo. Annab, 547 S.W.3d at 612. If the court does not have

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, it must dismiss the case without

1 A party is entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law after a conventional trial on the merits to the court. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro–Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997). A “trial” is a hearing in which the court hears and receives evidence. U. Lawrence Boze’ & Assocs., P.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 368 S.W.3d 17, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). If the trial court renders judgment as a matter of law, such as when a court grants dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, findings and conclusions are not improper, but they have no purpose and should not be requested or considered on appeal. See IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 443; U. Lawrence Boze’, 368 S.W.3d at 33. When reviewing these decisions, we exercise our own judgment in determining each issue, and, therefore, we “cannot consider findings and conclusions even if they are included in the record.” U. Lawrence Boze’, 368 S.W.3d at 33.

6 prejudice. See Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Bell v. State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp.,

945 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied)).

When we consider a trial court’s order on a plea to the jurisdiction, we

construe the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor and look to the pleader’s intent. See

Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

“When a plaintiff fails to plead facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does

not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of

pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend.”

Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002) (citing Peek v. Equip.

Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804–05 (Tex. 1989)). On the other hand, if the pleadings

affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may

be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Brown, 80

S.W.3d at 555.

Discussion

In six issues, Dao asserts that the trial court erred in (1) concluding it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over his claims, (2) misinterpreting the “amount in

controversy” requirement, (3) finding that Texas Property Code section 209.005(n)

grants exclusive jurisdiction to justice courts, (4) finding that the district court was

not the proper venue for Dao’s claims, (5) dismissing the case without considering

7 the substantive right of homeowners to access association records under Texas

Property Code section 209.005, and (6) ignoring Texas Government Code section

24.007 which provides separate and independent bases for district court jurisdiction.

Because these issues are intertwined, we address them together.

We begin with an overview of Texas court jurisdiction.

A. General Jurisdictional Framework

The Texas Constitution and state statutes provide the sole sources of

jurisdiction for Texas courts. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.

1996). District courts are courts of general jurisdiction and generally have subject

matter jurisdiction absent a showing to the contrary. In re Entergy Corp., 142

S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see also Dubai Petroleum Co. v.

Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (“[A]ll claims are presumed to fall within the

jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that

they must be heard elsewhere.”). Under article 5, section 8 of the Texas

Constitution, “[d]istrict court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and

original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where

exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution

or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” T EX. CONST.

art. 5, § 8. In addition to this constitutional jurisdiction, the Legislature has provided

that district courts have “original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount

8 in controversy is more than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

24.007.

By contrast, Texas justice courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Town of

Anthony v. Lopez, 661 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied).

Article 5, section 19 of the Texas Constitution grants justice courts “exclusive

jurisdiction in civil matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred dollars

or less, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” TEX. CONST. art. 5,

§ 19. The Texas Legislature has also expressly granted justice courts exclusive

jurisdiction over particular types of claims. For example, it has committed

jurisdiction of forcible detainer (eviction) suits exclusively to a justice court in the

precinct where the property in question is located. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.004. Texas Government Code section 27.031 grants justice courts original

jurisdiction over “civil matters in which exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district

or county court and in which the amount in controversy is not more than $20,000,

exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1). Thus, the original

jurisdiction of justice courts is concurrent with that of district courts in civil cases in

which the amount in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $20,000.

B. Texas Property Code Section 209 Claims

Dao asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction

over his claims against the Association. He argues that although Texas Property

9 Code section 209.005(n) does, in fact, allow homeowners to file a petition in the

justice court, the statute does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on justice courts as

evidenced by the use of “may” in the statute, which is permissive rather than

mandatory. He asserts that the district court has original jurisdiction over civil

matters in which, as here, the amount in controversy is more than $500.

In its brief on appeal, as in its plea to the jurisdiction, the Association asserts

that the trial court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Dao’s claims.

It asserts that “subsection (n) of § 209.005 explicitly states that disputes arising from

the denial of access to records are to be brought before the justice court, not the

district court.” Thus, it reasons that section 209.005(n) grants justice courts

exclusive authority over such claims. We disagree.

Chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code, known as the Texas Residential

Property Owners Protection Act, governs the relationship between residential

property owners’ associations and their members. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE

ANN. §§ 209.001–.017; see also Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 667

S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Section 209.005

provides that “a property owners’ association shall make the books and records of

the association, including financial records, open to and reasonably available for

examination by an owner . . . in accordance with this section. An owner is entitled

10 to obtain from the association copies of information contained in the books and

records.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.005(b).

Relevant here, section 209.005(n) states: “A member of a property owners’

association who is denied access to or copies of association books or records to

which the member is entitled under this section may file a petition with the justice

of the peace of a justice precinct in which all or part of the property that is governed

by the association is located requesting relief in accordance with this subsection.”

Id. § 209.005(n). If the justice court finds that the member is entitled to access, the

court may grant remedies, including an order to release records, attorney’s fees, and

a judgment authorizing the owner to deduct awarded amounts from future

assessments. Id.

When construing a statute, “[o]ur primary objective is to determine the

Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the

words chosen.” State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006); see also

Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (“A statute’s plain

language is the most reliable guide to the Legislature’s intent.”). As Dao notes, the

Legislature’s use of the permissive term “may” in section 209.005(n) is incompatible

with the concept of exclusive jurisdiction. “‘May’ creates discretionary authority or

grants permission or a power,” whereas the terms “shall” and “must” convey

mandatory conditions. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 311.016(1)–(3). Section

11 209.005(n) contains no language mandating exclusive jurisdiction in justice courts

over record access claims. See Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d

444, 447 (Tex. 1996) (noting statute merely providing that action “may” be brought

in district court “does not express an intention to grant exclusive jurisdiction to

district courts,” but rather, “to the extent that statutory courts share concurrent

jurisdiction with district courts, nothing in [such a] statute limits or excludes that

concurrent jurisdiction”); see also Eris v. Giannakopoulos, 369 S.W.3d 618, 620–

21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (concluding language of

Texas Property Code section 23.002 did not indicate legislative intent that district

courts have exclusive jurisdiction over partition actions; rather, use of word “may”

demonstrated permissive, rather than mandatory, procedure). The Association has

directed us to no authorities, nor are we aware of any, holding that justice courts

have exclusive jurisdiction over Texas Property Code section 209.005(n) claims.2

2 Other courts of appeals have considered chapter 209 claims without any suggestion that district or county courts lacked jurisdiction to hear such claims. See, e.g., Swan Point Landing Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Martin, 718 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2025, pet. denied) (considering appeal by property owners’ association from district court’s order granting summary judgment to property owners on their claim that association violated open meeting protocols under Texas Property Code section 209.0051 without suggesting that district court lacked jurisdiction); Candle Meadow Homeowners Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 05-17-01227- CV, 2018 WL 6187616, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (examining section 209.0051’s open meeting requirements in context of district court proceeding without suggesting that justice courts held exclusive jurisdiction); Spears v. Falcon Pointess Cmty. Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 03-14-00650-CV, 2016 WL 1756486, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming in part, and reversing in part, county court at law’s order granting 12 Thus, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction over Dao’s claims so

long as his suit was within the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy range over

which district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with justice courts.

C. Amount in Controversy

Dao asserts that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “amount in

controversy” requirement. Specifically, he argues that the court mistakenly

concluded that his petition failed to establish an “amount in controversy” sufficient

to confer jurisdiction on the district court. According to Dao, he is seeking

information about the legitimacy of a $50,000 withdrawal from the Association’s

funds (and potentially the return of these funds), which exceeds the jurisdictional

limit of justice courts. He also asserts that the trial court’s narrow view that “amount

in controversy” requires a direct, personal, financial loss conflicts with the prevailing

legal standard.

Section 24.007 of the Texas Government Code states that “[a] district court

has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in controversy is more

than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.007. In Texas, the

sum of money in controversy between the parties to a civil suit is a component of

homeowner association’s summary judgment motion and denying homeowners’ summary judgment motion on their claim that association violated section 209.005 by refusing to make its records available without raising any jurisdictional concern).

13 subject matter jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554

(Tex. 2000).

In his original petition, Dao did not allege a specific amount of damages or

that the damages sustained exceeded the district court’s minimum jurisdictional

limits. Dao sought the production of financial and insurance-related documents to

which he alleged he was entitled, which the Association refused to provide despite

numerous requests, in violation of Texas Property Code section 209.005. Dao’s

petition stated that he “reserves the right to amend these pleadings to allege other

and further damages as may be determined once discovery is complete and before

the case proceeds to trial.”

The Association argues that Dao’s original petition failed to substantiate an

“amount in controversy” sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the district court. It

points out that Dao’s petition exclusively requested document production without

alleging any monetary damages directly attributable to the Association’s actions.

According to the Association, the jurisdictional “amount in controversy” must be

based on direct, personal loss to Dao due to the Association’s specific actions or

omissions. It argues that to the extent Dao seeks to obtain the records free of charge

as a form of damages, the fees associated with the production of the records are

nominal and do not approach the $500 threshold required for district court

jurisdiction.

14 Dao responds that the Association mischaracterizes the nature of his claims.

He is not seeking “free documents” as a form of damages, but rather is seeking

information regarding a $50,000 withdrawal, among other things. He asserts that

the value of this withdrawal—not the cost of producing documents—constitutes the

true amount in controversy. According to Dao, the right to be protected, i.e., his

access to financial information, and the potential injury to be prevented, i.e., the

misuse of $50,000 in association funds, establish an amount in controversy within

the district court’s jurisdiction, even if the precise monetary value of that loss is not

yet quantified.

“It has long been the law that the phrase ‘amount in controversy,’ in the

jurisdictional context, means ‘the sum of money or the value of the thing originally

sued for.’” Tune v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000) . The

Texas Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hile the amount in controversy is frequently

determined by the damages sought, that is not always so.” Id.

The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Peek v. Equipment Service Co., 779

S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) is instructive. In Peek, the Court considered whether a

plaintiff seeking damages under the wrongful death and survival statutes invoked

the jurisdiction of a district court by filing a petition which pleaded various

categories of damages but failed to allege either a specific amount of damages or

that the damages sustained exceeded the court’s minimum jurisdictional limits. See

15 779 S.W.2d at 802. The district court dismissed the suit concluding that its

jurisdiction was not invoked because the plaintiffs’ pleading had not properly

alleged damages until after the applicable statute of limitations had run. See id. at

802–03. The court of appeals, in two unpublished opinions, affirmed. See id. at

803.

The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. See id. The Court concluded that the

plaintiffs’ original pleading, although defective, was sufficient to invoke the district

court’s jurisdiction and prevent the running of limitations. See id. The Court noted

that “[a]lthough the petition did not expressly allege that the amount sought was

within the court’s jurisdiction, neither did anything in the petition suggest that the

court lacked jurisdiction.” Id. at 804. The Court explained:

In any doubtful case all intendments of the plaintiff’s pleading will be in favor of the jurisdiction. Unless it is clear from the pleadings that the court lacks jurisdiction of the amount in controversy, it should retain the case.

....

The failure of a plaintiff to state a jurisdictional amount in controversy in its petition, without more, thus will not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Even if the jurisdictional amount is never established by pleading, in fact, a plaintiff may recover if jurisdiction is proved at trial.

Id. at 804–05 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that “the omission of any

allegation regarding the amount in controversy from plaintiff’s petition did not

deprive the court of jurisdiction, but was instead a defect in pleading subject to

16 special exceptions and amendment. Although defective, the original petition filed

in this cause was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.” Id. at

805; see also Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27

(Tex. 2004) (concluding plaintiff should be afforded opportunity to amend its

pleading when petition does not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate

trial court’s jurisdiction but does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in

jurisdiction).

We note that the “Peek presumption”—that the failure of a plaintiff to state a

jurisdictional amount in controversy in his petition, without more, will not deprive

the trial court of jurisdiction—applies only when (1) the defendant fails to object to

the plaintiff’s defective pleadings, and (2) the plaintiff’s pleadings do not

affirmatively demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction. See Buethe v. O’Brien, No. 03-09-

00363-CV, 2010 WL 2643087, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804 (quotation omitted)). If those conditions

are met, the court should presume in favor of jurisdiction and allow the plaintiff an

opportunity to prove jurisdiction at trial. Id. The Association did not object to Dao’s

pleading.

Applying these principles, we conclude that although Dao’s original petition

did not allege a specific amount of damages or that the damages sustained exceeded

the trial court’s minimum jurisdictional limits, neither is it clear from his pleading

17 that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the amount in controversy. We hold

that the district court erred in granting the Association’s plea to the jurisdiction and

should have retained the case and allowed Dao an opportunity to amend his pleading

before dismissing his claims.

We sustain Dao’s first issue.3

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s order granting the Association’s plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissing Dao’s claims against it and remand the cause to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kristin Guiney Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

3 In light of our disposition, we need not address Dao’s remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.