1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LANH TRUONG, No. 2:25-cv-01836-SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DVI STATE PRISON, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and is proceeding with this civil rights action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is 19 before the undersigned for screening under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. 20 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 21 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 22 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 23 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 24 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 25 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 26 lump sum.1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an 27 1 Although plaintiff attached a state court “request to waive court fees” form to his in forma 28 pauperis motion, plaintiff is advised that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires incarcerated 1 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate 2 order directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s 3 income to be taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 4 filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 5 STATUTORY SCREENING OF PRISONER COMPLAINTS 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 8 The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 9 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 10 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 11 1915A(b)(1), (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 12 fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous 13 if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. 14 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however 15 inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 16 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 17 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 18 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 19 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 20 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 21 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 22 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 23 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 24 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 25 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 26
27 persons proceeding in forma pauperis in civil rights actions to pay the full amount of a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); see also Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 28 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 2 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 3 PLAINTIFF’S FAC 4 The facts underlying plaintiff’s complaint occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated at the 5 Deuel Vocational Institution (“DVI”). ECF No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff names DVI as the sole 6 defendant. Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that in Fall of 2015, he was getting down from his top bunk 7 and stepped on a rat. Id. at 5. Upon realizing that he had stepped on a rat, plaintiff became 8 startled, lost his footing on the lower bunk, and fell, striking his head on the jagged edge of an old 9 thermostatic steam heater. Id. Plaintiff sustained a one-and-a-half inch gash that required 10 thirteen staples, which he received at an off-site hospital. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that after he 11 received the staples and an x-ray, the hospital medical staff “calously [sic] stated [he] was fine 12 with total disregard to the broader outcome of the human cost [he’d] suffered” and discharged 13 him after six hours. Id. at 6. Plaintiff maintains that the thermostatic steam heater should not 14 have been present in his, or any, cell. Id. at 5. 15 Plaintiff further alleges that in 2023 after being released from prison, medical 16 professionals assessed that he had suffered from “acute brain injury with partial memory 17 impairment,” leaving him with the intellectual capacity of a middle schooler. Id. at 6. In 2024, 18 plaintiff was put on disability and began receiving social security income as a result of the head 19 injury he sustained at DVI, “stemming from the institutional negligence committed by the 20 California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation.” Id. In his request for relief, plaintiff 21 seeks five million dollars. Id. at 18. 22 LEGAL STANDARDS 23 I. 42 U.S.C. 1983 24 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 25 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 26 including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim 27 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LANH TRUONG, No. 2:25-cv-01836-SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DVI STATE PRISON, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and is proceeding with this civil rights action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) is 19 before the undersigned for screening under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. 20 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 21 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 22 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 23 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 24 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 25 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 26 lump sum.1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an 27 1 Although plaintiff attached a state court “request to waive court fees” form to his in forma 28 pauperis motion, plaintiff is advised that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires incarcerated 1 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate 2 order directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s 3 income to be taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 4 filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 5 STATUTORY SCREENING OF PRISONER COMPLAINTS 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 8 The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 9 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 10 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 11 1915A(b)(1), (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 12 fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous 13 if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. 14 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however 15 inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 16 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 17 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 18 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 19 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 20 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 21 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 22 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 23 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 24 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 25 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 26
27 persons proceeding in forma pauperis in civil rights actions to pay the full amount of a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); see also Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 28 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 2 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 3 PLAINTIFF’S FAC 4 The facts underlying plaintiff’s complaint occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated at the 5 Deuel Vocational Institution (“DVI”). ECF No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff names DVI as the sole 6 defendant. Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that in Fall of 2015, he was getting down from his top bunk 7 and stepped on a rat. Id. at 5. Upon realizing that he had stepped on a rat, plaintiff became 8 startled, lost his footing on the lower bunk, and fell, striking his head on the jagged edge of an old 9 thermostatic steam heater. Id. Plaintiff sustained a one-and-a-half inch gash that required 10 thirteen staples, which he received at an off-site hospital. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that after he 11 received the staples and an x-ray, the hospital medical staff “calously [sic] stated [he] was fine 12 with total disregard to the broader outcome of the human cost [he’d] suffered” and discharged 13 him after six hours. Id. at 6. Plaintiff maintains that the thermostatic steam heater should not 14 have been present in his, or any, cell. Id. at 5. 15 Plaintiff further alleges that in 2023 after being released from prison, medical 16 professionals assessed that he had suffered from “acute brain injury with partial memory 17 impairment,” leaving him with the intellectual capacity of a middle schooler. Id. at 6. In 2024, 18 plaintiff was put on disability and began receiving social security income as a result of the head 19 injury he sustained at DVI, “stemming from the institutional negligence committed by the 20 California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation.” Id. In his request for relief, plaintiff 21 seeks five million dollars. Id. at 18. 22 LEGAL STANDARDS 23 I. 42 U.S.C. 1983 24 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 25 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 26 including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim 27 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law 28 (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. 1 County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 2 II. Linkage 3 Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 4 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 5 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 6 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's 7 “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a 8 series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which 9 [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 10 constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 11 and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 12 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 13 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 14 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 15 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 16 III. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement 17 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes 18 duties on prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 19 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials must ensure that 20 inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable 21 measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 22 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). The Amendment’s protections extend to “condition[s] of confinement 23 that [are] sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering” in the future. Helling 24 v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). 25 In such circumstances, it is a “prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial 26 risk of serious harm to an inmate” that violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. 27 This type of Eighth Amendment claim has an objective component and a subjective component. 28 First, an inmate must allege that the risk was, objectively, “sufficiently serious.” Lemire v. Cal. 1 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 2 Second, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant official acted, subjectively, with “deliberate 3 indifference” to his health or safety. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) 4 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.) The deliberate indifference standard requires a showing that the 5 prison official acted or failed to act despite the prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of 6 serious harm to the prisoner. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.). 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. Failure to State a Claim 9 The undersigned finds that plaintiff has not adequately stated an Eighth Amendment 10 conditions of confinement claim. Even assuming the allegedly ill-placed heater in plaintiff’s cell 11 constitutes a sufficiently serious deprivation of personal safety to satisfy the first prong of the 12 Eighth Amendment test, plaintiff fails to name a proper defendant or satisfactorily explain how 13 said defendant deliberately disregarded the harm posed by the heater. 14 A. Defendant DVI 15 Defendant DVI is not a proper defendant in a section 1983 action. The Eleventh 16 Amendment bars § 1983 suits against the State of California and its state agencies, including the 17 California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and its affiliated state prisons. 18 See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Richardson v. 19 California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 22-CV-06137-NC, 2023 WL 2394543, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 20 Mar. 6, 2023) (“[CDCR], as well as state prisons like Salinas Valley State Prison, are considered 21 agencies of the state”) (citing Palismo v. California Dep’t of Corr., 145 Fed. App’x 215, 216 (9th 22 Cir. 2005)). Moreover, defendant DVI is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See Allison v. 23 Cal. Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that San Quentin Prison is not a 24 “person” subject to suit under § 1983); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 25 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is not a person 26 amenable to suit.”). In the context of section 1983, the term “person” refers to individuals or 27 municipal entities that act under color of state law but does not include the state itself. Will v. 28 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989). Accordingly, as suits against state 1 agencies are essentially suits against the state itself, state agencies are not considered “persons” 2 either. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend to name, if he can, a defendant who can be sued 3 under § 1983. 4 B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference 5 As noted above, even assuming plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the Eighth 6 Amendment conditions of confinement test, his claim falls short of the second prong, which 7 requires a plausible showing that the defendant was subjectively aware of the substantial risk that 8 the heater posed to inmate safety and nonetheless disregarded it. See Peralta, 774 F.3d at 1082. 9 Plaintiff will be given leave to amend to allege, if he can, facts that plausibly establish how a 10 defendant knowingly disregarded the apparent risk to plaintiff’s safety that the heater presented. 11 The undersigned advises plaintiff to review the legal standard for Eighth Amendment conditions 12 of confinement claims provided above, emphasizing here that mere negligence is not sufficient to 13 establish liability. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 14 II. Leave to Amend 15 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned finds 16 that the complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth Amendment 17 against defendant DVI. DVI and other state prisons are not “persons” subject to 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983, and CDCR and its prisons are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 19 Moreover, plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing any defendant’s deliberate indifference to 20 his safety regarding placement of the heater in his cell. 21 Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If plaintiff 22 chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions about which he 23 complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71. The 24 complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. 25 Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 26 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions 27 and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Furthermore, “[v]ague and 28 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 1 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 2 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 3 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 4 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 5 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 6 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 7 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 8 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Any 9 claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 10 CONCLUSION 11 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED 13 2. Plaintiff’s prior request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is 14 DENIED as moot. 15 3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 16 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 18 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 19 4. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and will not be served. 21 5. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 22 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 23 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 24 number assigned this case, “2:25-cv-01836-SCR P,” and must be labeled “Second Amended 25 Complaint.” 26 6. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 27 recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 28 Procedure. 1 7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 2 | form used in this district. 3 | DATED: May 1, 2026 SEAN C. RIORDAN 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28