Langworthy v. Clallam County Sheriff

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 GENEVA LANGWORTHY, Case No. 3:24-cv-05258-TMC 8 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 9 v. 10 CLALLAM COUNTY SHERIFF; ALEX 11 SCHODOWSKI; DAVE NEUPERT; BRENT 12 BASDEN; AURORA BEARSE, 13 Defendants. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 In this case, Pro Se Plaintiff Geneva Langworthy sues the “Clallam County Sheriff”; 17 Judge Alex Schodowski; Judge Dave Neupert; Prosecutor Mark Nichols, the Clallam County 18 District Attorney’s Office, Judge Brent Basden; the Clallam County District Court; Zach 19 Meyers; Judge Aurora Bearse; the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington; 20 21 22 23 24 1 and the U.S. Magistrate Judges of this district.1,2 Her claims stem from a property dispute with 2 her neighbors that led to them obtaining an anti-harassment order against her in Washington state 3 court. She claims primarily that the various judges involved in her state court cases conducted 4 illegitimate proceedings and rendered incorrect decisions against her. For the following reasons, 5 all of Ms. Langworthy’s claims are dismissed. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Legal Standards 8 1. Section 1915 Screening 9 The district court may permit indigent litigants to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) upon 10 completion of a proper affidavit of indigency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court must subject a 11 civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the 12 sua sponte dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which

13 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 14 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 15 (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte 16 17 1 While her pro se complaint form does not name each party listed as a defendant here, see 18 Dkt. 1-1 at 2, Ms. Langworthy’s “statement of claims,” submitted along with her proposed complaint, contains what appear to be allegations against them. Construing the complaint 19 liberally, as the Court must do for pro se plaintiffs, the Court treats the Western District and the U.S. Magistrate Judges as named defendants in this case. See Woodruff v. Mueller, No. C 02– 20 3307 VRW, 2004 WL 724886, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2004) (identifying the named defendants by looking to the “body of the complaint” where the pro se plaintiff did not 21 specifically name all defendants in the caption of her filings as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)). 22 2 In the Ninth Circuit, judges are not required to recuse when the plaintiff names the federal 23 district they sit in as a defendant in the suit. See Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court declines Ms. Langworthy’s request for transfer of venue due to a conflict of 24 interest. Dkt. 1-2 at 35. 1 dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 3 An IFP complaint is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if “it ha[s] no arguable

4 substance in law or fact.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 5 1987) (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 6 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328–29 (1989). Under 7 this standard, a court may dismiss a claim that is based on an “indisputably meritless legal 8 theory.” Neizke, 490 U.S. at 327. 9 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 10 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)”―the statute’s second ground for dismissal―“is 11 the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 12 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). “Dismissal is proper only if it is clear

13 that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to 14 relief.” Id. 15 The Court must dismiss an IFP action “at any time” during the case when it determines 16 that the IFP complaint (or proposed complaint) is subject to dismissal under section 1915’s 17 screening provision. See § 1915(e)(2)(B). Courts in the Ninth Circuit may screen an IFP 18 complaint before determining whether the plaintiff qualifies financially for IFP status, and a 19 determination that a complaint is subject to dismissal under the statute itself warrants both 20 dismissing the complaint and denying a pending motion to proceed IFP. See Tripati v. First Nat’l 21 Bank & Trust, 821 F. 2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A district court may deny leave to proceed 22 in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the

23 action is frivolous or without merit.”); see also O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 24 2008) (“A prisoner’s civil action may be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A before any 1 fees have been paid, and thus before ‘filing’ occurs.” (quoting Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 2 399–400 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also id. (construing “a district court’s termination of an in forma 3 pauperis complaint during the screening process for a reason enumerated in § 1915A,

4 § 1915(e)(2)(B), or § 1997e(c) as a dismissal pursuant to the applicable section”). 5 Unless it is clear a pro se plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies of a complaint, the Court 6 will provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint to state a plausible claim. 7 See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal without 8 leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not 9 be saved by any amendment.”). 10 2. Judicial Immunity 11 Judges generally have absolute immunity from lawsuits for money damages. See Acres 12 Bonusing, Inc v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

13 9 (1991) (per curiam)). “Courts have articulated only two circumstances in which judicial 14 immunity does not apply”: “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial 15 capacity,” and actions that “though judicial in nature, [are] taken in the complete absence of all 16 jurisdiction.” See id. 17 In determining if an action is judicial, courts consider whether “(1) the precise act is a 18 normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy 19 centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly 20 and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity.” Lund v. 21 Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021). “These factors are to be construed generously in favor 22 of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793

23 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 24 1 As to lack of jurisdiction, a judge will be immune for a particular action if their “ultimate 2 acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” even if the motives 3 underlying the ultimate act are “clearly improper.” See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 (citations

4 omitted) (“Judges’ immunity from civil liability should not be ‘affected by the motives with 5 which their judicial acts are performed.’” (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 6 (1985)); see also id. (“[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome 7 of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity 8 extended to judges and prosecutors. As long as the judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions 9 taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction [sic], immunity applies.” (emphasis added)). 10 If immunity applies, it applies “however erroneous the [judge’s] act may have been, and 11 however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Cleavinger, 474 U.S. 12 at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872));

13 see also Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 14 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (“Grave procedural errors or acts in 15 excess of judicial authority do not deprive a judge of this immunity.”). 16 Judicial immunity against lawsuits for money damages applies to civil rights claims 17 brought under section 1983 and the ADA. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (regarding section 18 1983 claims); Lund, 5 F.4th at 970–72 (regarding ADA claims). 19 Ms. Langworthy’s claims stem from a property dispute between her and her neighbors in 20 Clallam County, Washington. According to Ms. Langworthy, her neighbors “excavat[ed] on her 21 property and . . . mov[ed] the boundary fence.” Dkt. 1-1. 22 3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

23 Under the doctrine set forth in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and 24 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (the “Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine”), federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack subject matter 2 jurisdiction to review errors allegedly committed by state courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“The 3 jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482

4 (“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in 5 judicial proceedings.”). The doctrine prohibits plaintiffs from “com[ing] to federal court to seek 6 ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. De 7 Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)). This is because “[t]he United States Supreme Court is 8 the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 9 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has provided the following “general formulation” of the 10 doctrine: 11 If a . . . plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court . . . , Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. 12 If . . . [a] plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction. 13 Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021). 14 If a court decides the doctrine applies, “it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in 15 the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial 16 decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. “Claims are inextricably intertwined if ‘the relief requested in 17 the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.’” Id. at 18 624–25 (quoting Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779); see Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 19 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where the district court must hold that the state court was 20 wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably 21 intertwined.”). Claims, including those for money damages, that do not expressly request 22 reversal or invalidation of the challenged state court decision may still be “inextricably 23 intertwined” if the “prayer for relief . . . is contingent upon a finding that the state court decision 24 1 was in error.” See Cooper, 704 F.3d at 782; see also id. (“Because the second claim ‘succeeds 2 only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it’ and ‘federal relief can 3 only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong,’ Cooper cannot escape the

4 reality that his second claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court decision, no matter 5 what label he puts on it.” (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, 6 J., concurring))); Busch v. Torres, 905 F. Supp. 766, 771 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“[I]f a suit seeking 7 damages for the execution of a judicial order is just a way to contest the order itself, then the 8 Rooker-Feldman doctrine is in play.”). 9 Relevant here, Rooker-Feldman applies “even where the challenge to the state court 10 decision involves federal constitutional issues, including section 1983 claims.” Benavidez v. Cty. 11 of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021). “Furthermore, the doctrine applies to both 12 final and interlocutory decisions from a state court.” Id. at 1143.

13 B. Analysis 14 Construed liberally, Ms. Langworthy brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 15 violations of her rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th 16 Amendment and the right to effective assistance of counsel under the 6th Amendment; under 18 17 U.S.C. § 242, and under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See Dkt. 1-1 at 18 3; Dkt. 1-2 at 1 (indicating, in title of her “statement of claims,” that she is bringing claims under 19 section 1983). The Court addresses each claim in turn. 20 1. Section 242 Claim 21 Ms. Langworthy lists 18 U.S.C. § 242 as one of the federal statutes “at issue in this case” 22 in her complaint form. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Appearing to reference the statute, which sets out criminal

23 liability for “willfully subject[ing] any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, 24 Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 1 protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States” “under color of any law, statute, 2 ordinance, regulation, or custom,’―in her “statement of claim,” she alleges that “[t]he 3 Defendants, acting under color of law, have deprived the Plaintiff of her real and personal

4 property, without due process of law, since June 2022.” Dkt. 1-1 at 4. 5 However, Section 242 is a criminal statute that “provide[s] no basis for civil liability.” 6 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). For this reason, Ms. Langworthy’s 7 Section 242 claim is frivolous and she would not be able to save the claim through amendment; 8 the Court will dismiss it with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 318 9 (noting that among the examples of “frivolous” claims are those “claims of infringement of a 10 legal interest which clearly does not exist”); Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 & n.22 (5th 11 Cir. 1993) (holding that “claims which otherwise clearly have no arguable basis in law, thereby 12 negating a rectification by amendment, usually should be dismissed with prejudice” under

13 section 1915 and that that “claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist 14 would fall into this category” (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327)); see also Marcos-Chavela v. 15 Utah, No. 2:22-cv-00975-JHC, 2022 WL 3018242, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2022) 16 (dismissing claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) with 17 prejudice and without leave to amend where the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim and the 18 claim was also legally and factually frivolous). 19 C. Analysis – Individual Defendants 20 The Court considers Ms. Langworthy’s remaining claims separately for each defendant. 21 1. Judge Dave Neupert 22 Ms. Langworthy alleges that Judge Dave Neupert was a judge in the anti-harassment

23 lawsuit filed against her by her neighbors. She claims he “failed to voluntarily recuse” from the 24 case despite “already [being] biased” against her and improperly issued the anti-harassment order 1 against her even though her neighbors’ petition was procedurally defective. Dkt. 1-2 at 2. She 2 also alleges that his anti-harassment order “chilled” her ability to pursue civil litigation, because 3 it prohibited her from serving her neighbors with “pleadings,” and suggests the order violated her

4 constitutional rights. See id. at 3–4. She also asserts Judge Neupert violated her right to 5 substantive due process by presiding over an arraignment hearing for a violation of her anti- 6 harassment order. Id. at 13. All of Judge Neupert’s conduct that forms the basis for 7 Ms. Langworthy’s claims is squarely within Judge Neupert’s judicial role and there is no 8 indication he did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 9 Judicial immunity bars Ms. Langworthy’s claims relating to these allegations and the 10 Court must dismiss them with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Stewart v. Aloia, 231 F. 11 App’x 724, 724–25 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of claims barred by 12 judicial immunity); Sanzaro v. Vega, 623 F. App’x 515, 516 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal

13 of claim barred by judicial immunity without leave to amend because the deficiencies in the 14 complaint could not be cured by amendment).3,4 15 2. Clallam County Sheriff 16 a. Fourteenth Amendment - Equal Protection 17 18 19

20 3 Unlike for Judge Schodowski, Ms. Langworthy does not allege that Judge Neupert was without jurisdiction to make his decisions. 21 4 Ms. Langworthy requests both monetary damages and “prospective injunctive relief from 22 ongoing rights violations” for her claims. Dkt. 1-2 at 36. The Court’s holdings regarding judicial immunity apply to both requests for relief, as “Judicial immunity is not limited to claims for 23 monetary damages and extends to claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996). 24 1 Ms. Langworthy also sues the “Clallam County Sheriff”5 for improperly serving process 2 on her by phone and incorrectly telling the Washington district court that she had agreed to 3 waive service of process. See id. at 4–5. She also alleges that the office illegally “prosecuted” her 4 for violating her neighbors’ anti-harassment order against her by placing a copy of her 5 “pleadings” from a lawsuit in their mailbox. See id. at 10–11. According to Langworthy, these 6 actions denied her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 To the extent Ms. Langworthy sues the Clallam County sheriff’s office as a whole, her 8 claim is only cognizable as a Monell claim, which requires her to “to allege that a department 9 policy or custom caused [her] injuries.” Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 10 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A municipality may be held liable as a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. 11 § 1983 when it maintains a policy or custom that causes the deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally 12 protected rights.”). “[A]n individual may prevail in a § 1983 action against municipalities,

13 including counties and their sheriff’s departments, if the unconstitutional action implements or 14 executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 15 promulgated by that body’s officers.” Lockett v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 16 2020). The plaintiff must show that the “policy, custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ 17 behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 18 1096 (9th Cir. 2013). Ms. Langworthy has not alleged that the sheriff’s office’s improper service 19 or criminal prosecution of her was motivated by a particular “policy, custom, or practice” of the 20 sheriff’s office. Accordingly, her Monell claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court 21 will provide leave to amend to identify such a policy or practice. 22

23 5 Ms. Langworthy does not clarify in her complaint whether she is suing a particular member of 24 the sheriff’s office or the whole office. 1 Moreover, to the extent Ms. Langworthy brings this claim against an individual employee 2 of the sheriff’s office, the Court dismisses it because her allegations do not make out a 3 cognizable equal protection claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

4 Amendment prohibits a state from denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal 5 protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The clause “is essentially a direction that 6 all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 7 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs raising these claims must 8 allege “intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an 9 inference of discriminatory intent” in their complaints. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. 10 Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Ms. Clark’s complaint does not state that she was 11 treated differently than similarly situated people or provide any direct or circumstantial evidence 12 of discriminatory animus based on her membership in an “identifiable class.” See Clark v. Wash.

13 State Dep’t of Health, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96409, at *15–16 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2024). 14 For these reasons, Ms. Langworthy’s complaint also fails to state a claim as to her equal 15 protection claim. If she decides to file an amended complaint, she must include allegations 16 showing she was denied equal protection under the rules stated above. 17 b. Fourth Amendment – Unreasonable Search and Seizure 18 Ms. Langworthy also sues the Clallam County Sheriff’s office for violating her Fourth 19 Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure for arresting her for an alleged 20 violation of her neighbors’ anti-harassment order, after she fled from officers attempting to arrest 21 her on her property. See Dkt. 1-2 at 12. She alleges the officers “physically abused” her during 22 the arrest. Id.

23 Ms. Langworthy’s Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 suffers from the same 24 deficiency as her Fourteenth Amendment claim: she has identified one incident during which the 1 Sheriff’s office allegedly violated her constitutional rights, but she has not identified a policy, 2 custom, or practice that motivated the allegedly illegal conduct. The Court dismisses this claim 3 without prejudice for failure to state a claim and will give Ms. Langworthy leave to amend.

4 3. Pro Tem Judge Alex Schodowski 5 According to Ms. Langworthy, Pro Tem Judge Alex Schodowski was also a judge in her 6 neighbors’ anti-harassment case against her in the Washington district court. She claims Judge 7 Schodowski violated various constitutional amendments by “issuing a default one year order 8 against her.”6 Dkt. 1-2 at 7–8. According to Ms. Langworthy, Judge Schodowski issued this 9 order after the district court had already lost jurisdiction over the case, citing RCW 10.14.150, a 10 provision of the statute which Ms. Langworthy alleges was the basis for the anti-harassment 11 order, which at the time provided that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction and 12 cognizance of any civil actions and proceedings brought under this chapter, except the district 13 court shall transfer such actions and proceedings to the superior court when it is shown that . . . a 14 superior court has exercised or is exercising jurisdiction over a proceeding involving the parties” 15 and that “the district or municipal court shall transfer the case to superior court after the 16 temporary order is entered.” Ms. Langworthy alleges that Judge Schodowski was without 17 jurisdiction to issue the order because, after the initial temporary order was issued, “a superior 18 court was already exercising its jurisdiction over the parties,” see Dkt. 1-2 at 2, and the statute 19 also provides that the district court must transfer the case to the Washington superior court after 20 issuing a “temporary order,” see id. at 6. 21 Ms. Langworthy does not specify whether Judge Schodowski’s “one year order” was also a 22 “temporary order” under the statute, but even if she is correct that Judge Schodowski was without

24 6 Ms. Langworthy does not explain what this order was. 1 jurisdiction to issue the order, her Section 1983 claim is still barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, since her allegations of constitutional violations essentially ask the Court to rule that Judge 2 Schodowski’s order was legally erroneous. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction 3 over the claims against Judge Schodowski. Since “[a] dismissal under the Rooker- 4 Feldman doctrine is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus should be 5 without prejudice,” McNeley v. Sheppard, 793 F. App’x 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (first citing 6 Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004); then citing Kelly v. Fleetwood 7 Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004)), the Court dismisses the claims against Judge 8 Schodowski without prejudice. However, because “there is no basis to conclude that 9 [Ms. Langworthy] could replead [her] claims to avoid the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar,” 10 Boudette v. Oskerson, No. 22-36003, 2024 WL 1342613, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2024) 11 (citing Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)), the Court 12 will not provide her leave to amend her complaint as to these claims against Judge Schodowski. 13 Ms. Langworthy also alleges that, later in her case, Judge Schodowski also heard 14 Ms. Langworthy’s “motion to quash . . . warrants.” Dkt. 1-2 at 21. Ms. Langworthy claims that 15 Judge Schodowski appointed an incompetent attorney to represent her to “prevent” her “from 16 effectively defending herself.” See id. For this claim, Ms. Langworthy does not allege Judge 17 Schodowski was without jurisdiction. It also amounts to a request for the Court to review a 18 decision of a state court. The claim is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 19 20 4. Prosecutor Mark Nichols/Clallam County District Attorney’s Office Ms. Langworthy does not list Mark Nichols (whom she identifies as a prosecutor who 21 participated in her prosecution for violation of the anti-harassment order) as a defendant, but she 22 alleges in the body of her complaint that he attempted to “incarcerate” her “without due process 23 of law” by “argu[ing] for excessively strict and burdensome conditions for Ms. Langworthy’s 24 1 bail and pre-trial release.” Dkt. 1-2 at 13. Like judges, prosecutors are generally absolutely 2 immune from suits for money damages. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. “Where a prosecutor acts 3 as an advocate in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case, absolute immunity

4 applies.” Id. at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similar to judicial immunity, 5 prosecutorial immunity applies even if the prosecutor is shown to have committed “grave 6 procedural errors,” unless they acted “without . . . authority.” Id. at 1077. 7 Ms. Langworthy’s allegations against Attorney Nichols’ allegedly illegal conduct while 8 arguing in court do not show that he acted “without authority” in doing so. To the extent she 9 asserts a claim against him, it is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 10 Ms. Langworthy also alleges that an unidentified Clallam County “prosecuting attorney” 11 attempted to deny her “right to trial by jury” by arguing against a motion to quash filed by her in 12 one of her cases and “perpetuat[ing] the position of that office that Ms. Langworthy should be

13 condemned without trial.” Dkt. 1-2 at 21. For the same reasons described above, this claim is 14 dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 15 5. Judge Brent Basden 16 Ms. Langworthy also sues Judge Brent Basden, whom she alleges heard an appeal of a 17 decision against her in the Washington District Court. See Dkt. 1-2 at 14. She claims Judge 18 Basden violated her “due process right[s]” by denying her appeal arguing that she was not 19 properly served in her district court case, “retrospectively extend[ing] the temporary order from 20 14 days to more than eight months,” reassigning the case to himself after transferring the case to 21 the Washington superior court, and holding a hearing in the superior court case in person (rather 22 than by Zoom) to prevent Langworthy from appearing due to her bench warrants. See id. at 15–

23 18. She also alleges he violated her “rights to due process and equal protection” by holding an ex 24 parte hearing in her absence. Id. at 18. And she alleges that he violated unidentified 1 “constitutional rights” by applying the incorrect state statute in issuing another anti-harassment 2 order against her. See id. at 18. 3 Ms. Langworthy again does not provide any allegations that Judge Basden did not have

4 subject matter jurisdiction over the case. And her claim asks the Court to decide that his 5 decisions were incorrect. Thus, the claim is subject to dismissal both as barred by judicial 6 immunity and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 7 Because immunity bars the claim, the Court dismisses it with prejudice and without leave to 8 amend. 9 6. Clallam County District Court 10 Ms. Langworthy also sues the Clallam County District Court for retaliation under the 11 ADA for “revoking” her “filing accommodation” allowing her to file her “pleadings” 12 electronically “to punish her for complaining about disability discrimination.” Dkt. 1-2 at 15. To

13 establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show 14 “(a) that he or she was engaged in protected activity, (b) that he or she suffered an adverse 15 action, and (c) that there was a causal link between the two.” See T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San 16 Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 472 (9th Cir. 2015). Ms. Langworthy does not elaborate 17 on how she complained about “disability discrimination” to the court, nor does she provide any 18 allegations tending to show that the court revoked her filing privileges because of said complaint. 19 Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend for failure to 20 state the claim. 21 Ms. Langworthy also alleges the district court violated her “due process rights” by 22 refusing to allow her to argue a “motion to quash.” Dkt. 1-2 at 15. Ms. Langworthy does not

23 allege the court lacked jurisdiction when it made this decision, and the claim again asks the 24 1 Court to opine on the correctness of the decision. The claim is dismissed with prejudice and 2 without leave to amend. 3 7. Attorney Zach Meyers

4 Although not mentioned in her complaint form or case caption, Ms. Langworthy appears 5 to bring a section 1983 claim against her defense attorney, Zach Meyers, for violating her rights 6 under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for failing to make “contact with [her]” or 7 taking any other action on her behalf. See Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 41. However, Attorney Meyers is not liable 8 under Section 1983 “because a defense attorney in a criminal prosecution, whether retained or 9 appointed, does not act ‘under color of’ state law.” Gandara v. Newsome, No. EDCV 21-1616- 10 SVW (KK), 2021 WL 12159636, at *5 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2021) (quoting Szijarto v. 11 Legeman, 466 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1972)). Ms. Langworthy’s claim against Meyers is dismissed 12 with prejudice.

13 8. Judge Aurora Bearse 14 Ms. Langworthy also sues Washington Court of Appeals Judge Aurora Bearse for 15 incorrectly upholding a lower court decision regarding her alleged lack of service in the anti- 16 harassment case. See Dkt. 1-2 at 18–19. She does not allege any lack of jurisdiction and asks for 17 this Court to review Judge Bearse’s decision. For the reasons described above, this claim is also 18 dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 19 9. Western District of Washington/U.S. Magistrate Judges 20 Ms. Langworthy also appears to raise claims against this District and its Magistrate 21 Judges, where she takes issue with other decisions against her in this district and claims that the 22 court and its judges are biased against her. See Dkt. 1-2 at 22 (claiming “[t]he U.S. District Court

23 for the Western District of Washington (“WAWD”) has an established pattern and practice of 24 denying procedural due process to Geneva Langworthy”). To the extent Ms. Langworthy wishes 1 to raise these allegations as separate claims, they are also barred by judicial immunity, as 2 Ms. Langworthy has no allegations showing the judges of this district were without jurisdiction 3 when they issued the orders she complains about. See Waialeale v. Offices of the United States

4 Magistrate(s), No. 11–00407 JMS/RLP, 2011 WL 2534348, at *3 (D. Haw. June 24, 2011) 5 (applying judicial immunity to claim against all judges in a judicial district). The Court dismisses 6 these claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. 7 III. CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons outlined above, all of Ms. Langworthy’s claims are DISMISSED 9 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). If Ms. Langworthy chooses to file a proposed amended 10 complaint as to those claims for which the Court grants her leave to amend, she must do so by 11 August 13, 2024. If Ms. Langworthy does not amend her proposed complaint, the Court will 12 deny her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her remaining claims without

13 prejudice. 14 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and 15 to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 16 Dated this 23rd day of July, 2024. 17 A 18 Tiffany M. Cartwright 19 United States District Judge

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