Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedSeptember 27, 2024
Docket2:20-cv-00635
StatusUnknown

This text of Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc. (Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STACIA LANGLEY, et al., No. 2:20-cv-00635-DJC-CSK 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER APPROVING MINORS’ 14 COMPROMISE GUIDING HANDS SCHOOL, INC., et 15 al., 16 Defendants. 17

18 Plaintiffs brought this action based on allegations that students with disabilities 19 enrolled at Defendant Guiding Hands School, Inc. were subject to frequent and 20 unnecessary use of restraints. Among the plaintiffs are several minor children 21 including Plaintiff M.S. by and through his mother, Melanie Stark1, and Guardian Ad 22 Litem, Christopher Stark. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Approve Settlement for 23 Minor Plaintiff M.S. (Mot. (ECF No. 296).) This motion is unopposed by any party. 24 Plaintiffs have also provided supplemental briefing in support of the motion. (Suppl. 25 Mem. (ECF No. 303).) 26 27

28 1 Plaintiff Stark is also individually a plaintiff in this action and a party to the proposed settlement 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court partially lifts the stay of this action for 2 the limited purposes of this motion2 and grants Plaintiffs Motion to Approve 3 Settlement for Minor Plaintiff M.S. 4 I. Background 5 The parties to this proposed partial settlement are Plaintiff M.S., a minor, 6 Plaintiff Stark, and Defendants Elk Grove Unified School District, Elk Grove Special 7 Education Local Plan Area (“SELPA”), Doug Phillips, and Marilyn Delgado. Defendant 8 School District is part of Defendant Elk Grove SELPA. (Mot. at 3.) Defendant Phillips 9 was the Director of Special Education for Elk Grove School District and SELPA. (Id. at 10 4.) Defendant Delgado was the Program Specialist assigned to Plaintiff M.S. by the 11 school district. (Id.) Elk Grove SELPA and Elk Grove Unified School District had a 12 contract with GHS to provide special education and related services for students. 13 (TAC ¶¶ 242.) 14 According to the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), at 15 nine years old, Plaintiff M.S. was placed at Guiding Hands School (“GHS”) by 16 Defendant Delgado, acting as a program specialist for the school district. (Id. ¶ 485.) 17 Plaintiff M.S. was restrained on his first day at GHS and a total of 61 times over the next 18 nearly two months. (Id. ¶ 253.) These restraints allegedly caused bruises, welts, and 19 abrasions to his face and body. (Id.) On several occasions, Plaintiff Stark raised 20 concerns about how Plaintiff M.S. was being treated, including how restraints were 21 being employed. (Id. ¶¶ 256–57, 262.) A subsequent investigation found multiple 22 alleged violations of Plaintiff M.S.’s IEP, failures to document injuries, and failures 23 connected with the school district’s decision to place Plaintiff M.S. at GHS. (Id. ¶ 264.) 24 As a result of these events, Plaintiff M.S. purportedly suffered physical injuries as well 25 as extreme emotional distress. (Id. ¶ 270.) Plaintiff M.S. claims that Defendants 26

27 2 No party objected to the Court lifting the stay of this action for the limited purpose of considering the two Motions to Approve Minor Settlement. (See ECF No. 299.) Nothing about this order should be 28 construed as applying to the separate Motion to Lift Stay (ECF No. 302) presently set for oral argument 1 Delgado and Phillips failed to take action “to stop the illegal and excessive restraints” 2 or to ensure GHS staff were following Plaintiff M.S.’s Behavior Intervention Plan. (Id. 3 ¶ 256.) 4 II. Legal Standard 5 No claim by or against a minor or incompetent person may be settled or 6 compromised absent an order by the Court approving the settlement or compromise. 7 E.D. Cal. R. 202(b). The Local Rules require that the motion for approval of a 8 proposed minor’s compromise disclose, among other things: (1) the age and sex of 9 the minor, (2) the nature of the causes of action to be settled or compromised, (3) the 10 facts and circumstances out of which the causes of action arose, including the time, 11 place and persons involved, (4) the manner in which the compromise amount or other 12 consideration was determined, including such additional information as may be 13 required to enable the Court to determine the fairness of the settlement or 14 compromise amount, and (5) if a personal injury claim, the nature and extent of the 15 injury with sufficient particularity to inform the Court whether the injury is temporary or 16 permanent. See E.D. Cal. R. 202(b)(2). 17 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held in Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 18 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) imposes a “special 19 duty” on district courts approving a minor’s compromise. “[T]his special duty requires 20 a district court to ‘conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the settlement serves 21 the best interests of the minor.’” Id. (citations omitted). However, this “special duty” 22 has a limited scope of review, only asking “whether the net recovery of each minor 23 plaintiff is fair and reasonable, without regard to the amount received by adult co- 24 plaintiffs and what they have agreed to pay plaintiffs’ counsel.” Id. at 1182. “If the net 25 recovery of each minor plaintiff under the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable, 26 the district court should approve the settlement as presented . . . .” Id. In making this 27 determination, “courts typically consider such information as the relative worth of the 28 settlement amount, the circumstances of the settlement, counsel’s explanation of their 1 views and experiences in litigating these types of actions, and other similar 2 compromises that have been approved by courts.” Rivett v. United States, No. 2:21- 3 CV-00717-DAD-AC, 2023 WL 4238909, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2023) (collecting 4 cases where the procedural posture was considered, the fact that the settlement 5 occurred at a court-supervised settlement conference was considered, and other 6 compromises were considered). 7 Plaintiffs bring a variety of state and federal law claims against Defendants. 8 Although the Ninth Circuit expressly limited its holding to “cases involving the 9 settlement of a minor’s federal claims[,]” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1179 n.2, where, as 10 here, a court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, courts will 11 apply the Robidoux standard to all of the claims, see A.G.A. v. County of Riverside, No. 12 19-cv-00077-VAP-SPx, 2019 WL 2871160, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2019) 13 (collecting cases). 14 III. Proposed Settlement 15 The proposed settlement would resolve claims brought both by Plaintiff M.S. 16 and his mother, Plaintiff Stark, against Defendants Elk Grove School District, Elk Grove 17 SELPA, Phillips, and Delgado. (Settlement Agreement (Mot., Ex. B) at 1.) Under the 18 terms of the settlement, these Defendants agree to pay $75,000 as a gross settlement 19 amount. (Mot. at 17.) Plaintiffs’ counsel requests payment of 33% of the gross 20 settlement as an attorney’s fee, as expressly provided by the terms of the Attorney- 21 Client Fee Contract entered into by Plaintiffs M.S. and Stark and their counsel prior to 22 their entry into this action, as well as $4,018.01 in costs. (Id.; see Attorney-Client Fee 23 Contract (Mot., Ex. A) at 2.) Under the agreement, 60% of the total remaining after 24 fees and costs is designated for Plaintiff M.S. and 40% is designated for Plaintiff Stark. 25 (Mot. at 17.) Plaintiff M.S. would receive a net recovery of $27,739.19. (Id.) Plaintiff 26 M.S.’s funds would be “deposit[ed] in a blocked account in an insured financial 27 institution is subject to withdrawal only upon the authorization of the Court until the 28 minor becomes of age of majority, and then the funds shall be disbursed to Plaintiff 1 M.S.

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Related

Robidoux v. Rosengren
638 F.3d 1177 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langley-v-guiding-hands-school-inc-caed-2024.