Langley Jr., William David v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 23, 2002
• Docket: 14-01-00484-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion filed May 23, 2002

Affirmed and Opinion filed May 23, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-01-00484-CR

WILLIAM DAVID LANGLEY, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 838,907

O P I N I O N

Following a bench trial, the trial court found appellant William David Langley, Jr. guilty of possessing greater than four grams and less than 200 grams of cocaine.  Appellant pleaded true to two enhancements, and the trial court sentenced appellant to twenty-five years= confinement.  On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.  We affirm.

In the late afternoon or evening of March 12, 2000, appellant borrowed a small, two-door Mercedes to run an errand with his friend, Steven Duncan.  Around 10:15 p.m., Harris County Sheriff=s Deputy Dansby noticed one of the headlights was out on the Mercedes and pulled the car over.  The officer observed the passenger=s left shoulder slump toward the middle of the car as if hiding something.  Appellant, who was driving, and his passenger (Duncan) seemed to be talking, and both were looking down toward the center of the car.  The officer approached and asked for identification.  Appellant=s forehead was wet with sweat.  About two weeks earlier, the same officer had pulled appellant over in the Mercedes for speeding, but this time appellant appeared much more nervous.

            On his first glance inside the car, Deputy Dansby did not see anything, but after asking appellant and Duncan to get out of the car, he noticed a clear plastic bag containing white powder between the driver=s seat and the center console.  Underneath the clear bag was a five-inch-long glass tube containing crack cocaine.  When the officer asked who the bag and tube belonged to, neither appellant nor Duncan responded.  The officers also found a plastic container with marijuana, a pipe, and cigarette paper in the glovebox. 

The owner of the Mercedes, Michael Mobbs, testified he knew appellant through appellant=s housemate, Doris Pickering.  He lent appellant his car on March 12, as he had done frequently, and testified no narcotics were in the car when it was in his possession.  He stated that if there had been a bag between the seat and the console, he would have seen it.

Appellant, who had multiple felony convictions, testified that the cocaine the deputy found in the Mercedes was never in his possession.  He alleged he saw the cocaine for the first time when the officer showed him the bag, and that authority figures made him nervous.

                                                      Newly Discovered Evidence

In his first point of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  He alleged that he discovered the testimony of Doris Pickering after his trial, and that if she had testified at trial  her testimony probably would have brought about a different result.  At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Doris Pickering testified that Michael Mobbs (the owner of the Mercedes) used cocaine and marijuana.  She said she found marijuana in the Mercedes five days after appellant=s arrest for possession, and had seen Mobbs take narcotics or paraphernalia out of the car on other occasions.  When asked whether Mobbs habitually left narcotics in his car, she answered, AIt=s possible.@  Pickering had multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, including failure to identify herself and aggravated perjury.  Pickering was incarcerated for parole violations shortly after appellant=s arrest and was still serving her sentence at the time of trial.  

To obtain a new trial, (1) the newly discovered evidence must have been unknown or unavailable to the movant at the time of his trial; (2) the movant=s failure to discover or obtain the evidence must not be due to a lack of diligence; (3) the new evidence must be  admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new evidence must probably be true and be likely to bring about a different result on another trial.  Keeter v. State, No. 1057-01, 2002 WL 805770, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. May 1, 2002) (interpreting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.001 (Vernon Supp. 2002)).  The new evidence must not be based on a witness whose identity and knowledge of the case was known or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have been known before trial.  Williams v. State, 549 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Zamora v. State, 647 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1983, no pet.). 

Here, appellant admitted that he Ahad beliefs@ that Pickering would testify on his behalf, but did not ask his trial attorney to talk to her because appellant Adidn=t feel it was relevant at the time.@  Appellant alleged that at the time of trial he did not know that Mobbs was going to testify, and did not know what particular evidence Pickering could add.  But given appellant=s belief that Pickering would testify for  him and his awareness of her connection with Mobbs, appellant has failed to explain why he did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering before trial what testimony she could offer.  Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.  See Waddy v. State, 880 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref=d); Beaugh v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 369, 371, 307 S.W.2d 807, 808 (1957) (finding no diligence when defendant knew the names of witnesses before trial but did not call them because he expected State=s witness to testify differently).

Additionally, on this record, the trial court would have been within its discretion in denying the motion for failing to show that the new evidence was probably true and would likely bring about a different result.  We overrule the first issue.

                             Factual and Legal Sufficiency

In his second and third points of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient.   To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove appellant exercised care, control, and management over the cocaine and knew it was contraband. See Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Evidence that  affirmatively links the appellant to the cocaine suffices for proof that he possessed it knowingly.  Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  The connection between the accused and the contraband must be more than merely fortuitous, but the evidence need not exclude every other reasonable explanation except his guilt.  Id.  Because affirmative facts linking an accused to contraband have been identified in numerous opinions, we do not list them again here.  See, e.g., Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 830 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref=d).  

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to associate him with the powder or crack cocaine because the car was borrowed and he made no furtive movements indicating knowing possession.  But the cocaine was in plain view, was found tucked between appellant=s seat and the center console, in the area where appellant=s attention was directed before the search, and in the car appellant was driving and that he frequently borrowed.  Additionally, appellant was sweating and much more nervous than he had been during a traffic stop conducted two weeks earlier by the same officer, indicating consciousness of guilt.  We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant=s conviction.

Although the police officer=s offense report made no mention that the cocaine was found closer to the appellant=s seat, and appellant alleged he had never seen the cocaine, we may not substantially intrude on the role of the fact finder when the issues turn on  credibility determinations.  See Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  After reviewing all of the evidence, we conclude that the record does not show that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact finder=s determination, or that it is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.  See id.  We overrule appellant=s second and third points of error and affirm the judgment.

/s/        Scott Brister

Chief Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed May 23, 2002.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Anderson and Frost.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).